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This study explored potential human factors predictors of home user security intentions 
through the lens of past performance, perceived self-efficacy, and locus of control. While 
perceived self-efficacy and locus of control are elements in several organizational and individual 
security models, past performance has been less frequently studied. The variable, past 
performance, which has been referred to in other studies as prior experience, knowledge, and 
information security awareness, is usually a single question self-assessment of familiarity or 
comfort with technology. This study explores user technical prowess in further depth, using formal 
technical education, informal technical education, employment in an IT/CS field, and self-reported 
email and internet security measures as a measurement of technical ability. Security intentions 
were determined by best practices in hardware security, network security, and IoT device 
protection. 
Studying IoT security in home users is important because there are 26.6 billion devices 
connected to the Internet already, with 127 devices are being added to the network every second, 
which creates a very large attack surface if left unsecured. Unlike organizations, with dedicated IT 
departments, home users must provide their own security within their network. Instead of building 
security around the user, this research attempts to determine what human factors variables effect 
intentions to use existing security technologies. Through an online survey, home users provided 
information on their background, device usage, perceived ability to perform security behaviors, 
level of control over their environment, current security intentions, and future security intentions. 
Hierarchical linear regression, path modeling, and structural equation modeling 
determined that past performance was consistently the strongest predictor of security intentions 
for home users. Self-efficacy and locus of control had varying results among the disparate 
methods. Additionally, exposure to security concepts through the survey had an effect on user 
security intentions, as measured at the end of the survey. 
This research contributed an initial model for the effects of past performance, self-
efficacy, and locus of control on security intentions. It provided verification for existing self-
efficacy and locus of control measurements, as well as comprehensive, modular security 
intentions survey questions. Additionally, this study provided insight into the effect of 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 Thirty years after reaching the home in 1990 via  dialup connections (Zakon, n.d.), home 
broadband Internet reached 73% of the population of the United States by 2017 (Pew Research 
Center, 2017), where it has since plateaued (Pew Research Center, 2019). An additional 17% of 
Americans do not have broadband home access, but do have smartphone Internet access (Pew 
Research Center, 2019). What once required an expensive personal computer (PC) and home 
phone line for access, can now be accessed by mobile phones, tablets, and low-cost IoT devices, 
which can be purchased for as little as $6.99 (Amazon, 2020). With increased connectivity 
comes increased security and privacy risks for home users, who may not have the expertise or 
interest in securing their devices against attackers. With such a large quantity of connected 
devices, unsecured home devices pose risks not only to home users, but also to corporations, 
government entities, and national infrastructure, if attackers harness home devices into botnets to 
use them for distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks on large organizations and 
infrastructure, or use an insecure IoT device as a gateway into an otherwise protected network 
(Newman, 2018). 
1.1 Internet of Things (IoT) 
Gartner defines the Internet of Things as a “network of physical objects that contain 
embedded technology to communicate and sense or interact with their internal states or the 
external environment (Gartner, 2017).”  The government defines IoT as “the concept of 
connecting and interacting through a network with a broad array of “smart” devices, such as 
fitness trackers, cameras, door locks, thermostats, vehicles, or jet engines” (United States 
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Government Accountability Office, 2017) and offers three categories of IoT: industry, consumer, 
and public sector.  
According to the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), the  
 
 “Internet of Things envisions a self-configuring, adaptive, complex 
network that interconnects ‘things’ to the Internet through the use of standard 
communication protocols. The interconnected things have physical or virtual 
representation in the digital world, sensing/actuation capability, a 
programmability feature and are uniquely identifiable. The representation 
contains information including the thing’s identity, status, location or any other 
business, social or privately relevant information. The things offer services, with 
or without human intervention, through the exploitation of unique identification, 
data capture and communication, and actuation capability. The service is 
exploited through the use of intelligent interfaces and is made available anywhere, 
anytime, and for anything taking security into consideration (IEEE, 2015).” 
 
All listed definitions share a common trait of previously non-networked physical devices 
being connected to the Internet. The Gartner definition is overly broad, avoiding differentiation 
between computers and other objects, while the government definition is both nonspecific by 
using the term “’smart’ devices” and limiting by providing an example listing. The IEEE 
definition, while long, provides the most comprehensive definition of IoT. It seemingly excludes 
smartphones, stating that “service is exploited through the use of intelligent interfaces (IEEE, 
2015)” when many smart devices are controlled remotely through smartphone applications. More 
directly, the FTC issued a report specifically excluding desktops, laptops, tablets, and 
smartphones from the Internet of Things (Federal Trade Commission, 2015). For the purposes of 
this paper, IoT devices exclude smartphones, tablets, and computers while recognizing that those 
devices can be used to control smart devices and typically house the applications required to do 
so. Despite the government definition including industry, which implies industrial control 
systems, those are outside of the scope of this paper. Industrial control systems are controlled 
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within the context of corporate or utility and therefore should have the organizational support 
that home IoT users lack. 
IoT device vulnerability is attributable to four sources: software, hardware, network 
connectivity, and user configuration. In January of 2014, Bruce Schneier authored a prescient 
opinion piece highlighting the vulnerabilities of IoT devices, which are often unpatched, running 
older operating systems, have binary drivers, and may not have patches available, even if users 
were willing to install them (Schneier, 2014). There are significant passive attack vectors, such 
as eavesdropping, node destruction, node malfunction, node outage, and traffic analysis, as well 
as active attacks throughout the seven layers of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model 
(Butun, Osterberg, & Song, 2019). 
Attackers want control of IoT devices for three main reasons: using the device in a botnet 
to attack larger targets (Fruhlinger, 2018; Goodin, 2020), using access to the device to pivot to 
other portions of the user’s network (Goodin, 2019), and more recently, financial gain through 
demanding ransom (Balaban, 2019). Less frequently, vigilantes compromise IoT devices and 
render them useless through destruction of software or hardware, better known as “bricking” 
them, to prevent their use by attackers (Laliberte, 2019).  
As networking technology improves, the spread of IoT devices will continue, with low 
earth orbiting satellites and 5G mobile broadband expanding the availability of the Internet to 
areas that do not have broadband capability (Liberg, et al., 2019). The Internet of Things is a 
facilitator in globalization through technological interaction, whereby instant communication 
worldwide is possible and affordable (Bernard, 2020). The Cloud of Things is only as secure as 
its most insecure device, requiring participants to secure their individual devices for the security 
benefit of the herd (Brooks & McKnight, 2017). 
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1.2 Cyber Attack Lifecycle 
In order to understand security concerns for IoT devices and home networks, it is 
important to first understand the cyber attack lifecycle, which is followed by attackers, regardless 
of target. The government definition of cyberspace is: “The interdependent network of 
information technology infrastructures, that includes the Internet, telecommunications networks, 
computer systems, and embedded processors and controllers. (Department of Homeland 
Security, 2017)” Cybersecurity is “the art of protecting networks, devices, and data from 
unauthorized criminal use and the practice of ensuring confidentiality, integrity, and availability 
of information (DHS CISA, 2019).”  Information privacy is defined as “the right to have some 
control over how your personal information is collected and used (IAPP, 2020).”  
While both concepts are important, and even overlap in some places, the scope of this 
research is examining security for home users. Privacy has a separate set of considerations and 
body of literature. The most important distinction is that a user’s main influence over their 
privacy is determining how much information to share. Once a user’s information is shared, the 
privacy and security of that information is controlled by the data recipient.  
The extended definition of cybersecurity is:  
“strategy, policy, and standards regarding the security of and operations in 
cyberspace, and encompass[ing] the full range of threat reduction, vulnerability 
reduction, deterrence, international engagement, incident response, resiliency, and 
recovery policies and activities, including computer network operations, 
information assurance, law enforcement, diplomacy, military, and intelligence 
missions as they relate to the security and stability of the global information and 
communications infrastructure. (Department of Homeland Security, 2017)”  
 
The standard definition of a cyber attack is “an attempt to gain unauthorized access to system 
services, resources, or information, or an attempt to compromise system integrity (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2017),” while the extended definition is “the intentional act of attempting to 
5 
 
bypass one or more security services or controls of an information system. (Department of 
Homeland Security, 2017)” 
 
Figure 1 Cyber Attack Lifecyle (Mandiant, 2017) 
The cyber attack lifecycle consists of initial reconnaissance, initial compromise, 
establishing a foothold, privilege escalation, internal reconnaissance, lateral movement, 
maintaining presence, and completing the mission.  
Initial reconnaissance consists of collecting information on the company and/or 
employees of the company being targeted. This can be accomplished through physical methods, 
such as observing employees entering and exiting the building, dumpster diving for company 
information, and social engineering.  Digitally, reconnaissance typically consists of scanning the 
network to enumerate the hardware on the network and open ports, which may provide 
information on the function of the server or computer and possible attack vectors.  Scanning a 
network may be detected by organizations with more sophisticated security departments, so 
attacks on those organizations are performed over an extended time period with smaller data 
packets to prevent detection. 
Initial compromise is when entry into the network is first achieved by a malicious 
attacker. This may involve gaining access to a server directly, but most often involves gaining 
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access to the most insecure device on the network, which may be a computer, printer, or IoT 
device. This may be accomplished through an attack on the server directly, exploiting open ports 
or outdated software. It may also be accomplished through user compromise, such as a phishing 
attack where the user opens a malicious attachment or provides their credentials to an external 
website. For IoT devices, there are at least eight ways to penetrate the device itself (Dunlap, 
2019) and there is also the ability to intervene in the communication between the device and the 
app that controls it (Ashford, 2019). 
Establishing a foothold consists of depositing software on the infected network to provide 
a backdoor into the system.  The software allows the attacker to continue to re-access the system 
at the conclusion of their initial session. One example of establishing a foothold may be the 
creation of a user account that appears legitimate within the company, but that the attacker has 
sole control over. At this time, the attacker may also download software to assist in the next 
several steps of the attack lifecycle. 
Escalating privileges is when the attacker uses various exploits to escalate privileges from 
basic user access to elevated, administrative privileges. This may be accomplished through 
performing actions as the SYSTEM account, cracking administrative passwords, or passing 
password hashes. Typically, as part of this step, consistent with establishing a foothold, the 
attacker will build an administrator account that is named to blend in with existing accounts. 
Internal reconnaissance consists of performing reconnaissance using compromised user 
credentials or surreptitiously created credentials to determine what data exists in the network, 
where it is stored, what hardware assets are on the network, network topology, and access control 
lists for network devices and data storage. This information is recorded to speed the process of 
exploiting the network to exfiltrate target information or to gain control over particular assets. 
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Lateral movement means pivoting from the initial entry point into other parts of the 
network and to other networks through trust relationships between the networks.  For example, 
during the Target breach, attackers initially gained entry into a heating, venting, and air 
conditioning (HVAC) contractor’s computer, which was used to log in to Target contractor 
management website, from which the attacker pivoted to the point of sale (POS) system network 
for Target (Krebs, 2015).  
Maintaining presence consists of emplacing backdoors and malicious software in several 
locations, allowing the attacker to re-establish presence if their presence is discovered and 
eradicated. This may also consist of hiding malicious software within commonly used files, such 
as Microsoft Word documents and Adobe Portable Data Filler (pdf) files, to trigger the 
emplacement of another backdoor when opened. Often malicious software uses reverse shells to 
bypass network security, making it seem like the connection is originating from inside of the 
network, rather than being connected to by outside parties. 
Completing the mission can consist of exfiltrating targeted data, damaging or deleting 
targeted data, and/or damaging equipment. Most often, the attackers leave their backdoors in 
place, even when the mission is complete to prevent repeating the steps listed above should a 
new mission arise. An example is the series of attacks on Saudi oil companies. First, there was 
the Shamoon virus that deleted data and destroyed hard drives, which was followed by another 
attack using an unnamed software that may have been intended to cause an explosion (Perlroth & 
Krauss, 2018). It appears that the same attackers were behind both attacks, so the new software 
may have been implanted using backdoors emplaced during the initial attack. 
Understanding the cyber attack lifecycle is critical to hardening systems to prevent or 
disrupt an attack. This research is primarily focused on studying home user personal security 
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performance measures, to determine how best to enable them to prevent initial compromise, keep 
attackers from establishing a foothold, prevent privilege escalation, reduce internal 
reconnaissance efficacy, and prevent lateral movement within their home network. 
1.3 Organizational Cyber Security Measures 
Information assurance or defensive cyber measures in general are widely varied and can 
be divided into administrative, network level, and host level.  Administrative defensive cyber 
measures include understanding the organization’s function and how data supports it, using DNS 
reputation services, monitoring, inventorying hardware and software, establishing security 
boundaries, securing data at all times, user training, penetration testing, and having a cyber 
incident response plan (National Security Agency Information Assurance Division, 2015). 
Network mitigations include firewalls, demilitarized zones (DMZs), access control lists (ACLs) 
on routers and firewalls, virtual private networks (VPNs), segregating networks and functions, 
and honeypots (United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team, 2016). Host level 
mitigations include application whitelisting, anti-virus and anti-malware software packages, 
controlling administrative privileges, limiting workstation to workstation communication, secure 
baseline configurations, applying patches in a timely fashion, and host intrusion prevention rules 
(National Security Agency Information Assurance Division, 2015).  Additionally, a 99 page 
guide to industrial control system cyber security assessments was published in 2016 (National 
Security Agency, 2016). 
Understanding the organization’s function and how data supports it means evaluating the 
overall organization and how that data needs to move between functions. By understanding what 
data is accumulated and how it is processed, an organization can take steps to secure that data 
and ensure that it is not vulnerable to attackers. 
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Domain Name Service (DNS) reputation services inspect hyperlinks to ensure that they 
are legitimate.  This is most often offered by an outside company that provides the service to 
several organizations and is constantly updating their intelligence, on which the system is based.  
Network monitoring and monitoring logs allows for system and network administrators 
to determine the network and computer baseline. When there is an anomalous traffic pattern, the 
administrators can inspect the logs and dissect the attack or attempted attack. If it is caught early 
enough, the administrators may be able to better secure their network to prevent an attack. 
However, once inside the network, attackers often delete logs or portions of logs to obscure 
malicious activity. In the event of real-time reporting, administrators may receive so many alerts 
that malicious intrusions are masked by other alerts or may reduce altering thresholds (Critical 
Start, 2019). 
Inventorying hardware and software prevents attackers from emplacing new devices on 
the network by ensuring that administrators recognize what belongs and take action to block or 
remove that which does not. Inventorying software simplifies the application whitelisting 
process, while inventorying hardware can assist in configuring port security. Network 
administrators may also use port security to prevent new devices being added to the network 
without an administrator granting permission. 
Establishing security boundaries means determining the security levels for various 
segments of the network. For example, a business that offers free customer Wi-Fi will not want 
customers to be able to access their internal documents. In a company with trade secrets, the 
network storage location on which they are contained, will be segregated logically from the rest 
of the network to prevent intellectual property theft. On airplanes that offer WiFi access to 
10 
 
customers, the internal aircraft systems should be segregated to prevent a user from accessing 
flight controls (Higgins, 2019). 
Securing data at all times means securing data in motion as well as data at rest through 
the use of encryption. Products such as Microsoft Bitlocker encrypt the entire hard drive, so if 
the computer is stolen, the thief cannot gain access to the data without a password. Securing data 
in motion involves encryption of the conveyance, whether that is an SD card, USB drive, email 
or any other form factor for moving data. Digitally signing a document provides verification that 
it came from the sender, but no protection preventing others from reading the document, while 
encrypting the document verifies the sender and keeps the content confidential, allowing only the 
sender and recipients to read it. 
User training can expose users to possible attack vectors and through education, 
organizations may prevent some users from making security mistakes that allow an attacker 
access. User education may focus on what is contained in an acceptable use policy or may 
provide helpful tips, such as how to identify a phishing email and what to do if they receive one. 
User education may be required in an organizational environment, but there are no mechanisms 
to provide education to home users or require their compliance with best practices. 
Penetration testing may be executed by a third-party company or using an internal 
penetration tester to test the security of the network. There are red teams, also known as black 
box penetration testers, with no insider knowledge of the company, and blue teams, who are 
given access to the internal workings of the company and provide mitigation feedback. The 
purpose of this is to proactively test the network and determine security flaws and mitigate them 
prior to an attack. 
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Cyber incident response plans provide guidance for recovery from incidents such as 
disasters, breaches, or data loss. The plans provide guidance for operating in austere conditions, 
recovering data, and restoring consumer confidence. They also attempt to provide risk 
assessments concerning the likelihood of an incident and cost of recovery from it. In some cases, 
it may also include cyber insurance coverage, depending on the reliance of the company on 
online presence and customer confidence. 
Firewalls are typically the first line of defense in a defense in depth strategy and are used 
to direct and filter traffic (Bradley, 2019). A firewall is typically placed between a border router 
and the rest of the network.  The firewall usually has at least two networks behind it, a 
demilitarized zone (DMZ) network and the internal organizational network.  At a basic level, the 
firewall tries to prevent attackers from reaching the internal network, while allowing any visitors 
access to the DMZ, where public-facing servers are located.  Through the use of access control 
lists (ACLs), the firewall can block traffic from known malicious internet protocol addresses 
(IPs), as well as prevent spoofed traffic from entering the internal network with non-routable IPs 
(Rubens, 2018).  
The DMZ is a less heavily protected network, where servers, such as web servers and 
mail servers, that visitors communicate with are placed. While it is not placed directly on the 
Internet, it has minimal protections thus allowing visitors to reach the servers there. The servers 
themselves are hardened against attacks since they are less protected than those in the internal 
network. The DMZ can be set up as a side network on a single firewall, or may be configured 
with dual firewalls, requiring all traffic to pass through the DMZ to get to the internal network. 
Access control lists exist on firewalls, routers, and layer three switches, which operate at 
the transport layer of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) model.  They can be used to route 
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and filter traffic appropriately. An ACL statement is typically formatted as [action] [source] 
[destination]. The action is “allow” or “deny”, while the source and destination can be individual 
internet protocol addresses (IPs), subnets, or “any”. By default, ACLs are configured to deny 
access to any IP. Due to application from the top of the list when applying an appropriate rule, 
the ordering of the statements in the ACL is as important as having the correct statements. If the 
first statement in the ACL is “deny any any”, then no traffic will pass through that hardware, 
while if the first statement is “permit any any”, all traffic will be allowed to pass through the 
router despite any statements to restrict traffic further down in the list. ACLs can be used to 
block traffic from entire lists of IPs and ports, thus blocking malicious traffic based on where it 
originated or what protocol it is using. The downside to ACLs is that they are static, must be 
updated frequently, and minor changes can prevent network traffic from being routed 
appropriately if a statement is placed in the wrong position or if a statement is accidentally 
deleted or disabled (Franklin, 2019). 
Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) allow organizations to create encrypted tunnels, 
through which multiple physical locations can communicate through encrypted tunnels or 
employees can connect securely from remote locations. For the employee or alternate location, it 
allows full access into the internal network from outside of the organization. Encryption makes it 
harder for an attacker to intercept the data being passed between the internal and external 
location. 
Segregating networks and functions is often achieved with virtual local area networks 
(VLANs) and the appropriate access control lists to restrict traffic.  For example, in a large 
corporation, there may be three main functions: finance, manufacturing, and human resources. 
The average worker in the manufacturing department does not need access to the finance 
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department’s records and information. Using the principle of least privilege, the manufacturing 
department would be placed in a VLAN with access to only their own information. If the 
manufacturing manager needed access to a folder in the finance department, that individual may 
be granted access to only the files or folders required. With a layer three switch, each port can be 
configured for the VLAN it belongs to, allowing employees from each department to use the 
same hardware, but remain virtually segregated based on their department (Cisco, 2018). As an 
added security measure, the switch can be configured with port security to prevent a 
manufacturing employee from switching his computer to a finance VLAN port to gain access to 
their files. 
Honeypots are virtual networks that appear to be insecure, which are used to lure 
potential attackers and determine what their methods are.  While a honeypot does not actually 
prevent being attacked, it can serve as an early warning that a network is being targeted and can 
provide intelligence about the attackers to allow the internal network to be protected (Fruhlinger, 
2019). 
Application whitelisting determines what programs (by name, file type, and/or location) a 
computer will execute, rather than attempting to block known bad applications by name or 
signature (Sedgewick, Souppaya, & Scarfone, 2015). While it is time-consuming to configure, it 
is one of the most robust protections against malicious software on a computer. It can prevent 
execution by files that should not be executable, such as word documents and pdf files. Once 
configured, it remains relatively static, but in the event a program does not function properly, it 
can be configured to allow that file to execute. Properly configuring the whitelist requires clean 
computers that have not been infected with malicious software.  
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Antivirus software alone is no longer an effective protection, but developers have added a 
cloud intelligence component to their antivirus protection, allowing for real-time updates to virus 
signatures (Raghunarayan, 2018).  Additionally, there are software companies offering anti-
malware packages, which search for rootkits, ransomware, adware, and other malware. 
Advanced versions may also provide real-time detection of patterns that indicate malicious 
software, by running the file in a sandbox to observe its behavior, even if there is no signature for 
that exact file.  
Controlling administrative privileges also falls under the principle of least privilege. 
Elevated privileges should only be given to administrators and should only be used on an as 
needed basis, meaning that an administrator should log in to their unprivileged account for 
routine use and should elevate privileges as needed to perform their tasks.  There should never be 
an email account associated with a privileged user account, as email is a vector for an attacker to 
gain credentials using a phishing attack. 
Limiting workstation to workstation communication not only assists with the segregating 
of networks and functions, but also prevents a pass the hash attack, which allows for a hash of a 
user’s credentials to be used to allow access to another computer. An attacker can then pivot 
through the network using that hash, which is much more damaging if it is a hash of 
administrator credentials. 
Secure baseline configurations are used to develop a uniform secure computer image, 
which ensures that only patched, secure computers are placed on the network and allows for 
infected machines to be wiped and reloaded quickly. They are also updated with all patches up to 
the point the image was made, reducing the amount of time spent patching a computer. 
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A significant source of intrusions is unpatched software, which makes it important to 
patch operating systems and other software as soon as the patches become available. When 
software manufacturers announce patches, they are also announcing exploitable flaws that exist 
in unpatched software, providing attackers with information on how to compromise computers. 
With Windows 10 Home Edition in 2015, Microsoft made patching mandatory for home users, 
but Pro and Enterprise users either receive patches through their organization or opt-in to 
Microsoft patches (Gibbs, 2015). In an Enterprise environment, there are several options for 
centrally managing and deploying patches, rather than patching each computer individually. 
Host intrusion prevention server (HIPS) rules are centrally managed for an Enterprise 
network and are designed to blacklist malicious software and signatures. The updates are sent to 
the individual hosts, allowing for the machines to be protected even if the server goes down.  
However, one drawback to the system is that if the HIPS server rules are compromised by an 
attacker, it will be proliferated to all managed hosts in the network. Additionally, it is trivial for 
an attacker to make a minor change to malicious software, resulting in a new signature. 
While these are organizational security measures, many can be adapted to the home 
network to further the goal of reducing an attackers’ ability to compromise a user’s home 
network, establish a foothold, escalate privileges, and move laterally. Determining how to 
motivate the user to perform home equivalents of organizational security measures will reduce 
the attack footprint, thus improving collective cyber security. 
1.4 Security Concerns Specific to Home IoT Devices 
 
Given the numerous threats to their devices, home users should want to protect their 
devices and online presence, but their attempts to do so appear to be mixed, with some 
unconcerned about password security, while others attempt to follow best practices (Olmstead & 
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Smith, 2017). When searching for “home internet security best practices”, Google returns several 
websites, each of which are primarily focused traditional organizational computing (Google, 
2017). For example, 2014 NSA guidance, published by the Department of Defense Chief 
Information Officer, includes three tips out of twenty-six that are specific to home entertainment 
devices (NSA, 2014), while a subsequent report reduces the number of tips for home 
entertainment devices to two (NSA, 2016). Home entertainment devices are only one form of 
many varieties of IoT devices and are the only ones that are addressed in either report. In 2018, 
Best Practices for Keeping Your Home Network Secure, had specific “computing and 
entertainment device recommendations” (National Security Agency, 2018). Over time, the 
guidance given to home users to secure their networks has increased and incorporated more IoT 
device recommendations. 
While home users cannot be expected to have organizational level cybersecurity 
measures in place, but there are several recommendations for commonly available home user 
security precautions. CSO Online offers eight tips for securing IoT devices at home and in the 
workplace: don’t connect if you don’t need to, create a separate network, pick good passwords 
and a different password for each device, turn off Universal Plug and Play (UPnP), make sure 
you have the latest firmware, be wary of cloud services, keep personal devices out of the 
workplace, and track and assess devices (Drolet, 2016). While the last two suggestions are 
directed to organizations, they may be applied in the home user context as well. 
There are many devices that can connect to the Internet, but just because it is possible, 
does not mean that it is prudent to do so. Many smart appliances, including at least one toaster, 
were part of the Mirai botnet (Blue, 2016) that disrupted DNS on the East Coast in 2016. While 
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notifications that toast is ready are convenient, they are likely not worth the security gap created 
by having an insecure device on the network. 
Several routers offer the option of a guest network, allowing the home user to segment 
computers from other devices, as well as allowing for visitors to connect to the Internet without 
receiving access to the home network. While this is an excellent solution to segment less secure 
devices, the user must ensure that their router’s guest network still offers encryption. Having an 
open Wi-Fi network invites intruders (Hoffman, 2015), who have an easier route to the more 
secure home network once connected to the guest network. 
Picking good passwords and multiple passwords is difficult for users to do, based on 
complexity guidance, frequency of change, and the number of accounts that home users have 
across the Internet. Fortunately, password complexity and frequency of change guidance has 
been updated to encourage longer, more user-friendly passwords with no timeline for change 
requirements (Sophos, 2016). Additionally, given the potential for password sharing within a 
household to manage smart devices, users must ensure that they do not reuse a password for a 
sensitive account on their devices. It is especially important that users change their default 
username and password on their routers to prevent attackers from compromising their network, 
due to default usernames and passwords being readily available on the Internet. Password vaults 
are another security measure that could reduce the mental burden on users to remember several 
long, complex, frequently changing passwords, reducing their requirement to remember a single 
password to access the others within the vault. 
Universal Plug and Play (UPnP), allows users to quickly configure their devices to 
connect to the Internet through the router by forwarding ports (Hoffman, 2016; List, 2019). The 
main vulnerability is that anything connected to the network is deemed trustworthy and may then 
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request that port forwarding. Given the inherent vulnerability in IoT devices, an attacker could 
gain access to the IoT device and use it to open ports, allowing for an attacker to establish a 
foothold on the network. 
Having the latest firmware can reduce the vulnerability of devices on the network to 
hacking. However, not all devices have upgradeable firmware, which can leave vulnerable, 
unpatched devices on the network for years with no support. Some devices automatically check 
for updates and prompt the user to install the latest firmware, but many require the user to 
manually check for updates, either on the device or online. There are also free services that will 
perform the website check for users and email them when the page has changed. It requires the 
user to perform an initial setup, where a user must enter the website for firmware updates for 
their particular device model (VisualPing, 2017). 
Due to their minimal computing power, many IoT devices rely on cloud services to 
function, as they do not have significant onboard storage or processing power. However, by 
sending data to the cloud, the user is opening an avenue into their network, which can be 
exploited. Some devices offer encryption between the device and the controller, but it is not 
configured by default. 
Keeping personal devices out of the workplace was advice intended to protect the 
organization, but can be applied in the home network as well. When hosting visitors, keep them 
in the guest network, instead of the trusted network. Compartmentalizing trusted devices from 
untrusted will improve the security of the network, as well as protecting the data stored on 
traditional computing devices. Due to their limited security features, IoT devices should also be 
placed into the untrusted guest network, instead of the trusted network. 
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The recommendation to track and assess devices was organizational advice, however, 
home routers have the capability to do so as well. Not only can users view devices connected to 
their network, they can also restrict connectivity by media access control (MAC) address, 
preventing new devices from being introduced to the network without administrator approval, 
similar to how port security works on a corporate network’s wired routers and switches. Home 
routers also have logging capability, allowing the home network manager to monitor for 
anomalous network traffic. Additionally, home network users can configure timers in their 
routers, restricting IoT device traffic when they are home with no need to remotely manage their 
devices. 
1.5 Research Problem 
 Cybersecurity is a complex, multi-billion dollar industry for organizations, but there is 
little support for home users.  While the number of personally-owned IoT devices is increasing, 
security support for home users is not, creating a security gap that is being exploited by attackers. 
IoT devices have been used to generate malicious botnets, which have been used to disrupt the 
Internet. 
Household IoT devices are always connected to the Internet, provide little to no direct 
feedback, are infrequently monitored remotely, and consistently connected to a power source, 
making them a target for attackers to use them in botnets (Palmer, 2018). With an estimated 26.6 
billion IoT devices connected to the Internet in 2019 (Maayan, 2020), a more than fivefold 
increase from the 5.2 billion home user IoT devices connected to the Internet in 2017 (Gartner, 
2017), IoT devices have already surpassed the 3.365 billion personal computers (PCs) that were 
sold between 2006-2016 (Dunn, 2017). While PC sales have decreased between one and ten 
percent year over year since 2012, IoT device installations grew by 750 million between 2014 
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and 2015, and by 1 billion between 2015 and 2016 (Columbus, 2016), and by 21.4 billion 
between 2017 and 2019 (Gartner, 2017; Maayan, 2020). At an estimated rate of 127 devices 
connecting per second (Maayan, 2020), over 4 billion new IoT devices will be added by the end 
of 2020. 
 While many devices generate small quantities of network traffic to connect to the 
controller and to send information to the cloud, IP cameras can produce significant network 
traffic. For example, Nest recommends a minimum upload speed of 2 Mbps for their indoor and 
outdoor cameras (Nest, 2017), but bandwidth calculations for a single 5MP camera, using H.264 
encoding, streaming high quality video, at 30 fps requires 24.06 Mbps of bandwidth 
(Securitybros, 2017). One hundred thousand cameras can potentially generate 2.4 Tbps of traffic 
if aggregated and directed at a single source. The Mirai botnet attack and related attacks prior to 
it generated 620 Gbps to 1.5 Tbps of network traffic, which enabled the attackers to disrupt each 
website they targeted (Department of Homeland Security, 2016). While the most highly 
publicized incidents have been directed at civilian websites, the greatest threat from botnets are 
attacks targeting the government, military, or critical infrastructure.  
 There is no infrastructure in place, nor any federal laws or regulations requiring home 
users to secure their network or requiring manufacturers to provide security measures in their 
devices intended for home use. The IoT Cybersecurity Improvement Act of 2017, would have 
required that devices purchased for federal government use “ (1) do not contain known security 
vulnerabilities or defects; (2) rely on software or firmware components capable of accepting 
properly authenticated and trusted updates from the vendor; (3) rely only on non-deprecated 
industry-standard protocols and technologies for certain functions; and (4) do not include fixed 
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or hard-coded credentials (Warner, 2017).” The bill was not passed, but the requirements would 
have been beneficial for both federal government entities and home users. 
 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has a Cybersecurity for IoT 
Program, which “supports the development & application of standards, guidelines, and related 
tools to improve the cybersecurity of connected devices and the environments in which they are 
deployed (NIST, 2020).” Their stakeholders are government, industry, international bodies, and 
academia, with users being noticeably absent (NIST, 2020). As part of the program, NIST has 
developed two frameworks: draft recommendations for IoT manufacturers (Fagan, Megas, 
Scarfone, & Smith, 2020) and considerations for managing IoT cybersecurity and privacy risks 
(Boeckl, et al., 2019). Neither document focuses on home user security protections, with the 
former targeting manufacturers and the latter targeting the organizational cybersecurity 
workforce. California passed Assembly Bill 1906, which took effect January 1, 2020, requiring 
manufacturers to provide “a reasonable security feature or features” for connected devices, with 
a specific focus on authentication (California Assembly, 2018). 
Insecure IoT devices pose a threat not only to the home user whose network it resides on, 
but also to the organizations that are targeted by botnets. While those botnets are currently used 
to perform DDoS attacks, in the future they could be used to harness computing power for any 
number of uses, including cracking cryptographic algorithms. Studying home user’s security 
behaviors and motivations, to determine how to increase their security can reduce the number of 
unsecured devices available to attackers and improve cybersecurity for everyone. 
Home users do not typically receive security feedback from their IoT devices to 
determine whether they have been hacked or not. Encouraging users to secure their devices will 
improve the security of the Internet for everyone, because of the threat of IoT devices being used 
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in a botnet to attack larger targets. Additionally, with the option to work from home, a corporate 
or government network could be attacked through an employee’s more easily accessed home 
network. 
This study intends to explore IoT security’s relationship to locus of control, self-efficacy, 
and past performance by answering the following question: How does a user’s locus of control, 
self-efficacy, and past performance influence home IoT security intentions? This is an important 
question because there are no safeguards in place for users as there are in a corporate 
environment. Those who choose to secure their IoT devices and home networks are either 
committing to research how to secure those devices or are already familiar with cyber security 
through formal or informal education and exposure. One would also expect that they are 
confident in their ability to secure the network and their belief that the network is something that 
they can control. Exploring how those three elements interrelate can help researchers determine 
how to increase user propensity to secure their home network with existing tools and methods. 
Internal locus of control means that a person believes that they can control things within 
their environment, while external locus of control is the belief that things happen to them, which 
they do not control. Perceived self-efficacy is the belief that the person can accomplish a given 
domain-specific task. Past performance, for this study, is the measure of formal education, 
informal education, IT/CS-related employment, and self-reported internet and email security 
behaviors. 
The hypothesis for this study is: Home users’ perception of self-efficacy, increased past 
performance, and internal locus of control in computing environments will increase their 
intentions to make their home IoT environments more secure. 
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1.6 Contributions  
This study looked deeply into human factors in security intentions for home IoT users in 
the specific context of locus of control, self-efficacy, and past performance. While it was guided 
by theory, to reduce interaction effects, it focused solely on those three concepts, which appear in 
several theories, as outlined in the literature review. It also contributed a valid and reliable test 
instrument for measuring past performance, which measures respondents’ exposure to 
cybersecurity and internet and email security habits. While the Security Behavior Intentions 
Scale (SeBIS) measures individual security intentions, the SeBIS focuses on device securement, 
software updates, password management, and proactive awareness. In the IoT environment, 
those are not necessarily the priority and, in some cases, they are not possible. Additionally, the 
Human Aspects of Information Security Questionnaire (HAIS-Q) evaluates organizational user 
security behaviors. However, given the organizational context, it focuses on compliance with 
policy, rather than a personal, internal drive to protect a home network. While some of the self-
efficacy questions refer to information security policy, this study focused on home users with no 
organizational support. This instrument explores what constructs cause users to put forth the 
effort to secure their home network without any external influence or support. Understanding 
what motivates a user allows future research to focus on ways to influence human factors that 
encourage security intentions.  
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Chapter 2 Literature Review 
 
Most academic IoT-specific security research is focused on technical systemic solutions 
to IoT security.  At best, there is mention of a user role in securing the Internet of Things, but 
those references generally absolve the user of any expectations or responsibility. However, there 
is a large body of literature pertaining to organizational computer users relating to technology 
adoption, coping with threats, and user security behaviors. 
 User behaviors differ greatly in the home context from the organizational context.  
Whereas organizations have acceptable use policies and security control mechanisms, such as 
minimum password complexity or two-factor authentication requirements, home users have 
greater autonomy over their security mechanisms.  A home user may choose convenience over 
security, which can result in many insecure behaviors. For example, a home user can decide to 
leave the default administrator password on their home router, which allows any attacker to gain 
full control of their home network. They may also choose to just use the router out of the box, 
without taking advantage of available security mechanisms, such as restricting users, not 
broadcasting the SSID for passers-by to see, or not requiring any authentication to connect to the 
Wi-Fi. 
Security is also unique in that it is invisible, users of IoT devices receive no feedback 
relating to security efficacy, and even home personal computers (PCs) that don’t have updated 
security software will not provide efficacy feedback.  Organizations have various forms of 
monitoring, logging, and real-time updates in some cases, allowing system administrators 
potential early warning of intrusions. On the other hand, a home user may be breached and may 
not realize it, unless the attacker has done something noticeable, such as adjusting a Nest 
thermostat (Maher, 2019) or installing software on a computer that leaves a trace. 
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Organizations also have the benefit of dedicated security personnel, who are responsible 
for researching, installing, maintaining, and monitoring security hardware and software, while 
home users may be technological novices. Not only do home users not have access to 
organizational level software suites, but they may also receive pop-up ads offering protection, 
which may instead be malicious software. 
 Several main theories, and their derivatives, may influence user security behaviors from 
diverse fields including psychology, healthcare, and human-computer interaction.  The scope for 
this literature review is human factors research that influenced the variable selection, technology-
related studies focused on human factors in security, IoT specific studies, and user technology 
mental models. 
2.1 Psychological and Educational Theories 
Wigfield and Eccles’ (2000) Expectancy-Value theory, based on Atkinson’s motivational 
determinants of risk-taking behavior (Atkinson, 1957), includes previous achievement-related 
experiences as an influence on achievement motivation, in the context of mathematical 
achievement motivation in children. While the full theory measures many more items, the 
inclusion of past performance components allows an analysis of ability and domain-specific 
education in relation to the belief structures locus of control and self-efficacy. Past performance 
is evaluated through previous achievement-related experiences, which effect the child’s 
interpretation of experience, including locus of control. The interpretations of experience effect 
the child’s goals, including their self-concept of their abilities, which in turn drives their 
expectation of success (Wigfield & Eccles, 2000).  
Locus of control (Rotter, 1966) is part of the broader social learning theory (Rotter, 1954) 
and focuses on an individual’s perception of whether what happens to them can be controlled. 
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Those with internal locus of control feel that they have control over their circumstances and what 
happens, while those with external locus of control feel that they have little to no control over 
what happens to them and are less invested in their experiences.   
Locus of control was examined in early studies of information systems (Schneiderman, 
1979; Zmud, 1979; Simes & Sirsky, 1985; Meinert, Festervand, & Lumpkin, 1991), but 
primarily in the context of user satisfaction and human-computer interaction. Schneiderman 
(1979) and Simes and Sirsky (1985) found that locus of control effected user satisfaction with 
human-computer interaction, while Meinert, Festervand, & Lumpkin (1991) found that there was 
no statistically significant relationship between locus of control and user satisfaction.  
Self-efficacy is a construct from social cognitive theory that assesses individuals’ 
personal beliefs in their ability to complete a task (Bandura, 1977). Computer self-efficacy is the 
individuals’ perception of their ability to use a computer, and in the initial development of the 
construct, computer self-efficacy accounted for 22.5% of the variance in computer usage and 
24% of the variance in outcome expectations – performance (Compeau & Higgins, 1995).  
In later work, Bandura clarified that self-efficacy constructs should be intentional about 
being specific enough to measure the desired construct, as self-efficacy is domain specific 
(Bandura, 2006). Additionally, the work cautions to avoid conflating self-efficacy with security 
intentions, encouraging terms like “will” be reserved for intentions, while self-efficacy should 
use words like “can”. Bandura (2006) also warned that self-efficacy must be differentiated from 
locus of control, due to its focus on the respondents’ belief of whether they control their own 
outcomes or whether their outcomes are externally controlled, while self-efficacy focuses on the 
ability to perform the specific task(s). 
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2.2 Protection Motivation Theory 
 
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) is a health-based theory based on threat appraisal 
and coping-appraisal (Floyd, Prentice-Dunn, & Rogers, 2000). PMT is based on fear appeals and 
how they influence individual’s behaviors (Rogers & Deckner, 1975). It has since been updated 
to include reward and self-efficacy factors (Rogers, 1983). This theory has environmental inputs 
and intrapersonal inputs, which then go through the cognitive mediating processes, evaluating a 
maladaptive response (threat appraisal) and adaptive response (coping appraisal). With the 
addition of fear, the threat appraisal and coping appraisal determine the protection motivation.  
Based on that protection motivation, the user will then decide to perform a maladaptive response 
(not to protect their system) or an adaptive response (self-protection) (Floyd, Prentice-Dunn, & 
Rogers, 2000). 
Hanus and Wu (2016) conducted a study focused on home users (students) to determine 
the impact of users’ security awareness on desktop security behavior, viewed through a PMT 
lens. In their survey, they measured threat awareness, countermeasure awareness, perceived 
severity, perceived vulnerability, self-efficacy, response efficacy, response cost, and desktop 
security behavior and analyzed the results using partial least squares structural equation 
modeling (PLS-SEM). Threat awareness was expected to effect perceived severity and 
vulnerability, while countermeasure awareness was expected to effect self-efficacy, response 
efficacy, and response cost (Hanus & Wu, 2016). Countermeasure awareness items were Likert 
scale questions in which users self-reported their familiarity with installing system updates, 
antivirus software, firewalls, and data backup.  Self-efficacy, perceived severity, perceived 
vulnerability, response cost, and response efficacy were both independent and dependent 
variables. The path coefficient for countermeasure awareness to self-efficacy was 0.487 and for 
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self-efficacy to desktop security behavior was 0.522, with desktop security behavior having an 
R2 value of 0.461 (Hanus & Wu, 2016). 
Torten, Reaiche, & Boyle (2018) used the constructs from Hanus & Wu (2016) to study 
information security professionals, instead of students, using the same model. Their analysis was 
performed with partial least squares path modeling (PLS-PM). Countermeasure awareness still 
had a significant large effect on self-efficacy, while the R2 for self-efficacy increased to 0.317. 
The overall R2 value for desktop security behavior increased to 0.619 (Torten, Reaiche, & Boyle, 
2018). 
Woon, Tan, and Low (2005) studied home wireless security in the context of PMT. They 
measured knowledge through a quiz and then measured perceived vulnerability, perceived 
severity, response efficacy, self-efficacy, and response cost. Their study showed a high 
correlation between knowledge and self-efficacy. Self-efficacy had the highest effect on 
recommended behavior. 
Anderson & Agarwal (2010) proposed the Individual Security Motivation Model, which 
is based in PMT and proposes that there is a difference between intentions to protect one’s own 
computer and the Internet as a whole. In the paper Anderson & Agarwal briefly discuss that there 
are similarities to the theory of planned behavior and the theory of reasoned action (Anderson & 
Agarwal, 2010). The first study tested the effect of security behavior self-efficacy on attitude 
toward security-related behavior, resulting in a path coefficient of 0.32. Attitude toward security-
related behavior had a significant relationship to both intentions to perform security-related 
behavior to protect the Internet and separately to protect one’s own computer. The effect on 
intentions to perform security-related behavior (one’s own computer) was far stronger (0.61) 
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than the effect on intentions to perform security-related behavior (Internet) (0.15) (Anderson & 
Agarwal, 2010). 
Egelman and Peer (2015a) based the Security Behavior Intentions Scale (SeBIS) 
primarily on PMT. To develop the scale, they determined best practices and had users rate their 
agreement with statements. The final four constructs were device securement, password 
generation, proactive awareness, and updating (Egelman & Peer, 2015). In a follow-up 
experiment, Egelman & Peer (2015b) measured the Big Five personality traits and their effects 
on privacy preferences and behaviors, then measured decision-making psychometrics against 
privacy preferences and behaviors. Decision-making psychometrics generated a higher R2, with 
awareness having the highest R2 of 0.27 (Egelman & Peer, 2015).  
Egelman & Peer’s (2015a, 2015b) SeBIS scale was used to test the variance in cyber 
security behavior intentions based on demographics, personality traits, risk-taking preferences, 
and decision-making styles. Gender had a significant effect in passwords, awareness, and 
updating, while age and role had no effect (Gratian, Bandi, Cukier, Dykstra, & Ginther, 2018). 
Race, education, and household income were not evaluated. 
Jansen & van Schaik (2018) used a modified PMT to study precautionary online behavior 
in an online banking context. Analyzing the results using partial least squares path modeling 
(PLS-PM), response efficacy, self-efficacy, and locus of control had the highest effect on 
precautionary online behavior. Precautionary online behavior had an R2 of 0.66 with locus of 
control having a path coefficient of 0.15 and self-efficacy having a path coefficient of 0.26 
(Jansen & van Schaik, 2018).  
Tsai et al. (2016) studied security intentions from a PMT perspective. Using multiple 
regression to analyze three models, their respective adjusted R2 values were 0.29, 0.433, and 
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0.432. Self-efficacy had a slight positive B value in the first model (0.06), but a stronger negative 
B value in the second and third models (-0.10) (Tsai, et al., 2016). 
2.2.1 Fear Appeals Model 
 
Specifically, in the cybersecurity space, a fear appeals model (FAM) based on PMT has 
been proposed which focuses on autonomous users in a decentralized IT environment, a closer 
approximation to home users.  Fear appeals are designed to express a threat, then provide 
mitigation instructions and their value to the user (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). For example, 
for a home user, they could be warned about phishing attempts, then provided with a lesson on 
how to identify phishing attempts, and an explanation of how not falling victim could prevent 
their computer being compromised or their bank account being emptied. 
FAM measures perceived threat severity and perceived threat susceptibility, which in turn 
influence response efficacy and self-efficacy. According to the model, social influence is 
unrelated to threat severity, susceptibility, response efficacy, and self-efficacy, but influences 
behavioral intent. In the Johnson & Warkentin (2010) study, response efficacy and self-efficacy 
significantly influence behavioral intent. Social influence had no statistically significant 
relationship with behavioral intent or the other variables (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010).  The 
result of experimental testing showed an R2 of 0.271 and that the correlation of perceived threat 
susceptibility and response efficacy and self-efficacy (0.187) were statistically significant 
(Johnston & Warkentin, 2010). The study from which the self-efficacy questions were adapted, 
was a health study, which measured self-efficacy as ability, ease, and convenience to perform a 
prevention task (Witte, Cameron, McKeon, & Berkowitz, 1996).  




 The Health Belief Model (HBM) is derived from PMT and the Expectancy-Value theory, 
and was used to measure user security behaviors starting in 2009 (Ng, Kankanhalli, & Xu, 2009). 
In their study, Ng et al. (2009) studied how Perceived Susceptibility, Perceived Benefits, 
Perceived Barriers, Cues to Action, General Security Orientation, Self-Efficacy, Perceived 
Severity effected Computer Security Behavior. Unlike the Johnston and Warkentin (2009) study, 
there was no social element.  
 Williams, Wynn, Madupalli, Karahanna, & Duncan (2014) developed the Security Belief 
Model, which was an adapted Health Belief Model specifically geared toward information 
systems. In the study, years of computer experience, years of total experience, work in IT 
department, use PC regularly at work, have internet access at work, and position were used to 
measure computer experience and work experience. Computer experience and work experience 
were control variables, as opposed to independent variables (Williams, Wynn, Madupalli, 
Karahanna, & Duncan, 2014). The model explained 43% of variance in security behavior 
intentions, but self-efficacy was not statistically significant. 
 Another study using HBM evaluated the effect of Perceived Vulnerability, Perceived 
Severity, Perceived Benefits, Perceived Barriers, Self-Efficacy, and Cues to Action on Computer 
Security Usage with Age, Gender, Education, and Prior Experience as moderating variables 
(Claar & Johnson, 2012). Prior Experience measured frequency, recency, and severity of a 
computer security problem. Through multiple regression, the relationship of vulnerability, 
barriers, and self-efficacy to computer security usage were found to be significant. The authors 
used two different models, with the first having an R2 of 0.14 and the second an R2 of 0.304. 
 More recently, an HBM study targeted farmers and those in the agriculture business to 
evaluate the effect of perceived susceptibility, perceived severity, perceived benefits, self-
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efficacy, and cues to action on cyber security behavior, with gender, age, and education as 
moderating variables (Geil, Sagers, Spaulding, & Wolf, 2018). This differed from the Claar & 
Johnston (2012) study in that it did not use prior experience as a variable, although it did have 
items that measured whether respondents were affected by a computer security incident and the 
recency of the event. Barriers, benefits, and self-efficacy were the most influential variables.  
White (2015), in studying the effect of education and prevention on security for home 
computers, showed that education increases preventative behavior. The study also attempted to 
quantify prior experience, but in this case, that meant prior experience with security incidents, 
not prior IT or security-related experience. However, the education level of the participants and 
their exposure to security education had a positive effect on security behaviors (White G. L., 
2015). In an updated study, computer security education was added as a moderating variable on 
the effect of protective behavior (White, Ekin, & Visinescu, 2017). 
 Anwar et al. (2017) studied gender differences in cybersecurity behavior. Additionally,  
their model added computer skills and experience with cyber security practice to their model  
and determined that there were significant differences between the genders in five variables: 
computer skill, prior experience, cues to action, security self-efficacy, and self reported cyber 
security behavior (Anwar, et al., 2017). 
2.2.3 Threat Control Model 
 
The threat control model addresses locus of control and self-efficacy in predicting a 
user’s security behaviors (Workman, Bommer, & Straub, 2008). In a factor analysis of the 
model, self-efficacy, response efficacy, and locus of control were the top three influences on user 
security intentions. Locus of control had a large, significant negative effect on omissive 
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behavior: subjective, while self-efficacy had a significant negative effect on subjective omissive 
behavior and objective omissive behavior. 
2.3 Theory of Reasoned Action 
 
According to the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & Azjen, 1975), our behaviors are 
influenced by attitudes and subjective norms. Attitudes are comprised of evaluation and strength 
of a belief, while subjective norms are comprised of normative beliefs and motivation to comply. 
One critique of the theory of reasoned action is that its predictive power sharply decreases in 
situations where additional information, resources, or experience are required to complete the 
behavior (Sheppard, Hartwick, & Warshaw, 1988). Measuring past performance to determine 
user education and comfort with technology and security is intended to fill this gap. 
2.3.1 Theory of Planned Behavior 
 
The theory of planned behavior is situation dependent and examines environmental 
effects on perceived behavioral control (Ajzen, 1991). Attitude toward the behavior, subjective 
norm, and perceived behavioral control are inputs to the intention to perform a behavior and the 
actual behavior is the output (Ajzen, 1991). Subjective norms and perceived behavioral control 
consider external influence, in the case of subjective norms, and environmental factors, such as 
availability of a career path, are included in perceived behavioral control.   While an individual 
may feel strongly that they control their fate overall, they may also believe that they cannot 
complete a behavior due to other limitations.  For example, five years ago, a female military 
member may have had significant tactical proficiency and been in excellent physical shape, but 




The theory of planned behavior has a strong basis in Bandura’s self-efficacy theory and 
attempts to predict behavior from participant intention and perceived behavioral control (Ajzen, 
1991). Within the theory of planned behavior, the term perceived behavioral control is based on 
Bandura’s self-efficacy construct. The word confident was used synonymously with perception 
of self-efficacy, asserting that if intentions remained constant, a person confident that they can 
master an activity would be more likely to persevere (Ajzen, 1991). Ajzen (1991) acknowledges 
that perceived behavioral control alone may not be enough if the individual lacks sufficient 
information about the behavior. 
2.3.2 Technology Adoption Model 
 Taylor & Todd (1995) used an augmented TAM to evaluate the role of past experience in 
behavioral intention. In their study, perceived behavioral control, of which past experience is a 
component, had a path coefficient to behavioral intention of 0.50 for experienced users compared 
to 0.16 for inexperienced users (Taylor & Todd, 1995). 
 In a study of IoT users, that was focused on security deBoer et al. (2019) found that past 
performance influenced IoT usage. With use as the dependent variable, six moderating variables, 
and one dependent variable, their model was able to explain 18% of variance in IoT use. Their 
past performance equivalent, was a construct labeled IoT skills, which included mobile skills, 
information navigation skills, social skills, and creative skills, and had path coefficient of 0.38 to 
perceived ease of use and 0.21 to perceived usefulness. The effect of IoT skills on use was not 
directly tested. 
2.3.3 Technology Threat Avoidance Theory 
Liang and Xue (2009) proposed that technology adoption and threat avoidance are two 
separate phenomena, with technology adoption unable to fully explain user threat avoidance 
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behaviors. Their theory is based on cybernetic theory (Weiner, 1948), which posits that human 
behavior is self-regulated through feedback loops (Carver & Scheier, 1982). The technology 
threat avoidance theory (TTAT) is based on the positive feedback loop, whereas the technology 
adoption model is based on the negative feedback loop. When malicious software is introduced, 
the user will perform a threat appraisal, determining impacts of infection, and coping appraisal, 
which either focuses on solving the problem or changing the user’s perspective of the problem 
(Liang & Xue, 2009). In the threat appraisal context, self-efficacy is referred to as “confidence in 
taking the safeguarding measure” and influences user perceptions of the overall efficacy of 
protective measures (Liang & Xue, Avoidance of Information Technology Threats: A 
Theoretical Perspective, 2009).  When empirically tested, perceived self-efficacy had a 
significant relationship to avoidance motivation (Liang & Xue, 2010).  
Chen & Liang (2019) expanded TTAT with the addition of wishful thinking to extend 
TTAT. The study focused on coping behavior and included wishful thinking as a moderating 
variable. Self-efficacy was an independent variable, with perceived avoidability as the dependent 
variable. Self-efficacy explained 25% of the variance in perceived avoidability, had a negative 
relationship with perceived threat, a positive relationship with avoidance motivation, and a 
statistically insignificant relationship to wishful thinking (Chen & Liang, 2019).  
2.4 Knowledge Theories 
 
 The knowledge, attitude and behavior (KAB) model, also known as Information Security 
Awareness (ISA) was developed as a global model to evaluate a user’s awareness in particular 
regions, their attitude toward security, and their self-reported security behaviors (Kruger & 
Kearney, 2006).  
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Parsons, McCormac, Butavicius, Pattinson, & Jerram (2014), developed the hypothesis 
that as users’ domain specific knowledge increases, their attitude toward information security 
should also increase, which in turn should generate more risk-averse security behavior. The 
Human Aspects of Information Security Questionnaire (HAIS-Q) was designed to measure 
password management, email use, internet use, social networking site use, mobile computing, 
information handling, and incident reporting (Parsons, McCormac, Butavicius, Pattinson, & 
Jerram, 2014). Survey responses were analyzed using multiple regression and a significant 
relationship was found between knowledge of policy and procedures, attitude towards policy and 
procedures, and self-reported behavior. 
Whitty, Doodson, Creese, & Hodges (2015) focused on the effect of cyber security 
knowledge, age, locus of control, self-monitoring, lack of premeditation, urgency, sensation 
seeking, and lack of perseverance on password sharing. Participants rated their own knowledge 
on a five-point Likert scale “very unknowledgeable” to “very knowledgeable”, with 91% rating 
themselves as average or above (Whitty, Doodson, Creese, & Hodges, 2015). Age, self-
monitoring, and lack of perseverance were the only statistically significant predictors. However, 
cyber security knowledge had the highest B despite not being statistically significant. 
While not based in theory, Cain, Edwards, & Still (2018) conducted a cyber hygiene 
study evaluating the effect of knowledge on cyber hygiene behaviors. In their paper, they argue 
that self-report is a valid measure for the subject area. However, with technical measures, a user 
may think that they have performed the task sufficiently and be incorrect, such as believing they 
have a secure password when they do not (Egelman, Harbach, & Peer, 2016). However, in both 
studies users were likely to report negative security behavior. 
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The cyber hygiene study was exploratory and attempted to collect more information on 
typical security behaviors, technology usage, and social media usage. Their analysis of age 
difference determined that the oldest age group had more secure behaviors, but that there was no 
difference in other age groups. They found no differences between groups between age and 
knowledge; gender and behaviors; having been attacked and knowledge; training and behavior; 
and training and knowledge, however there were significant differences between genders’ 
knowledge. Additionally, self-proclaimed experts had less secure behaviors and less cyber 
hygiene knowledge (Cain, Edwards, & Still, 2018). 
Continuing to evaluate differences in individual users, but still within an organizational 
context, Hadlington, Popovac, Janicke, Yevseyeva, & Jones (2019) added work locus of control 
to the evaluation of ISA. Work locus of control, work identity commitment, and reconsideration 
of work commitment were all entered into the hierarchical regression simultaneously. Work 
locus of control was the only significant predictor of the three and had a large negative effect on 
ISA scores at -39.6%. (Hadlington, Popovac, Janicke, Yevseyeva, & Jones, 2019). The study 
also explored the relationship between gender and HAIS-Q scores, with women scoring 
consistently higher, but with a small effect size. 
While focused on cybersecurity professionals, Ben-Asher & Gonzalez (2015) evaluated 
the effect of domain specific knowledge on an intrusion detection task. Using skills evaluations 
for theoretical knowledge and a work history, including education, certification, and work time 
for practical knowledge, the team determined actual experience levels. There was no difference 
in performance among experts and novices and the two groups had similar levels of confidence 
in detecting an attack (Ben-Asher & Gonzalez, 2015). 
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Zimmerman & Renaud (2019) propose a shift from “human as problem” to “human as 
solution”, of which a pillar is to encourage learning and communicate and collaborate. Security 
awareness is an important aspect of this and employees are encouraged complete training in 
mixed groups across departments (Zimmerman & Renaud, 2019). 
2.5 Combined Theories 
The Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) and UTAUT2 
combined elements of TAM, TPB, and TRA to determine what had the most predictive power in 
order to be retained in the model (Venkatesh, Speier, & Morris, 2002). 
Theory of planned behavior and threat control model were combined with organizational 
narcissism to determine what factors influence organizational users’ risky security behaviors 
(Cox, 2012). Locus of control and self-efficacy were combined into Perceived Behavioral 
Control. Attitude toward behavior and subjective norms were evaluated for their effect on 
intended behavior, while perceived behavioral control was evaluated for its effect on intended 
behavior and actual behavior. Perceived self-efficacy had a high loading, while locus of control 
had a low loading (Cox, 2012). 
Herath et al. (2014) proposed combining PMT, TTAT, and TAM into a single model and 
examined implementation of email security services with that model. The experiment tested risk 
perception, email screening self-efficacy, adoption intention, and attitude (usefulness, ease of 
use, responsiveness, and privacy concern). In that study, perception of self-efficacy influenced 
the intention to adopt eAuth, an email security authentication service (Herath, et al., 2014). 
Email screening self-efficacy had a small significant effect on intention to adopt the software, 
with all of the independent variables explaining 31% of the total variance in intention to adopt. 
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Goal achievement (Batra & Ahtola, 1991) includes two categories: hedonic goals and 
utilitarian goals. Hedonic goals are achieved through enjoyment of using the device, software, or 
security measures, while utilitarian goals are achieved by the outcome of the use of the device, 
software or security measures (Batra & Ahtola, 1991). These measures of efficacy have been 
combined to attempt to measure how a user will perceive the usefulness of a product, to include 
applications for home users (Jang J. , Shin, Aum, Kim, & Kim, 2016), which combined locus of 
control with goal achievement theory. 
In information science, experiential locus of control has been divided into hedonic goals, 
utilitarian goals, and autonomy (Jang J. , Shin, Aum, Kim, & Kim, 2016). Hedonic goals refer to 
the internal motivation of users to enjoy their experience, while utilitarian motivation aligns with 
external motivation for functionality and ability to use the software or device. Autonomy has 
been explained as both system and user autonomy, with the authors hypothesizing that lower 
user autonomy positively affects the user’s external locus of control (Jang J. , Shin, Aum, Kim, 
& Kim, 2016). This study has experiential locus of control as the dependent variable, with 
variables comprising hedonic goals and utilitarian goals. 
2.6 Usable Security, Mental Models, and the Internet of Things 
 
 Challenges with securing Internet of Things devices are managing multiple devices, 
safety, understanding interaction between devices, lack of manufacturer support, and home user 
configuration of devices (Fu, et al., 2017). While most of the IoT literature attempts to solve the 
technical problems, this white paper offers suggestions for improving home user understanding 
and ability to manage their own security configurations, while also providing recommendations 
for manufacturers to make their devices easier for home users to control and configure. 
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 End users have a very different understanding of how IoT devices function and 
communicate with each other, thus making it more difficult for them to understand how to secure 
those same devices (Zeng, Mare, & Roesner, 2017). Their research focused on how users interact 
with their smart homes, their technology mental models, their threat mental models, mitigation 
strategies, multi-user interactions, and other concerns. The most important lesson from this 
research is the effect that user mental models have on their threat models and security behaviors 
(Zeng, Mare, & Roesner, 2017). By not understanding how security works, users tend to make 
bad decisions based on erroneous assumptions (Wash, 2010). In his study, Wash (2010) 
compared best practices with users’ mental models of viruses and hackers. None of the 
participants in the study could conceive of a botnet only wanting to use the computing power of 
their device to attack another computer, but that has become far more common. 
 More recently, there was a study focused on a new 6 item scale for measuring end user 
security attitudes, meant to extend SeBIS (Faklaris, Dabbish, & Hong, 2019). The 6 items are 
device-neutral and use general language to measure security, such as “I seek out opportunities to 
learn about security measures that are relevant to me (Faklaris, Dabbish, & Hong, 2019).” The 
generality allows it to be used for multiple environments, but may prevent the instrument from 
measuring the differences in technical ability based on platform. 
 Another recommendation from tangential research is for systems to be “understandable 
through study and observation (Rader & Slaker, 2017).” While the research was focused on folk 
models of sensor data collected, the lesson regarding user understandability of the data collected 
can be applied to all IoT devices, not just wearables. Smart home IoT devices provide little 
feedback to the user to allow them to understand how the device interacts with the Internet and 
home network, and what data is transmitted, stored remotely, or stored locally. 
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 Using Discrete Choice Theory, Molin, Meeuwisse, Pieters & Chorus, (2018) studied the 
relationship between technical measures, perceived security, perceived usability, utility, and 
choice. Their experiment offered three different packages with varying levels of security 
measures and has users evaluate those packages for security, user-friendliness, and asks for their 
preference (Molin, Meeuwisse, Pieters, & Chorus, 2018). There was a small negative correlation 
of -0.143 between security and usability. One limitation of this study is that the security 
measures were evaluated as packages, rather than individual items. This does not evaluate 
whether users may tolerate higher security in some technical measures, but want lower security 
in others. 
 Dhillon, Oliveira, Susarapu, & Caldeira (2016), adapted value focused thinking, based on 
Keeney’s (1992, 1999) work, to consider the relationship between information security and 
usability. The authors’ began with interviews with users to determine their priorities. Starting 
with 150 items, measuring 24 constructs, their survey and factor analysis reduced the model to 
24 items spanning 4 constructs. Of the initial items, only 12 items, measuring 2 constructs were 
included in their security-related survey . Maximize security & privacy spanned 8 items and 
maximize disaster recovery spanned 4 items. However, the final 4 constructs, maximize ease of 
use, enhance system related communication, maximize standardization and integration, and 
maximize system capability, are not directly security constructs (Dhillon, Oliveira, Sasrapu, & 
Caldeira, 2016). The study does not provide specific data on the loadings or correlations of the 
two security-related constructs.  
 Egelman, Harbach, & Peer (2016) combined survey feedback with an examination of the 
relationship between self-reported security behaviors and actual security behaviors. For 
awareness, participants were asked to identify a phishing website, of which 3.1% were 
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successful. For securement, they attempted to crack user passwords, with an 85.3% success rate. 
For updating, users participated in a survey in which they provided their user-agent string from a 
Mac. Lastly, to test securement, Android phone users were tested to see if they used a PIN, 
pattern, or slide to unlock (Egelman, Harbach, & Peer, 2016). 
 Emerging IoT research focuses heavily on providing security for both organizational and 
home contexts, but are focused on the technological aspects of security and/or privacy. 
Guomopoulos & Mavrommarti (2020) are testing a framework for pervasive computing 
applications designed to allow users to configure their smart environments. Using the end user 
development framework to amalgamate commercially available devices, they focused on user 
mental models of construction to develop a smart environment. TAM3 was the theoretical 
background, which evaluates computer self-efficacy. Interestingly, this study evaluated locus of 
control with external locus of control treated as a positive attribute, through measuring whether 
the user felt they had enough technical support to complete the task (Goumopoulos & 
Mavrommati, 2020).  
 Hochleitner et al. (2012) focused on understandable and usable interfaces, with concern 
for “psychological acceptability” in security feedback mechanisms. In order to make it easier for 
the user to perform tasks, they wanted the interface to match user mental models, as well as to 
provide feedback from the system to the user (Hochleitner, Graf, Unger, & Tscheligi, 2012). 
 Technical researchers are focusing on defining the attack surface of IoT (Rizvi, Orr, Cox, 
Ashokkumar, & Rizvi, 2020), technical vulnerabilities (Butun, Osterberg, & Song, 2019; Jurcut, 
Ranaweera, & Xu, 2020; Yang, Wu, Yin, & Zhao, 2017), and defining a new four layer 
hierarchical information security model specific to IoT (Yin, Fang, Gou, Sun, & Tian, 2020).  
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 Outside of the scope of this document, but deserving of a brief mention, are research 
studies concerning IoT privacy. IoT privacy scholars are exploring co-designing smart home 
privacy mechanisms (Yao, Basdeo, Kaushik, & Wang, 2019), making the user a part of the 
process instead of designing a system then testing it on the user later, and designing privacy-
aware internet of things applications (Perera, et al., 2020) within the construct of a privacy by 
design framework. One study monitored traffic within 3 residences to determine what private 
data was being transmitted and where, surprising the European residents with the amount of data 
that was transported outside of the GDPR area (Seymour, Kraemer, Bims, & van Kleek, 2020). 
 In an empirical study, Hsu and Lin (2016), explored the determinants of IoT service 
adoption from a network externality perspective. The study developed its measurement 
instrument from some of the same literature included here, but study measured concern for 
information privacy, with security being relegated to the data recipient, not the user (Hsu & Lin, 
2016). Kim, Park, and Choi (2017) studied the adoption of an IoT smart home service through 
the lens of the value-based adoption model. However, neither study had a security component 
and neither used locus of control, self-efficacy, or past performance. 
Other researchers have used TAM and TPB to study the effect of privacy controls, among 
other variables, on intention to use IoT devices (Guhr, Werth, Blacha, & Brietner, 2020). Zheng 
et al. (2018) studied user perceptions of smart home privacy in an exploratory, qualitative study 
that examined the users’ mental models of how their devices work, what data they collect, as 
well as their feeling about their data being exposed, privacy concerns, and whether they were 
willing to take additional steps to protect their privacy.   
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2.7 NOAH for IoT Framework (Excerpted from (Mitchell & Park, 
2017)) 
 
“While there are organizations using IoT devices on their corporate networks, this 
version of the NOAH Framework is intended to focus on the household as the unit of measure. 
The larger NOAH Framework can address organizational uses of IoT devices and would have 
the same considerations, while a household deciding to implement IoT would have far different 
considerations within the same general framework categories. 
 
              Figure 2 NOAH for IoT Framework 
IoT devices give households the ability to run many aspects of their household remotely. 
When a household is considering IoT technologies, they must consider the purpose of their 
devices. The household may need something to make it look like they are home due to frequent 
travel, remote control of thermostat settings due to an irregular schedule, or monitoring of the 
home to prevent burglary. Whatever the purpose, incorporating IoT in the home should be a 
planned process in order to establish a secure and reliable computing environment. 
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A simple example case would be that of a traveler who wants to make it appear that 
someone is home.  They have very little background in IT and want a simple deterrent.  The user 
wants to make the lights turn off and on at random times. 
Most IoT devices are designed to work out of the box, with little to no intervention from 
the user. However, management typically involves downloading an app or going to a website and 
using an account to manage the devices remotely. In a short period of time, a user with little to 
no IT experience can get their devices online and meeting their household needs. This 
functionality is important, as users are less likely to adopt technology if it is difficult or time-
consuming to configure it (Rogers E. , 1999). In our example scenario, the user has very little IT 
background, so difficult installation or multiple or complicated applications will not work for this 
user.  
Another concern within functionality are vigilante acts, such as “bricking” IoT devices, 
which will eliminate the functionality of a given device (Laliberte, 2019).  The malicious 
software (malware) does not discriminate based on the device’s function, so if a healthcare IoT 
or industrial IoT device is rendered unusable, it may have grave consequences. A pacemaker or 
insulin pump becoming inoperative can kill the device’s users, while industrial IoT devices that 
no longer function could cause power outages or water system failures. For ordinary consumer 
devices, if it happened soon after being connected to the network, the consumer may be able to 
return it for a refund, otherwise, they would have no recourse. Even if they were able to 
determine the source of the software and the person behind it lives in the United States, the dollar 
value of an IoT device would not likely be enough for law enforcement to intervene. While the 
creator of the BrickerBot malware pledged to discontinue the vigilante campaign in December 
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2017 (Mathews, 2017), Silex malware emerged in 2019 performing a similar function (Cimpanu, 
2019). 
IoT devices ship with default administrator usernames and passwords, a vulnerability 
exploited by Mirai botnet software. Attackers used IoT devices to perform DDoS attacks on 
many websites and Dyn, the company that handles domain name system (DNS) resolution for 
servers hosted on the East Coast. The largest attack made Twitter, Netflix, and other websites 
unavailable (Woolf, 2016). After the release of the source code, subsequent variants have been 
observed targeting Enterprise IoT devices (Nigam, 2019). Depending on the device, there are 
various security options, but a review of Nest thermostat installation, welcome, and set-up 
guides, offers no information on how to securely configure your device (Nest, n.d.). Security is 
only discussed is in the set-up guide in the context of knowing the Wi-Fi password. When 
establishing a Nest account, it does require a moderately strong password (minimum of eight 
characters with at least one each upper case, lower case, and special characters). Meanwhile, 
older Foscam IP cameras phone home to the company and other cameras, even when peer to peer 
(P2P) traffic is turned off in configuration settings (Krebs, 2016). Whether this is due to insecure 
coding practices or something more malicious, it highlights the lack of transparency by IoT 
manufacturers concerning their products. 
The example user would need to evaluate whether the firmware can be updated, if the 
manufacturer offers technical support, whether the device or manufacturer have had past security 
breaches, if directions are provided for a secure installation, and whether there are analog 
options, such as light timers, that can meet the user’s needs.  
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IoT devices are highly proprietary, making integration into a home network difficult 
unless a user only purchases a single brand. Otherwise, each brand has a different app to manage 
their devices (App My Home, n.d.). However, Amazon’s Alexa works with most newer IoT 
devices, allowing voice control of various IoT devices in the home. While present in the home, a 
user can centrally manage their devices, but when not physically present must use the Amazon 
app, if they have iOS, or a third-party workaround for Android (Lloyd, 2017). The example user 
would need to evaluate which devices appeal to them and what accessories may be required for 
each device. 
The cost of IoT devices limits the population that will utilize them, as well as the number 
and type of devices an individual will use. Ranging from approximately thirty to fifty dollars for 
smart lightbulbs and outlets to hundreds of dollars for thermostats and locks to thousands for a 
smart refrigerator, they are expensive to introduce and require dedicated Internet access in the 
home to function as intended (Home Depot, n.d.). Anyone who tethers Internet service through 
their cell phone provider can only utilize IoT devices when their mobile device is present and 
receiving service in the home. There are hidden costs that must be considered, such as the cost of 
mitigations, the value of the user’s time, and the difference in cost between any analog options 
and the IoT option. 
Like all other technology, IoT devices will need to be replaced. Given the lack of 
maturity in the IoT market, it is unclear how long these devices will last and what will trigger a 
need for replacement for a user. Some manufacturers claim that smart lightbulbs can last up to 
22.8 years, based on 3 hours of use per day. (Home Depot, n.d.) Based on their lifetime 
calculations, the lightbulb lasts 24,983 hours. Even if left on continuously, the lightbulb should 
last 2.85 years. Some devices have upgradeable firmware, but many others do not. If a device is 
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determined to be a security risk, a user must decide whether to replace it immediately or accept 
risk and wait until it no longer functions. Users must consider the maturity of the technology, as 
WiFi products will likely be supported long-term, while newer technologies, such as ZigBee may 
not. 
Each household is a separate organization with its own mores and standards, so NOAH 
for IoT focuses on accountability from the IoT manufacturers themselves. Many of the lower 
cost products on the market are unsupported. The manufacturers make them, but provide little in 
the way of support or software updates, leaving a user vulnerable to attackers. Devices are still 
proprietary with no standards for use of ports, configurations, user-adjustable attributes, 
maintenance, support, or responsibility when there is a vulnerability.   
Management of IoT devices in the household has an added layer of complication in that 
many of those who would procure, install, and maintain the equipment are not trained in 
information technology and even more do not fully understand cybersecurity. The management 
of devices is further complicated by the need for multiple applications, as mentioned in the New 
Technology section.  
Each household may also have different objectives. Some may want to use smart devices 
for security purposes, such as monitoring the home while away, making it appear that someone is 
there. Others may want smart devices to reduce energy consumption, allowing for monitoring 
and managing of ambient temperature and device energy utilization. Yet another group may want 
smart devices for convenience sake, with learning devices adjusting to their schedules and smart 
refrigerators providing them with a grocery list. Another possible audience would be those with 
disabilities who use smart devices to allow for independent living. Each household should 
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evaluate their needs and wants before installing a slew of smart devices that introduce 
vulnerabilities into their home network. In other words, just because something can be automated 
and connected to the Internet doesn’t mean it should be. 
The United States has a complicated patchwork of federal, state, and local laws. With the 
rise of telecommunications then Internet, geographical boundaries have been blurred. In 2018, 
the General Data Protection Regulation took effect in the European Union (Official Journal of 
the European Union, 2016). Some IoT devices are constantly listening and logging users’ 
behaviors, which raises several legal issues. Companies have navigated the legal system to 
protect themselves, although there are current challenges to a company’s duty to provide 
information on their users. So far, there has been no legal precedent to determine whether a host 
is required to notify guests that they have IoT devices in their home and that those devices may 
possibly record their image or audio. There has also been no precedent to determine what data a 
host can collect from visitors to their network or what responsibility they may have if their 
network has been hacked and a visitor’s data is compromised. However, there has been legal 
precedent allowing a company to be held liable for its product being used to commit privacy 
violations. (Sieniuc, 2016) 
Ethical standards vary by region, religion, and any other number of factors. However, IoT 
does not have any clear ethical boundaries yet. Nanny cams have become popular to watch 
visitors to a home without their knowledge. There should be clear limitations to device 
placement (no bathrooms, private changing areas, etc.), as well as a duty to warn to allow 
individuals to opt out of entering a home with cameras. With the existing insecurity of IoT 
devices, there are questions relating to a homeowner’s liability, legally and morally, if their in-
home cameras were used to monitor another individual for nefarious purposes, such as stalking 
50 
 
or finding someone in witness protection.  The vigilante botnets present further ethical concerns.  
While the individuals responsible may feel they are serving the greater good by diminishing the 
devices available to attackers, those same attackers could seize their botnet.  BrickerBot prevents 
the devices from working again, even with a factory reset, depriving an end user of the use of 
their personal property.   
Using another definition of administration, there are considerations for who will be 
managing the various hardware and software within the home. Typically, younger users are 
expected to be the IT savvy members of a household, but parents may want to monitor the same 
individuals who are likely to have the most ability to install and configure these devices. 
Depending on the number of different types of devices and different brands, a single household 
may be juggling multiple applications, hubs, and interface devices. The more complex the 
system is, the more difficult it will be for a household to manage installation, configuration, and 
security for the system. 
In this context, human resources refers primarily to whomever manages and uses the 
system. In a household, there may also be users who are non-participants in using the devices, 
such as small children and those who choose not to use them. While they are still affected by the 
choices that the users and administrators of the devices make, they do not fit within the Human 
Resources context of the framework; their issues are considered in the Administration portion of 
the framework. 
The first component of human resources is time. Time to set the devices up can be a 
predictive measure of how securely the system will be configured. The longer it takes to 
configure it, the less likely a user will securely configure it.  
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The technical education level of the person responsible for the installation will influence 
the security of the configuration. Users with higher levels of technical education will be more 
likely to attempt to securely configure their devices. Technical education includes, but is not 
limited to, online programming classes, learning to program, hands-on time with various 
hardware and software, structured degree programs, and professional certification courses. 
A user’s confidence in their technical skills may also be a deciding factor. Even those 
who have technical education may not feel comfortable with what they learned or may have 
academic knowledge, but not hands-on knowledge of how to configure devices. Those with more 
confidence are more likely to continue to work on their configuration and make it more secure. 
Delegation refers to the ability of multiple users in the household to control the devices. 
Some devices allow for multiple user accounts to manage the same devices, which is a more 
secure installation, while others link devices to a single account, requiring the household to share 
passwords. Given a user’s propensity to re-use passwords, requiring devices to be linked to a 
single account, will make the primary account holder vulnerable to other household members 
having access to their other accounts. 
Risk overlaps all areas of the framework. From a New Technology standpoint, every 
device introduces its own risks, which are difficult for a user to evaluate. Manufacturers do not 
publish the ports their devices communicate on, what information is locally stored, and what 
information traverses the router. The user manuals also do not provide information on possible 
risks or ways to reduce them. From an organization standpoint, the interaction of the devices 
with each other and with any required hubs adds to the level of risk within the system. As 
entropy increases, management becomes more difficult and users seek ways to simplify how they 
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manage their devices. From an administration standpoint, there may be some liability on the part 
of the device owner should their devices cause harm to someone else. The new Amazon Echo 
Look, has a camera that will use machine learning to increase their ability to personalize your 
experience (Barrett, 2017). Based on their stated use case, taking pictures of you to determine 
your best outfit option, the device will likely be in a bedroom. If that camera, or any others, are 
insecure and a third-party posts nudes of a visitor to the home, the owner of the insecure network 
may be liable for the damages if the visitor did not consent to being recorded. Lastly, the 
operator of the network introduces risk and non-participant members of the household are 
subject to risk. A child with an Internet-connected baby monitor may be at risk of being verbally 
abused by a complete stranger (Owens, 2016). 
Adoption is another area that overlaps the four main components of NOAH for IoT. As 
technology changes on a near constant basis, there is always a question of when to adopt and 
commit to purchasing a device. The decision-maker must weigh several factors to determine 
when and what to adopt. While one decision-maker may choose devices that don’t require a hub, 
another may already have a hub and adopt only devices that work with it. Administratively, the 
decision-maker must decide how they are going to use the technology to determine if it is worth 
adopting. Lastly, the installer will have to determine if they are able to install those devices. If 
they do not have the technological acumen to install them, the household will be unable to adopt 
the selected devices. (Mitchell & Park, 2017)” 
2.9 Related Work Summary 
 
While the concepts of locus of control and self-efficacy in information security are 
mature and present in many theories, they have not been consistent, in their significance or 
53 
 
direction. In most models listed above, they are studied in the context of threats (vulnerability, 
susceptibility, and/or severity) and other external factors, including benefits, costs, barriers, cues 
to action, and social influence. The interaction effects of these other elements may be the reason 
for the contradictory findings among studies. 
The human factors empirical studies in this section have almost exclusively focused on 
traditional computing, with the exception of Cain, Edwards, & Still (2019). The IoT empirical 
studies have focused on technical measures, instead of human factors, except for Goumopoulos 
& Mavrommati (2020), who focused on end user development for IoT usage, not security. 
Twenty-nine human factors empirical studies were evaluated, with eighteen focusing on 
individual users and eleven focusing on organizational users. They had two to nineteen 
independent variables and one to eight dependent variables. The adjusted R2 range for the 
computer security or use dependent variable was from 0.045 to 0.777. Interestingly, the model 
with the fewest variables, two independent and one dependent, had the highest R2 at 0.777. The 
analysis methods used in those studies were Partial Least Squares (Path Modeling and Structural 
Equation Modeling), regression, ANOVA, correlation, and means and t-tests. Fifteen of the 
studies evaluated self-efficacy with coefficients ranging from -0.29 to 0.565 and two that were 
not significant. Five studies included locus of control with coefficients from -0.990 to 0.15 and 
one not significant result. Past performance was included in ten studies, with a coefficient range 
of 0.185 to 0.603 on security intentions and a 0.487 to 0.563 range of effect on self-efficacy with 
three not significant results. Rhee, Kim, and Ryu’s (2009) study tested an approximation of all 
three variables in my research, but their past performance approximation measured computer 
experience and was not detailed or security specific. Additionally, the studies tested existing 
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intentions and behaviors, but none of them tested future changes that respondents intended to 
make. 
Most of the recent IoT scholarship is focused on technical solutions for privacy and 
security. While technical solutions are important, the complexity of securing disparate brands in 
a rapidly evolving space with little supply chain control, makes a single solution difficult to 
achieve. My research focuses on human factors that can be leveraged to motivate users to secure 
their devices and networks with existing, available technologies. This research focuses on why 
home users make the security choices they do, while the majority of the most recent research 
focuses on how to secure IoT. 
The role of past performance in user security behaviors is less mature, but that may be 
explained by it being known by different variable names, including past experience and 
knowledge. Given the dearth of secure IoT configuration information available on the Internet or 
in manufacturer documentation, users may not have the enough knowledge or information to 
perform the security behaviors they intend to. IoT courses and certification programs are new, 
compared to traditional cyber security, and targeted toward IT security professionals (Cert 
Nexus, 2020). Cisco introduced IoT certification courses in 2015 (Cisco, 2015), but competitors 
have since developed their own IoT curricula (Wouk, 2019). 
Locus of control appears in social learning theory, experiential locus of control, and 
threat control model.  Psychological locus of control research focuses on locus of control as the 
dependent variable to determine what shapes the individual’s internal or external locus of 
control, while much of the information systems research uses locus of control as an independent 
variable to explain users’ actions. 
55 
 
In the information systems and security field, self-efficacy presents in various forms in 
theory of planned behavior, theory of reasoned action, protection motivation theory, fear appeals 
model, goal achievement, and the combined TAM and TTAT. 
Past performance is a consideration in Expectancy-Value theory, while there are at least 
two studies attempting to quantify the role of education in security behaviors. Varying past 
performance measures appear as prior experience in the health belief model and security belief 
model, knowledge in the Knowledge Attitude Belief model, and countermeasure awareness in 
some versions of the protection motivation theory. 
 Security Intentions is known by many names throughout the various theories concerning 
information security, including security behavior intentions (Williams, Wynn, Madupalli, 
Karahanna, & Duncan, 2014), desktop security behavior, ISSP compliance behavioral intention 
(Infinedo, 2012), and avoidance behavior (Liang & Xue, Avoidance of Information Technology 
Threats: A Theoretical Perspective, 2009). 
Kritzinger & von Solms (2010) proposed an E-Awareness model, which would force 
home users to participate in cyber awareness training before being allowed to get on the Internet. 
This would place the responsibility of information security on the ISP providing Internet access, 
rather than the user (Kritzinger & von Solms, 2010). 
 Due to the inconsistency of effect of locus of control and perceived self-efficacy, along 
with the limited study of past performance, this study will focus on the effect of locus of control, 
perceived self-efficacy, and past performance on home user security intentions. The models were 
decomposed, removing any other independent variables, such as threat avoidance, coping 




Chapter 3: Research Methodology 
 
Chen and Liang (2019) used a series of vignettes to test users’ responses to placing 
themselves in computer security scenarios. Respondents answered online survey questions to 
measure the variables perceived susceptibility, perceived severity, perceived effectiveness, 
perceived costs, self-efficacy, social influence, risk tolerance, wishful thinking, and avoidance 
motivation. Egelman, Harbach, & Peer (2016) conducted a series of surveys, but also 
independently verified security behaviors through password cracking and observing how users 
secured their mobile devices. For this exploratory survey, there was no independent verification 
of security behaviors, as related to security intentions, nor were there vignettes to place 
respondents into scenarios. 
 Linear regression (Woon, Tan, & Low, 2005; Ng, Kankanhalli, & Xu, 2009; Claar & 
Johnson, 2012; Parsons, McCormac, Butavicius, Pattinson, & Jerram, 2014;Whitty, Doodson, 
Creese, & Hodges, 2015; Egelman & Peer, 2015; Tsai, et al., 2016; Geil, Sagers, Spaulding, & 
Wolf, 2017; Gratian, Bandi, Cukier, Dykstra, 2018; Hadlington, Popovac, Janicke, Yevseyeva, & 
Jones, 2019), Partial Least Squares Path Modeling (Workman, Bommer, & Straub, 2008; Rhee, 
Kim, & Ryu, 2009; Johnson & Warkentin, 2010; Cox, 2012; Chen & Liang, 2019; Hanus & Wu, 
2016; Torten, Reaiche, & Boyle, 2018; Jansen & van Schaik, 2018), and Structural Equation 
Modeling (Bulgurcu, 2010; Infinedo, 2012; Hanus & Wu, 2016; deBoer et al., 2019) were used 
to analyze the resultant data in prior studies.  
3.1 Research Design 
This survey was designed to measure locus of control, past performance, self-efficacy, 
and security intentions in IoT home users over the age of 18. Past performance was designed to 
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consider general technical measures, such as information technology/computer science (IT/CS) 
education, as well as security specific measures, such as security certifications. Self-efficacy also 
measures both technical and security specific domains. Security intentions are the network and 
device protection measures participants self-report they are currently using, as well as those they 
intend to use in the future to improve their security. Age, ethnicity, gender, household income, 
and overall education level are control variables. 
 
Figure 3 Survey Mechanics 
3.2 Participants 
Participants were recruited through Facebook, LinkedIn, and 2 email distribution lists, 
called listservers (listservs) for information management professionals, with the survey open 
February 22 through March 5, 2018. Those who received the initial invitation to participate were 
asked to pass on the link to their networks, which is a form of snowball sampling.  
As a convenience sample, participants opted-in to participate and all who did so were 
included in the survey. The target audience were IoT device owners, but those who did not own 
IoT devices were asked follow-up questions to explore their reasoning for not owning them. 
There were 528 respondents through Facebook, 98 respondents through the listservs, and 13 
respondents through LinkedIn, for a total of 639 respondents, 569 of whom completed the 
survey.  
On Facebook the research plea was posted on my personal Facebook wall, where it had 
the potential to reach 557 friends, as well as multiple Facebook groups, ranging from hundreds to 
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thousands of members. Each of the groups in Table 1 have varying degrees of affinity and 
likelihood of participation in the survey. However, there is overlap between the various groups, 
as evidenced by my membership in all of them. For example, West Point Class of 2001 has a 
membership of 703, while all members of WPW (West Point Women) Class of 2001, with a 
membership of 103, are all eligible to be members of the broader West Point Class of 2001 
group. Therefore, without completing a significant membership analysis, it is impossible to 
determine the actual reach of the research pleas posted. 
Additionally, there was no method, at the time, in Facebook to track the number of views 
of a post. It is unclear how many of the various groups’ membership saw the research plea. The 
algorithm Facebook uses to determine what each user sees on their timeline is not publicly 
available, therefore it is not possible to determine the possibility that any given member of any 
group would see the post on their own timeline. The Facebook groups and their membership 




Group Name Members 
Personal Wall 557 
African American Army Officers 9926 
WPW Class of 2001 103 
SVO at Syracuse University Social Group 83 
West Point Class of 2001 703 
West Point Forum 1338 
West Point Women 3344 
Veteran 2 Veteran Info 473751 
Army Women Officers Mentorship 9874 
Formation 22 25858 
All About Leader Self Development 139 
African American Female Army Officers 2069 
West Point African American Women 269 
Single Parent Army Officers 89 
Women's Mentorship Network 2944 
Army Signal Officer Network 1321 
USMA Careers and Networking 10664 
USMA DC '01 +/- 4 88 
An Officer and a Mommy 335 
The Officer's Club 3705 
The Unarmed Forces 1117 
Academy Women 860 
Veterans 2 Federal Government Jobs 49721 
West Point African American Army 
Officers 728 
The Legacy of the Long Gray Line 2206 
   
Total 601792 
Table 1 Facebook groups where research pleas were posted 
On LinkedIn, the research plea was posted to my personal profile, where it was expected 
to reach 577 individuals, many of whom are members of the cybersecurity community. The 
53listserv is a community of current and former Army information systems managers, while the 
Functional Area (FA) 26B listserv is a listserv of current Army information systems managers 
only. There are hundreds of members on each listserv, with the 53listserv including those who 
have left the military to work in the defense industry, as well as corporate information 
technology. However, there is significant overlap between the 26B listserv and the 53listserv, 
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with the main difference being the exclusion of former Army information systems managers on 
the 26B listserv. Some of the members of the listservs are also in the Facebook groups listed 
above and are Facebook friends. 
LinkedIn 
Group Name Members 
Contacts 577 
Cyber Security Forum Initiative - CSFI 92176 
Cyber Law and Information Security 11260 
CuseConnect - Syracuse University Students/Alumni 15604 
Global B2B Defence 19903 
Syracuse University Alumni Network 39749 
US Army 47495 
Bronze Star Medal Recipients Association 11135 
Georgia Tech Cybersecurity Leadership Program 37 
Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism 
(INSCT) 906 
Iraq War Veterans 31309 
Joint Service Academy Network - New York Metro 800 
Military Officers of the United States of America 15844 
Ringknockers 5821 
Service Academy Business Network 3436 
Signal Corps Regimental Affiliation 2935 
Syracuse University - School of Information Studies 4458 
Syracuse University iSchool Information Management 271 
US Military Tech and Comms 916 
USMA Tech 1022 
United States Military Academy (USMA) at West Point 3805 
West Point Alumni Group 3761 
West Point Association of Graduates LI Discussion 
Group 17162 
West Point Class of 2001 395 
West Point Women 875 
   
Total 331652 
Table 2 LinkedIn groups where research pleas were posted 
Response rates are difficult to determine due to the nature of the sampling methodology. 
Facebook, LinkedIn, and the listservs do not provide information on who has seen the research 
plea, unless the people who viewed it choose to leave an attributable response, such as a reaction 
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(like, love, etc.), a comment, or chose to share it. To improve response rates, I shared the 
information publicly, allowing anyone on Facebook to view the research plea and allowing those 
in my friends list to share it without requiring additional interaction, such as commenting or 
sending a message. Because it is a snowball sample as well, it is difficult to view all shares, 
depending on the methodology the sharer uses. For example, on Facebook, the sharer can share 
through Facebook Messenger, where the share would no longer be traceable. Individuals may 
also copy and paste the link once they enter the survey and send it out from there, preventing 
tracing the number of potential participants who have seen the plea. 
 Traditional response rate calculations cannot be accurately applied in this scenario, as 
there is no way to measure the number of people who were exposed to the survey appeal. Users 
may not have read the email that was sent out over the two listservs, members of groups may not 
have read the appeal posted within those groups, and those who are linked to me on social media 
may not have received the appeal in their feeds.  
 Typically, snowball sampling is reserved for hard to reach populations, where you start 
with members of the population, who then provide contact information for others meeting the 
same criteria. The challenge with home users is that there is no central organization through 
which to arrange the survey. Traditional mail-in surveys are time-consuming and expensive, 
while not guaranteeing that those contacted are in the targeted audience of home users.  
 The LinkedIn response rate was low compared with that of Facebook and the two 
listservs. While a case can be made that LinkedIn is not used as much, that would likely not 
account for such a sharp drop in participants. Revisiting the post determined that instead of 
hyperlinking the survey in the preview window at the bottom of the post, the platform 
hyperlinked the syr.edu website from my email address. Anyone who clicked at the bottom of 
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the post, instead of clicking on the specific survey hyperlink in the main body of the post, was 
redirected to the syr.edu main page, from which there was no way to navigate to the survey, 
which was hosted on an entirely different website. While I received no feedback from users 
concerning this problem, I have many contacts that are on both LinkedIn and Facebook and I 
assume that those who are on both platforms chose to use the Facebook survey link instead. 
3.3 Variables   
 The following charts show which questions tested each variable. Not every participant 
received each question, as some questions are situation dependent.  For example, if a user 
responds “no” to question 11, asking if they have any formal education, they will not view 
questions 13, 14, 15, 16, or 19, which are designed to measure the amount and types of formal 
education they have. Some questions were also mutually exclusive, such as questions 49 and 50. 
Answering “yes” to question 48, concerning whether the user planned to make any changes to 
their security settings, directed the user to question 49, while answering “no” directed the user to 
question 50. Answers to question 50 were then used to determine why the respondent was not 
planning to make any security changes. Question 51 asked what IoT device changes the user 
planned to make, regardless of their answer to Question 48. 
There were no users under 18, but the survey was designed to eliminate them if they 
answered under 18 to age range question. Those who did not own IoT devices provided 
demographic information, then were directed to alternate questions concerning their 
consideration of IoT devices and reasoning for not incorporating them into their home network. 
The alternate questions did not have any bearing on the measured variables, but were collected 
for exploratory purposes to determine the course of future research concerning non-adopters. The 
alternate questions are not included in the tables below that map survey questions to variables. 
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PP1 Q12,18 Informal IT Education 
PP2 Q11,13,14,15,16,19 Formal IT Education 
PP3 Q17 Job in IT/CS-related field/work on computers1 
PP4 Q20 
What kinds of devices are connected to the Internet in your 
home? 
PP5 Q21 
Approximately how many IoT devices do you have in your 
home? (Excludes computers and smartphones) 
PP6 Q22 
Do you own your router or is it provided by your Internet 
provider?: personally owned, Internet provider owned, other 
PP7 Q23 Did you set up your router yourself?: yes, no 
PP8 Q24 
Have you logged in to the router provided by your Internet 
provider?: yes, no 
PP9 Q25 
Who set up your router?: someone else who resides in the 
home; commercial third party, i.e.. Geek Squad; No one, it 
worked out of the box; Other 
PP10 Q26 
Do you know how to log in to the Internet provider-owned 
router? 
PP11 Q27 What do you do on the Internet? 
PP12 Q28 Approximately how many online accounts do you have?  
PP13 Q29 Approximately how many unique passwords do you have? 
PP14 Q30 
When using the Internet, do you: check for encryption when 
performing secure transactions, use strong passwords, use the 
same password on multiple sites, use a password vault, check 
the reputation of shopping sites, log out of secure sites when 
finished, close the browser when finished with a secure site?: 
always...never 
PP15 Q31 
When checking email, do you: open emails from people you 
don't know, open attachments from people you don't know, 
click on links in emails, use digital signatures/encryption, log 
out when finished, close the browser when finished?: 
always...never 
Table 3 Past Performance Questions 
 The questions listed above in Table 3 are designed to determine the respondent’s past 
performance. The questions attempt to determine technical and security ability in a meaningful 
way. Previous studies have attempted to quantify past performance as knowledge (Cain, 
 
1 Adapted from White, et al. (2017). 
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Edwards, & Still, 2018; Ben-Asher & Gonzalez, 2015; Whitty, Doodson, Creese, & Hodges, 
2015; Hadlington, Popovac, Janicke, Yevseyeva, & Jones, 2019; Gratian, Bandi, Cukier, 
Dykstra, & Ginther, 2018) or prior experience (Taylor & Todd, 1995) with measurements such 
as length of computer experience or knowledge of specific security tasks. This study explored 
several different options for constitution of knowledge. Formal education measured high school 
and below classes, college classes, certifications, degrees, and recency of degrees or certificates. 
Informal education determined whether respondents learned from friends/relatives, looking up 
solutions to IT problems, reading books related to IT/CS, hands-on tinkering, self-taught 
programming, and an option to provide a free text “other” answer.  
Locus of Control 
Item Question Measure Adapted from: 
LOC1 Q38 
Keeping my home network safe is: beyond 
my control…within my control 
Workman, et al. (2008), who 
adapted from Rotter (1971) 




I believe that it is within my control to 
protect myself from information security 
violations at home: disagree…agree 
LOC3  Q40 
The primary responsibility for protecting 
my home network belongs to: my Internet 
provider…myself 
LOC4 Q41 
Taking necessary security measures is 
entirely under my control: disagree…agree 
Tsai, et al. (2016), but listed 
as a self-efficacy measure 
Table 4 Locus of Control Questions 
 The locus of control questions in Figure 7 were adapted from Workman, et al. (2008) and 
Tsai, et al. (2016), as were the self-efficacy questions in Figure 8. The locus of control questions 
tested whether the respondents had an external or internal locus of control, with internal scoring 
highest on the Likert scale. The self-efficacy questions measured whether the respondents were 
confident in their ability to protect their home network, implement preventative security 
measures, and stop information security violations. Additionally, question 45 measured anxiety 




Item Question Measure Adapted from: 
SEFF1 Q42 
I feel comfortable taking measures to 
protect my home network: disagree…agree 
Tsai, et al. (2016), who 
adapted from Anderson and 
Agarwal (2010) 
SEFF2 Q43 
I have the resources and the knowledge to 
protect my home network: disagree…agree 
SEFF3 Q44 
Protecting my home network is: 
hard…easy 
SEFF4 Q45 
I feel nervous when I think about online 
security issues: agree…disagree 
SEFF5 Q46 
I have the skills to implement preventative 
measures to keep stop people damaging 
my home network: disagree…agree 
Workman, et al. (2008), who 
adapted from Rotter (1971) 
and modified according to 
Compeau and Higgins (1995) 
guidelines 
SEFF6 Q47 
My skills to stop information security 
violations on my home network are: 
inadequate…adequate 
Table 5 Self-Efficacy Questions 
 Security intentions (existing) were measured by security software, network protection 
measures, and IoT device protection measures. Each question provided a list of potential security 
measures for its respective domain that were adapted from best practices (NSA, 2014; National 
Security Agency Information Assurance Division, 2015a; National Security Agency Information 
Assurance Division, 2015b). 
Security Intentions (Existing) 
Item Question Measure 
SINTEX1 Q33 
Which of the following security software do you 
use? 
SINTEX2 Q34 
Which of the following network protection 
methods do you use? 
SINTEX3 Q35 
Which of the following IoT device protection 
measures do you use? 
Table 6 Security Intentions (Existing) Questions 
 Security intentions (future) questions shown in Figure 10 were partially adapted from 
Tsai et al. (2016) and Liang & Xue (2010), with the remaining measures based on best practices 
(NSA, 2014; National Security Agency Information Assurance Division, 2015a; National 
Security Agency Information Assurance Division, 2015b). 
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Security Intentions (Future) 
Item Question Measure Adapted from: 
SINTF1 Q49 
Thinking of your future actions, indicate the degree to 
which you agree or disagree with the following statements 
regarding your likelihood of implementing security 
measures to protect your home network. 
Tsai, et al. (2016), 
who adapted from 
Anderson and 
Agarwal (2010), 
Liang and Xue 
(2010)  
1. I am likely to take security measures to protect the 
Internet. 
2. I will upgrade my security measures to protect myself 
better online. 
3. I will change my passwords more often. 
4. I will use passwords that are harder to guess. 
5. I will change my browser security settings to a higher 
level. 
6. I will learn how to be more secure online. 






















8. I will not use default passwords. 
9. I will limit connections to my router by MAC address. 
10. I will use WEP encryption 
11. I will use WPA2 encryption. 
12. I will limit the number of connections to my router. 
13. I will change the WiFi password to a mix of letters, 
numbers, and special characters. 
14. I will change the IP address range and default gateway 
to random numbers (avoiding .1, .100, and .254). 
15. I will turn off remote router management. 
16. Other 
SINTF2 Q51 
In the future, I plan to make the following IoT device 
changes: 
1. Buy only devices with upgradeable firmware. 
2. Place IoT devices on a separate guest network. 
3. Replace insecure IoT devices, even if they are still 
functional. 
4. Check for firmware updates regularly. 
5. Update firmware when available. 
6. Review router logs. 
7. Use encryption when available. 
8. Check shodan.io to see if any of my devices are 
vulnerable. 
9. Find other alternatives for devices that don't need to 
connect to the Internet. 
10. Other 
Table 7 Security Intentions (Future) Questions 
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 The survey was piloted to ensure that the language was understandable for participants. 
While there are some technical questions regarding security measures in the test, explanations 
and examples were provided for those questions.  
3.4 Data Processing 
 
 There were 639 total respondents, of whom 569 completed the survey, for a completion 
percentage of 89.05%. Columns included start date and end date, from which the completion 
time was calculated. Start date, end date, and recorded date were deleted from the processed data 
set, while completion time was retained. Empty columns, such as Recipient Last Name, 
Recipient First Name, Recipient Email, and External Reference were all deleted. Additionally, 
columns containing identifying information, such as latitude, longitude, and IP address were 
deleted to protect the confidentiality of participants. The distribution and user language columns 
were deleted as all of the answers were “anonymous” and “EN” respectively. The 15 digit 
response ID was replaced with a sequential Participant ID, providing each response with a 
number from 1 to 639.  
Those who did not complete the survey were removed from the results by filtering on 
completion percentage, keeping only results with a value of 100. Having a value of 100 does not 
mean that all questions are answered, but does mean that the respondent clicked through the 
entire survey through the last question. On this survey, the only questions that were required 
were the survey consent and the selection of an age, to ensure that no one under the age of 18 
could participate. 
 For questions with checkboxes, the responses were provided in a single column, with 
commas separating the values. While using checkboxes provided greater fidelity in fewer overall 
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survey questions, using the information required breaking the comma separated values into 
usable information. Each check was assigned a value from 1 to 14, depending on the number of 
options available on each question. An equal number of columns were created to hold a value for 
each possible answer. For a smaller subset of questions, an additional column was added to total 
the values in each separate column. For the majority of questions, the value in each column was 
binary, with a 1 for yes and 0 for no. However, for one question, the responses were weighted 
based on the increasing difficulty to attain the education listed. 
For checkbox questions with 9 or fewer options, no additional substitution was required. 
However, for questions with 10 options, using Excel to separate out each number caused issues 
with the formulas used to do so. In that case, I used find and replace to change all instances of 
the number 10 to roman numeral X. Two questions had 14 options, at which point changing all 
answers to the letters A through O in reverse sequential order prevented inadvertent changes, 
such as 14 being changed to 1D, when attempting to change the number 4 to D had the changes 
been made in sequential order. 
Once the data was transformed in a way that it could be processed, I used the if, iserror, 
and find functions of Excel to divide the checkbox questions into their individual answers. The 
command “=IF(ISERROR(FIND("1",G2)),0,1)” instructs Excel to look in cell G2 for the number 
one and if it is present, to place a one in the cell in which the formula appears. If it is not present, 
Excel will place a zero in that cell.  
Likert items were auto-numbered using Qualtrics. However, they were not always auto-
numbered in 1-5 or 1-7 order. Some of the questions were sequentially numbered 8-14, 15-21, 
18-24, 20-26, or 22-28. When cleaning the data, those answers were changed back to 1-7, using 
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find and replace in Excel. Inexplicably, question 47 was auto-numbered 1-5,11,12, requiring 11 
to be re-coded as 6, 12 to be re-coded as 7, etc. 
For questions that were negatively worded, the answers were reverse-coded to ensure that 
the responses are positive and on the same scale as those items that were positively worded. 
Questions thirty and thirty-one would have typically had some elements reversed based on the 
wording of the question. However, the answer scale was reversed and went from Always to 
Never instead of Never to Always, so the positively worded questions were reversed, while the 
negatively worded questions were not. 
Processing the Excel spreadsheet for import into SPSS was a three step process. First, all 
columns that were calculated were copied and pasted back into place as a number. Then, 
columns that held multiple answers separated by commas and text boxes were deleted, as they 
were irrelevant to the numerical analysis. For reverse coded questions, the original columns were 
also deleted. 
3.5 Analysis Methods 
 Prior to conducting analysis, the data was processed, as described above and imported 
into SPSS 26 and Intellectus statistics for analysis. Descriptive statistics were run on a per 
question basis, in order to ensure all data is within appropriate parameters, as well as to illustrate 
trends by question. Means and standard deviations are provided for continuous data, while 
frequencies and percentages are used for categorical data. In some cases, categorical data is 
converted to and analyzed as continuous data. 
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3.5.1 Validity and Reliability  
Exploratory factor analysis can be used to determine the influence of each question on 
user security intentions (Fabrigar & Wegener, 2012). This allows for the questions with low 
loadings to be excluded and focus on the influence of those that have the most impact.  
 
Figure 4 Initial Analysis Diagram 
 While locus of control and self-efficacy questions are primarily adapted from prior 
studies, past performance only had one question from a prior study and security intentions had 
six items from a prior study out of twenty-six. In order to test the correlation to various past 
performance factors, there are a significant number of questions relating to the participant’s 
formal education, informal education, and Internet security habits. Those that had the least effect 
on the participant’s security intentions were removed from consideration, thus providing a 
smaller pool of questions to be used in future studies and in the analysis of this study. 
Additionally, the questions were on different scales and had to be analyzed individually rather 
than as a combined variable. 
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3.5.2 Multiple Hierarchical Linear Regression 
 In order to examine the research question, five multiple hierarchical linear regressions 
will be conducted to determine the effects of locus of control, perceived self-efficacy, and past 
performance on home user security intentions. Five analyses are appropriate because there are 
five items measuring security intentions, each on different scales. Multiple linear regression was 
selected to assess the relationship among nominal, ordinal, or continuous predictor variables on a 
continuous criterion variable. For this study, the independent variables are locus of control, 
perceived self-efficacy, and past performance, with security intentions as the dependent variable.  
Research Question: Do locus of control, perceived self-efficacy, and past performance predict 
security intentions? 
H0: Locus of control, perceived self-efficacy, and past performance do not predict security 
intentions. 
H1: Locus of control, perceived self-efficacy, and past performance predict security intentions 
(existing) security software usage. 
H2: Locus of control, perceived self-efficacy, and past performance predict security intentions 
(existing) network protection measures. 
H3: Locus of control, perceived self-efficacy, and past performance predict security intentions 
(existing) IoT protection measures. 
H4: Locus of control, perceived self-efficacy, and past performance predict security intentions 
(future) security changes. 
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H5: Locus of control, perceived self-efficacy, and past performance predict security intentions 
(future) IoT protection changes. 
Past performance is based on six items on the survey. Due to the items being scored on 
different scales, the individual questions for questions 13, 15, 17(reversed), and 18, were used as 
predictors, while questions 30 and 31 are both Likert scale questions on the same scale and were 
combined into a single variable. Question 13 measured formal education and is categorical. 
Question 15 measures progressive information technology and security education through 
measuring weighted certification counts. Question 17 is also ordinal with participants measured 
on how much IT/CS is required in their job, if they have had an IT/CS-related job in the last 
three years, or do not have a job that requires IT. Question 18 is also a categorical variable, 
measuring informal education, which was a count of the number of answers selected. Mean 
scores for questions 30 and 31 were also used as predictors to measure past performance. 
Locus of control is a continuous variable calculated by the mean score of four Likert 
scale survey questions (Questions 38-41). Perceived self-efficacy is also a continuous variable 
and will be calculated from the mean of six survey questions (Questions 42-47). For the multiple 
linear regression, the security intentions dependent variable was first divided into existing and 
future. The security intentions (existing) dependent variable was further separated into security 
software (Q33), network protection (Q34), and IoT protection (Q35). Security intentions (future) 
was divided into changes (Q49) and IoT changes (Q51). Question 33 was measured as a count of 
number of types of security software self-reported by the user. Question 34 and 35 will also be 
counts of types of network protection measures and IoT device protection measures respectively. 
Security intentions (future) was measured by a mean score of responses to question 49 and a 
count of IoT device protection types in Question 51. The number of respondents who answered 
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question 49 were greatly reduced, because only respondents who answered yes to question 48, 
which asked whether they intended to make changes, were shown question 49. All respondents 
were shown question 49, which asked what IoT changes they intended to make. 
To ensure validity of the model, the assumptions of normality of residuals, 
homoscedasticity of residuals, absence of multicollinearity, and lack of outliers will be assessed. 
Normality of residuals assumes that residuals of the regression model follow a normal 
distribution. A Q-Q scatterplot of the residuals tested for normality (DeCarlo, 1997; Bates, 
Machler, Bolker, & Walker, 2015; Field, 2013). The assumption of homoscedasticity of residuals 
is that there is no relationship between the residuals and the fitted values, which will be 
examined with a scatterplot of the residuals and the fitted values (Bates, Machler, Bolker, & 
Walker, 2015; Field, 2013; Osborne & Waters, 2002). The absence of multicollinearity was 
assessed using variance inflation factors (VIF), where values over 10 would have suggested the 
presence of multicollinearity (Menard, 2009). Lastly, lack of outliers will be determined by a 
studentized residual that exceeds the .999 quantile of a t-distribution with n-1 degrees of freedom 
(Field, 2013; Stevens, 2009). 
The hypothesis was tested using hierarchical multiple linear regression, where predictors 
were added in sequence to understand the effect that each independent variable has on each 
dependent variable being measured. They were evaluated to determine their predictive value. 
The F-test was used to determine whether the independent variables predicted the dependent 
variable. R-squared was reported to determine the amount of variance in the dependent variable 
can be accounted for by the independent variables. The t-test will determine the significance of 




3.5.3 Partial Least Squares – Path Modeling 
 
 For partial least squares path modeling (PLS-PM), the research question remains the 
same, but the hypotheses are slightly different. Due to the ability of PLS-PM to aggregate the 
dependent variables into latent variables, the dependent variable is only divided into security 
intentions existing and future variables. 
Research Question: Do locus of control, perceived self-efficacy, and past performance effect 
security intentions? 
H0: Locus of control, perceived self-efficacy, and past performance do not effect security 
intentions. 
H6: Locus of control, perceived self-efficacy, and past performance effect security intentions 
(existing). 
H7: Locus of control, perceived self-efficacy, and past performance effect security intentions 
(future). 
 As a non-parametric test, PLS-PM does not assume normality of distribution and does not 
require any assumption tests. 
 The data was evaluated by a measurement (outer) model and a structural (inner) model. 
For the outer model, validity was tested based on whether the construct was reflective or 
formative.  For reflective factors, loadings and communalities, unidimensionality of indicators, 
crossloadings and bootstrapped loadings were explored. A Cronbach’s alpha and Dustin-
Goldstein rho above 0.7 were considered unidimensional. The loading and communalities were 
examined to determine if at least 50% of variance can be explained, with loadings greater than or 
equal to 0.707 and communalities greater than or equal to 0.50. Crossloadings exist when an 
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indicator variable has a higher loading on a different latent variable. Significance of bootstrapped 
loadings were determined with a 95% confidence interval. 
 Multicollinearity and bootstrapped weights were evaluated for formative indicators. A 
variance inflation factor (VIF) over ten would indicate multicollinearity in the model (Menard, 
2009). Bootstrapped weights for formative indicators were also determined with a 95% 
confidence interval. 
 The R2 value, average variance extracted (AVE), goodness of fit index (GoF), and 
bootstrapped regression coefficients were examined for the structural model. Endogenous latent 
variables were examined to determine if at least 20% of their variance was explained by each 
independent variable. Each reflective indicator was evaluated to determine if it had an AVE 
greater than or equal to 0.50.  
3.5.4 Structural Equation Modeling 
 
 Structural equation modeling (SEM) tests whether the latent variables, security intentions 
(existing) and security intentions (future) are adequately described by past performance, locus of 
control, and self-efficacy. The research question and hypotheses remain the same as PLS-PM. 
Research Question: Do past performance, locus of control, and self-efficacy effect security 
intentions? 
H0: Past performance, locus of control, and self-efficacy do not effect security intentions. 
H6: Locus of control, perceived self-efficacy, and past performance effect security intentions 
(existing). 




 The assumptions of multivariate normality, outliers, and absence of multicollinearity 
were tested. Multivariate normality assumes that each linear combination of variables follows a 
univariate normal distribution, which was tested by plotting Mahalanobis distances and 
comparing them to a Chi-square distribution (Field, 2013). An outlier is a Mahalanobis distance 
exceeding the 0.999 quantile of the Chi-square distribution (Kline, 2015). Multicollinearity was 
tested by calculating the R2 values of the variables and creating a correlation matrix of the 
variables. An R2 exceeding 0.90 would be considered high collinearity (Kline, 2015), as would a 
determinant of the correlation matrix of less than 0.00001 (Field, 2013). 
 The model was evaluated using the Chi-square goodness of fit test, model fit, and 
examining the R2 values between indicator variables and their latent variables (Hooper, 
Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008). The model was considered a good fit if there was a non-significant 
Chi-square result at a significance level of 0.05. Additionally, root mean square error of 
approximation (RMSEA), comparative fit index (CFI), Tucker-Lewis index (TLI), and 
standardized root mean square residual (SRMR). An RMSEA less than 0.10 was considered 
adequate and less than 0.08 was considered an excellent fit; a CFI value above 0.90 was 
considered an acceptable fit and greater than 0.95 was considered a good fit; a TLI value 
exceeding 0.95 was considered an excellent fit; and an SRMR less than 0.08 was considered 
adequate and below 0.05 was excellent (Hooper, Coughlan, & Mullen, 2008). An R2 below 0.20 
was indicative of possibly not describing the latent construct and was considered for removal. 
 For subsequent regressions, the unstandardized estimate was used as the Beta coefficient, 
while the z statistic and p-value were used to determine the significance of the direct effect. 
Mediation was then assessed by evaluating direct, indirect, and total effects.  
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Chapter 4 Survey Results 
 From February 22, 2018 to March 5, 2018, a 52 question survey measuring locus of 
control, perceived self-efficacy, past performance, and security intentions, was conducted via 
Qualtrics, an online survey platform, with a total of 637 respondents, of whom 569 completed 
the survey, for an 89.32% completion rate. The survey utilized a snowball sampling 
methodology, resulting in this method of calculating completion rate. While one would typically 
measure completion rate by the number of participants who completed the survey divided by 
those identified to participate in the survey, that calculation is impossible in this situation for the 
reasons listed below. 
Due to the limitations of social media and emails sent to list servers, there is no way of 
definitively quantifying the number of potential participants who viewed the research plea. At 
the time of this survey, Facebook did not show analytics concerning the number of people who 
viewed a post. Additionally, when an email is sent to a list server, it is sent to a central email 
address. Once the central email address receives the email, it sends it to member email addresses 
based on their delivery preferences. There was no way to request a read or delivery receipt and 
notices that an email is invalid would have been sent to the listserv email address, not the 
message originator’s email address. For the 53listserv, available options are receiving each email 
as it is sent or receiving a daily digest of all emails that were sent that day. Either way, even if a 
user received the email, it may not have been viewed depending on whether they opened it, or in 
the case of an email digest, whether they read the email in its entirety. 
The user survey collected a wide variety of variables to understand what affects user IoT 
security intentions. The research question asked: How does user locus of control, self-efficacy, 
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and past performance in security measures influence home security intentions? My hypothesis 
was that internal locus of control, higher perceived self-efficacy, and higher past performance 
would result in increased security intentions.  
 In this section, the results for each question are reported for all participants who 
completed the survey. Survey results from those who did not finish are not included in this 
section. 
4.1 Respondents by Source 
 
The research plea was posted to Facebook and LinkedIn, as well as emailed out to two 
list servers based on Information Systems Management affinity groups. The results can be seen 
in Figure 10. The Facebook research plea produced the most respondents, with 528, of whom 
464 completed the survey, for a completion rate of 87.88%. The email plea resulted in far fewer 
respondents with 98, of whom 93 completed the survey, for a completion rate of 94.90%. 
LinkedIn produced the fewest respondents, with 13, of whom 12 completed the survey, for a 
completion rate of 92.31%.  
 Of the three sources, Facebook provided the most value, despite having the lowest 
completion rate. Email had the highest completion rate, likely because the targeted respondents 
have an affinity for information security, as that is, or was previously, their primary occupation. 
LinkedIn had a high completion rate, but a low participation rate of 2.03%, providing 13 out of a 
total of 639 participants. 
LinkedIn had a low participation rate, which may have been due to a technical limitation 
how hyperlinks are treated in their posts. The research pleas were nearly identical across all 
platforms, with only the name of the platform and universal resource locator (URL) changed 
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based on the platform the plea was shared on. The survey link was approximately halfway 
through the post and I included my syr.edu email address, as the point of contact, near the end of 
the post. Facebook allowed for users to click on the link and go directly to the survey. The email 
had the hyperlink in the body, allowing users to go straight to the survey. However, LinkedIn 
instead provided a clickable link to the Syracuse University main website, http://www.syr.edu, 
based on the included contact email address, rather than the survey hyperlink. The 13 people 
who attempted the survey had to copy and paste the link into their browser to complete the 
survey, rather than clicking the hyperlink. 
4.2 Demographics 
The demographic items collected for the survey instrument were age, education level, 
ethnicity, household income, and gender. The available options, as well as method of input are 
listed below in Table 8. 
Demographics Variables 
Variable Options Input 
Age 





<High School, High School Graduate, Some 




White, Black or African American, American Indian 





<$10K, $10-19,999, $20-29,999, $30-39,999, $40-
49,999, $50-59,999, $60-69,999, $70-79,999, $80-
89,999, $90-99,999, $100-149,999, $150K+ 
Radio button 
Gender Male, Female, Nonbinary Radio button 
Table 8 Demographics Variables 
Ethnicity was the only question that allowed for multiple inputs via checkbox. All other 
questions required the selection of a single answer. In post hoc processing, those who selected 
multiple races were reassigned a code of 7 for multi-racial for analysis. 
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Household income was collected in $10,000 increments, up to $150,000. Household 
income was used instead of individual income because Internet of Things devices tend to be a 
household purchase, as opposed to an individual purchase. While there are some exceptions, 
such as video game consoles, many IoT devices are intended for household usage, such as 
Amazon Echos, smart doorbells, and cameras.  
A nonbinary option was included in gender, resulting in four respondents who identified 
as nonbinary and an additional four respondents that left gender blank while answering all other 
demographic questions. Based on a population estimate that 0.6% of the population is 
transgender (Flores, Herman, Gates, & Brown, 2016), 3.4 of the respondents would be expected 
to be transgender. Another estimate of 390 out of 100,000 (Meerwijk & Sevelius, 2017), would 
mean .039% of the general population or 2.22 respondents to the survey would be expected to be 
transgender. While transgender and nonbinary are not synonymous, estimates of the nonbinary 
population have been conducted as a subpopulation of the transgender community, with 35% 
self-reporting as nonbinary (James, et al., 2016).  
The ages of the survey respondents, as shown in Figure 13 below, included twenty 
respondents over the age of 65, who finished the survey. The perception of technology 
participation is that it is primarily the domain of younger people, but there were almost an equal 
amount of participants between the ages of 18 and 24 as there were over 65. One reason for this 
may be that people in the 18-24 age bracket are more likely to be living in someone else’s space, 
such as a college dorm and that they are also likely to have a lower household income, due to 
being in school or at the beginning stages of a career. On the other hand, participants over the 
age of 65 may be more likely to own IoT devices to assist with independent living and because 
they may have adult children who gift them devices. 
82 
 
Variable n %  Variable n % 
Age    Annual HHI 
  
18-24 22 3.87  >$10,000 3 0.53 
25-34 154 27.07  $10,000-$19,999 3 0.53 
35-44 218 38.31  $20,000-$29,999 6 1.05 
45-54 86 15.11  $30,000-$39,999 14 2.46 
55-64 69 12.13  $40,000-$49,999 16 2.81 
65-74 18 3.16  $50,000-$59,999 25 4.39 
75-84 2 0.35  $60,000-$69,999 32 5.62 
   
 $70,000-$79,999 36 6.33 
Education    $80,000-$89,999 38 6.68 
< High School 1 0.18  $90,000-$99,999 46 8.08 





Some college 18 3.16  $150,000+ 166 29.17 
2 year degree 18 3.16      Missing 5 0.88 
4 year degree 183 32.16  





Gender   
Doctorate 40 7.03  Male 322 56.59 
    Missing 1 0.18  Female 239 42 
   
 Nonbinary 4 0.7 
Ethnicity        Missing 4 0.7 
White 407 71.53  
   






Yes 445 78.21 
Asian 20 3.51  No 124 21.79 
Other 20 3.51     
Multi-racial 14 2.46     
    Missing 1 0.18     
Table 9 Demographic Summary Table 
 Overall education levels for the participants in this study were high with 92.62% of 
respondents having a 4 year degree or higher, compared to 30.69% of the United States 
population (US Census Bureau, 2016), and 39.2% of the United States internet user population 
(Ryan, 2018). There were forty respondents with doctoral degrees, three hundred and four with a 
professional degree, and one hundred and eighty-three with a 4 year degree. By contrast, there 
were only eighteen respondents with a 2 year degree, eighteen with some college, four high 
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school graduates, and one respondent who is not a high school graduate, for a total of forty one 
respondents with a 2 year degree or below. 
 Survey respondents were primarily white at 71.53% of respondents, followed by black at 
18.63%, Other (including Hispanic) at 3.51%, Asian at 3.51%, American Indian or Alaska 
Native at 0.18%, Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander at 0.53%, and 2.46% who selected more 
than one race. Respondents were able to select more than one ethnicity, resulting in a percentage 
greater than 100%. The accidental exclusion of Hispanic as an option was noticed by at least 
eleven respondents, who selected Other and typed variations of Hispanic or Latinx in. There 
were two respondents who typed “American” in the other box and one respondent who typed 
“mixed”. The sample of white respondents is aligned with that of computer and internet users in 
2016 in America, while black respondents were overrepresented, and Asian and Hispanic 
respondents were underrepresented (Ryan, 2018). Due to the exclusion of the Hispanic category, 
it is impossible to know how many other respondents of Hispanic origin may have chosen not to 
select other.  
 Survey participants had a high annual household income, with 60.63% of respondents 
having an annual household income above $100,000. There were slightly more respondents in 
the $100,000-149,999 category (179) as there were whose household income was below $89,999 
(173).  Only 13.53% of respondents self-reported household income below the United States 
median household income of $60,293 (US Census Bureau, 2018). Internet usage penetrates 
higher income households at a greater rate (Ryan, 2018), but this survey overrepresents high 
income household and underrepresents lower income households. 
 Respondents were given three choices for gender: male, female, or nonbinary. Males are 
overrepresented at 56.59% compared to their US population representation of 49.02%, while 
84 
 
females are underrepresented at 42% for survey respondents, as opposed to comprising 50.98% 
of the US population. The nonbinary respondents provided another data point for estimating their 
representation within the United States population. Gender was not included in the Census 
Bureau Computer and Internet Usage survey to determine if technology is adopted equally across 
genders (Ryan, 2018). 
4.3 IoT Non-Ownership 
Prior to measuring the variables outlined in 4.3, survey participants were asked whether 
they owned IoT devices. Those who did not were provided with a follow-up question whether 
they had considered owning IoT devices or not. 136 respondents answered no to the IoT 
ownership question, while only 135 of those respondents answered the follow-up question about 
whether they had considered it or not. Of the 135, 58% answered no, while the other 42% 
answered yes. 
 Seventy-eight respondents selected no when asked if they had considered IoT devices. 
When asked to provide reasons why they had not, they selected a total of 113 reasons for not 
considering them, as respondents were able to select multiple answers. Figure 5 shows the 





Figure 5 Reasons IoT Devices Were Not Considered 
 Among all respondents, having an acceptable existing configuration was the leading 
reason that IoT devices had not been considered with thirty-eight respondents, followed by not 
knowing enough about them with twenty-three respondents, while only twenty respondents 
viewed them as a security risk. Among the thirteen respondents that selected Other, five believed 
that because they were renting, they could not have IoT devices, two hadn’t thought of it, two did 
not elaborate in the text box, one questioned why they should get them, one said they didn’t need 
them, one did not have the network capability for them, and one said they believe they are 
counterproductive. Ten respondents viewed them as too costly, eight believe they require too 
much effort, and one respondent felt they are too new.  
Fifty-seven respondents had considered IoT devices, but ultimately had not installed any, 
providing ninety-six reasons why they had not, averaging 1.68 reasons each. Their responses are 
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Figure 6 Reasons IoT Devices Were Considered but not Installed 
 Like those who had not considered IoT devices at all, the respondents’ leading answer 
was that their existing configuration met their needs satisfactorily with twenty-three responses, 
followed by those that are still deciding with seventeen responses and those that view them as a 
security risk with seventeen responses as well. Not having the time and cost each had fourteen 
responses, while the devices being viewed as requiring too much effort had eight responses. 
Three respondents viewed the devices as being too new, while no respondents selected that they 
had found other workarounds or Other.  
4.4 Past Performance  
 
 Questions 11-26 measured respondents’ self-reported past performance. Only the 
questions used for the past performance variable are reported here. 
 62.21% of respondents reported having formal information technology or computer 
science education, compared to 37.79% without it. Attempting to compare the survey 












Q10 Reasons considered, but not installed
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information technology and computer science formal education, as well as the disparity between 
states in their K-12 computer science curriculum (Google, 2018).  
Unfortunately, even in collegiate computer science education, security is most frequently 
an elective and not a required course (Cable, 2019). By not requiring security courses or teaching 
secure coding in the curriculum, software development focuses on usability rather than security. 
 College courses were the most frequently selected option by respondents, with two 
hundred and thirty-six self-reporting that they took IT/CS related courses in college. Of those 
who took college courses, fourteen completed a minor in an IT/CS field, sixty-nine completed a 
bachelor’s degree, eighty-five completed a master’s degree, ten completed a graduate certificate, 
and seven completed a PhD.  13.09% of those who completed a four year degree, determined by 
totaling all respondents with a 4 year degree or higher degree, completed that degree in an IT/CS 
field, while 17.5% of those who completed a doctorate did so in an IT/CS field. Only 2.66% of 
those who completed a bachelor’s degree had a minor in Information Technology or Computer 
Science. 
 Certification courses were the second most frequently selected formal education, with 
123 respondents reporting that they completed at least one certification course. One hundred and 





Figure 7 Formal IT/CS Education by Type 
 Among those who obtained degrees in IT/CS fields, there were no respondents who did 
their bachelor’s, master’s degrees and PhD all in IT/CS fields. Twenty-eight respondents did 
their bachelor’s and master’s degrees, three respondents did their bachelor’s, master’s, and a 
graduate certificate, and three did their master’s and PhD in IT/CS fields. Based on their 
responses, it appears most common for students to get a bachelor’s in a non-IT/CS field and then 
return for a master’s degree in an IT/CS field, as fifty-seven of the respondents did. It is unusual 
that there were no respondents who completed their bachelor’s through PhD in the same field 
and that there were four respondents who only did their PhD in an IT/CS field.  
 Respondents who selected other and provided a written response cited military training, 
on the job training and experience, online training, and an associate’s degree. The associate’s 
degree was used as an example, but then was not included on the list of formal education 
options. The military respondents primarily attended Signal Corps basic branch training, but 
there was at least one respondent who attended the specialty Telecommunications Engineer 
course. Some of the respondents didn’t specify which military training course they attended. 
 Among the ninety respondents who had taken classes in high school, the range was from 
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respondents have two classes relating to computer security, while twenty-five had one, and 
seventeen had three. Six respondents had four, two had five, three had six, and one had fifteen. 
Question 15 asked respondents what certifications they had and provided radio buttons to 
select multiple options. This question was weighted with values assigned to the certifications 
based on difficulty to obtain them and relevance to security. Basic IT certifications were 
assigned a value of one point, basic security certifications two points, intermediate IT 
certifications three points, intermediate security certifications four points, advanced IT 
certifications five points, and advanced security certifications were assigned a value of six 
points.  
Four hundred and forty-six respondents (78.38%) had no certifications. The remaining 
one hundred and twenty-three respondents held a total of 295 certification levels, resulting in an 
average of 1.48 certification levels each, with a range from one to six. The question did not give 
the respondents the ability to provide the count of how many certifications they had at each level, 
but instead how many skill levels they have certifications in. 
Among those with certifications, the number of respondents with each type of 
certification decreased as difficulty level increased, except for advanced security certifications. 
While difficulty of the material may be one reason for this, higher level certifications generally 
require more prerequisites, in the form of additional certification tests, time working in the field, 
and recommendations from colleagues who already hold the higher certification (ISC2.org, n.d.) 




Figure 8 Certifications by Type 
Three hundred and thirty-three respondents (58.52%) did not take any IT/CS courses in 
college. The remaining two hundred and thirty-six respondents took one to thirty IT/CS courses. 
Those who did not take any IT/CS courses were removed from Figure 9.  
 
Figure 9 Number of IT/CS College Courses 
With those who did not take a class removed, 58.9% of the remaining respondents did not 
take sufficient classes for an IT/CS minor, which normally requires approximately five courses. 
On the other end of the spectrum, twenty of the remaining respondents (8.48%) took twenty to 
thirty courses, indicating completing a bachelor’s and taking additional graduate level courses. 
Four hundred and forty-one respondents (77.5%) self-reported informal IT/CS education, 
while one hundred twenty-eight respondents (22.5%) reported that they had no informal IT/CS 
education. Three hundred and nineteen respondents (56%) had both formal and informal IT/CS 
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education, one hundred and fifty-seven (28%) had either formal or informal IT/CS education, 
while ninety-three had neither (16%).  
 Of those with informal education, three hundred and fifty-six have looked up solutions to 
IT/CS problems on the Internet, three hundred and twelve have tinkered with computers or other 
devices, two hundred and forty-four have learned programming, two hundred and forty have 
learned from friends and relatives, while two hundred and one have read books on IT/CS topics. 
There was an average of 3.11 types of informal IT/CS education per respondent. 
 Three hundred and fifty-one respondents (61.69%) do not currently work in an IT/CS-
related field, nor have they in the last three years. The second highest number of participants, one 
hundred and thirty-four, currently hold positions that require IT/CS work more than fifty percent 
of the time. Twenty-eight respondents (4.92%) perform IT/CS work for thirty to fifty percent of 
their job, while thirty-seven respondents (6.5%) spend less than 30% of their work time on 
IT/CS-related tasks. Nineteen respondents (3.34%) do not currently work in an IT/CS-related 
field, but have in the last three years. 
Ninety-three, or 16.34%, of respondents had no formal or informal IT/CS education, 
while three hundred and nineteen had both formal and informal IT/CS education. While states 
are making progress in improving access to computer science education at the K-12 level 
(Ascione, 2018), that will not provide IT/CS education for those who have already completed 
high school. Eighty-six of the ninety-three who had no formal or informal IT/CS education also 
do not work in an IT/CS-related job. 15.11% of all respondents have no obvious method of 
learning how to secure their personal network and devices with no formal or informal IT/CS 




Figure 9 Formal and/or Informal IT/CS Education 
 Of those who had either IT/CS degrees or certificates, their most recent degree or 
certificate was awarded from 1971 to 2018. 47.76% of all respondents who reported the year of 
their most recent degree or certificate had earned it in the three years prior to the survey, 57.46% 
in the five years prior, and 70.9% in the ten years prior. Figure 10 shows the distribution of 
degrees or certificates by year. 
 
Figure 10 IT/CS Degree or Certificate Recency 
 Overall, respondents had 6.36 connected device types per household. This question did 
not ask how many devices per type there were. Computers, smartphones, and tablets have the 
most household saturation with 98.07%, 96.13%, and 85.06% respectively, but they are not IoT 
devices per the selected definition. 79.09% of respondents have home automation devices, with 
smart outlets, thermostats, and lightbulbs given as examples for that category. 56.77% had E-











































































such as Smart TVs, Fire Sticks, and connected DVD/Blu-Ray players. 34.45% have video game 
systems, 32.34% have monitoring devices, such as baby monitors or nanny cameras, 29.17% 
have smartwatches, such as Apple Watch and Samsung Galaxy Gear, and 11.25% have do-it-
yourself lightweight computing, such as Raspberry Pi or Arduino systems. Security system 
devices, medical devices, and smart appliances were the least common devices at 9.14%, 5.45%, 
and 5.10% respectively. 10.72% of respondents selected Other. 
 Respondents were asked how many IoT devices they had in their home. Answers ranged 
from zero to forty-five devices, with 12.30% having zero, 49.56% having between one and five, 
27.24% with six to ten, and 10.90% with eleven or more. There was one respondent each with 
forty-five devices, forty devices, thirty devices, twenty-seven devices, and twenty-two devices. 
Among those with eleven or more devices, twelve was most common with twelve respondents, 
followed by fifteen devices selected by eleven respondents, and twenty devices reported by eight 
respondents.   
While forty-five devices may seem excessive now, there are many ways that could 
become a more common number in the future. To illustrate a scenario where forty-five devices 
may be reasonable, assume a family of four with two adults and two school-aged children are 
living in a 1300 square foot, 3 bedroom, 2 bathroom house. A home of that size has 
approximately twenty-three electrical receptacles, for a total of forty-six outlets, based on the 
National Electrical Code (National Fire Protection Association, 2020).  Smart outlet devices can 
purchased for as little as $8.99 individually or $29.99 for four, equating to $7.50 each (Amazon, 
2020). That same home would have at least eight light fixtures, where smart lightbulbs could be 
used in place of standard bulbs at a cost of $13.99 individually or $39.99 for a four pack, 
equating to $10.00 each (Amazon, 2020). The house may contain one to four smart televisions, 
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depending on the parents’ stand on technology in the children’s rooms. Even if the televisions 
are not smart, they may have a media player or fire stick to stream to the non-smart televisions. 
The home may also have a smart thermostat. Because there are children in the home, there may 
be one or two video game consoles, which are also connected to the Internet. There is likely at 
least one additional smart device to control the various devices around the home, such as a 
Google Home or Amazon Alexa. To protect and monitor the home, there may also be a smart 
doorbell with camera and two cameras inside the home. In this scenario, there are up to sixty-
three IoT devices not including any smart appliances, medical devices, smartwatches, or fitness 
trackers. Even if the household only used smart outlets for half of their outlets, that would still be 
forty potential IoT devices. 
Only seventy people responded that they had zero IoT devices, yet one hundred and 
thirty-six respondents answered no to question eight, which asked if they owned IoT devices. 
The other sixty-six respondents who self-reported having no IoT devices in question eight had 
between one and fifteen IoT devices in their household. This may indicate that the respondent 
does not own the devices, but they are present and in the possession of another member of the 
household. Depending on the types of devices within the household, there may be privacy and 
agency implications for the non-owner resident, such as the children in the example above. 
 Question 22 asked respondents who owned their as an exploratory question. 53.36% of 
respondents owned their router, 44.63% have ISP-owned routers, 4.53% had both personally-
owned and ISP-owned routers, and 2.01% selected Other. ISP-owned routers typically are 
installed by the ISP and have some default security mechanisms built in, such as complex 
randomized passwords. However, ISP-owned routers may also be using the customer’s home 
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Wi-Fi network as a public Wi-Fi hotspot, allowing unknown parties to connect to their router 
(Hayes, 2014). 
 67.83% of respondents set their routers up themselves, while 32.17% did not. This 
question does not necessary indicate technical prowess, as it does not delve into what settings 
they used, or even how long the router setup may have taken. Such follow-up questions in the 
future may help to determine whether it was configured securely or just configured to function as 
quickly as possible. 
 Of the two hundred and sixty-six respondents who have ISP-owned routers, they were 
asked whether they had logged into the router. While an overwhelming majority had at 81.58%, 
there was a sizeable minority that had not. Forty-nine respondents had no configuration control 
over their router, as it was installed by the ISP and has never received any further configuration 
from the user. 
 Routers were most frequently configured by a commercial third party, if not configured 
by the respondent with 39.34%, followed by the least secure answer “no one, it worked out of the 
box” at 19.12%, and 18.03% selected “someone else who resides in the home”. 23.5% of 
respondents selected other, of whom four of the respondents did not have a router, one had a 
friend set it up, one had a landlord set it up, and the remainder who provided a reason listed some 
variation of their ISP. In the future, the ISP needs to be added as a selection. 
 Those who had not logged in to their ISP-owned router were asked if they knew how in 
Question 26. Of the forty-nine respondents, 75.51% did not know how to log in to the router, 
while 24.49% knew how and chose not to. 
 Respondents overwhelmingly perform the following actions online: check email 
(99.47%), perform searches (97.36%), shop online (96.49%), use social media (95.08%), watch 
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videos (94.02%), communicate anonymously (93.32%), bank online (92.97%), and read news 
(92.79%). Conducting research is close behind at 86.99%, with a sharp drop to 51.32% for chat, 
50.79% for playing games, 46.92% comment on news and blog posts, while only 7.73% 
communicate secretly. Email is consistent with prior results; online banking, online shopping, 
and research have expanded; while chat has experienced a small amount of growth (Furnell, 
Bryant, & Phippen, 2007). 
 
Figure 11 Participant Online Actions 
 Question 28 asked respondents how many online accounts they had, with answers 
provided as a selection of ranges: 1-5, 6-10, 11-20, 21-30, and more than 30. Question 29 asked 
the participants how many unique passwords they had, with answers also provided as a selection 
of ranges: 1-5, 6-10, 11-15, 15-20, or more than 20. Due to the two questions having two 
different sets of answers, the only way to compare them directly was to process them after the 
survey was complete to get them on the same range. In Question 28, the ranges 21-30 and more 
than 30 were combined into a single answer of more than 20, while in Question 29, the ranges 
11-15 and 15-20 were combined into a single answer. Because the answers are based on ranges, 
it is more difficult to determine if there is a one to one ratio between accounts and passwords. 
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However, there were one hundred and ninety-eight respondents (34.86%) who the same range of 
accounts as they had of passwords. 
 
Figure 12 Online Accounts and Passwords 
 As seen in Figure 12, there is an inverse relationship between the number of accounts and 
the number of passwords. If users had a unique password for each account, there would be a 
correlation of 1 between the two questions and their means would be the same. As seen in Figure 
41, there is a .6796 difference between the two means, with the mean for number of accounts 
higher than the mean for number of passwords, and the standard errors for both are .04567 and 
.04497 respectively. There is only a correlation of .432 (p=.000) between the answers to the two 
questions, as seen in Figure 42, which indicates a relationship, but not a direct correlation. 
Paired Samples Statistics 
 Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Pair 1 Q28_scale 2.9120 568 1.08834 .04567 
Q29_scale 2.2324 568 1.07178 .04497 
Table 10 Paired Samples Statistics 
 
Paired Samples Correlations 
 N Correlation Sig. 
Pair 1 Q28_scale & Q29_scale 568 .432 .000 
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 Question 30 answered a series of questions about participants’ online security past 
performance. The answers were on a Likert scale from always to never. Originally, it appeared 
that these questions had an opposite effect from the education questions. However, the reason for 
that initial appearance was that the answers range from positive effect to negative effect, whereas 
the other Likert scale questions ranged from negative to positive. Therefore, when reverse coding 
negatively worded questions and leaving positively worded questions untouched, it produced an 
opposite effect. 
 Overall, respondents’ self-reporting positive security behaviors outnumbered those 
reporting negative security behaviors on every question but the one asking if they used a 
password vault. For the other questions, 45.76% to 77.74% self-reported positive security 
behaviors, while 7.24% to 22.08% selected the neutral response, and 13.60% to 38.16% self-
reported negative security behaviors. 
 Checking for encryption when performing secure transactions allows the user to ensure 
that their information is encrypted while passing over the network, where an attacker can steal 
the information, and to ensure that they are performing a transaction with the website that they 
intend to. Two hundred and twenty-six respondents (39.93%) always check, while one hundred 
and seventy-four (30.74%) check for encryption most of the time. Forty-one (7.24%) answered 
that they check approximately half of the time, eighty-one (14.31%) selected sometimes, while 
forty-four (7.77%) never check. 
 Using strong passwords had the most positive responses, with 77.74% of respondents 
selecting either Always or Most of the Time. For this question, a strong password was defined as 
a password with “at least 2 upper case, 2 lower case, 2 numbers, 2 special characters, total of at 
least 14 characters.” This question also had the least negative responses with those selecting 
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sometimes or never totaling 13.60%. The twenty respondents who selected never when asked 
about using strong passwords are particularly concerning. The survey question description is 
more stringent than typical web-based account requirements, but similar to corporate password 
complexity requirements.  
Nine of the twenty respondents (45%) who selected that they never use strong passwords 
have neither formal nor informal IT education, nor an IT/CS-related job. Eleven of fifty-seven 
respondents (19.30%) who self-reported sometimes using strong passwords have neither formal 
nor informal IT education, nor hold an IT/CS job. However, twenty-two of the two hundred and 
sixty-three respondents (8.37%) who always use strong passwords also have no IT education or a 
job related to IT/CS. 
As a follow up to Questions 28 and 29, participants were asked whether they used the 
same passwords on multiple sites. From the comparison of number of accounts to the number of 
passwords, it was clear that respondents were re-using passwords across multiple accounts, 
which was confirmed by the answers to Question 30. While thirty-four respondents (5.99%) said 
they always re-used passwords, one hundred and forty-nine (26.23%) selected most of the time, 
for a total of 32.33% with negative password behavior. Another one hundred and twenty-five 
respondents (22.08%) selected about half the time, while two hundred and six (36.27%) selected 
sometimes. Only fifty-three respondents (9.33%) selected never. 5.28% of respondents had over 
20 online accounts and between one to five passwords, indicating that a breach on any of their 
accounts would likely lead to a compromise on several other accounts. This aligned closely with 
the respondents who self-reported that they always re-use passwords.  
Based on the number of users that re-use passwords, password vaults might reduce 
password re-use, but respondents aren’t using them. A password vault is software that stores a 
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password for each account that a user has, while the user only has to memorize a single password 
or can use a simpler PIN or password in conjunction with a two factor authentication method. 
Respondents overwhelmingly do not use password vaults, with three hundred and forty-
one (60.04%) responding that they never use a password vault, while fifty-nine respondents 
(10.39%) self-reported using a password vault most of the time, and twenty-five (4.40%) 
reported using a password vault about half of the time. Online shopping was self-reported by 
96.49% of respondents, making it a sizeable threat vector. However, the percentage of those who 
practice the security behavior of checking the reputation of shopping sites most or all of the time 
is only 52.83%, while 38.16% check either sometimes or never. When online shopping, users 
voluntarily supply enough information for a malicious actor to steal funds from the credit card or 
account they chose to use for their purchase.  
One hundred and fifty-nine respondents (27.99%) self-reported always logging out of 
secure sites when finished and one hundred and forty (24.65%) reported doing so most of the 
time. The question does not address whether they are the only people with access to their device, 
as anyone with physical access can perform tasks under their account if it is already logged in. 
On a home computer or mobile phone that no one else has physical access to, this is not a 
security risk. 10.25% log out about half of the time, while 19.61% log out either sometimes or 
never.  
 Two hundred and six respondents (36.27%) self-reported that they always close their 
browser when finished with secure sites, one hundred and forty-three (25.17%) selected most of 
the time, and fifty-nine (10.39%) reported that they close the browser when finished about half 
of the time. This security measure protects the user from someone using the back button from 
returning to a secure session or from credentials being cached in the browser until it is closed. 
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One hundred and twenty-two respondents (21.48%) sometimes close their browser when 
finished, while thirty-five (6.16%) never do. 
 Question 31 was used to determine the respondents’ past performance in email security. 
While their Internet security measures were mildly positive, respondents’ email security 
measures were significantly positive. For the first three questions, concerning opening emails 
from unknown senders, opening attachments from unknown senders, and clicking on links in 
emails, the respondents’ overwhelmingly chose sometimes or never. The following two 
questions, concerning logging out when finished and closing the browser, had much more mixed 
results. That may be due to respondents’ being the only users with physical access to the 
computer or device on which they check their email. 
 50.89% of respondents never open emails from people they don’t know, while 43.59% 
sometimes open emails from people they don’t know. 2.49% open them about half the time, 
2.14% most of the time, and 0.89% open emails from people they don’t know always. Results for 
opening attachments from unknown senders are even more positive. 92.16% of respondents 
never open attachments from unknown senders, 6.24% do sometimes, 1.07% about half of the 
time, while those who selected most of the time (0.18%) and always (0.36%) were less than 1%. 
Respondents reported clicking on links in emails, as shown in Figure 45, by choosing 
never (31.55%), sometimes (55.97%) about half of the time (7.66%), most of the time (4.28%), 
or always (0.53%). When answering whether they log out when finished with email, it was a 
much wider distribution of answers. Like Internet usage, if the respondent is the only person with 
physical access to the device, logging out is not necessary.  
 Like logging out when finished, closing the browser is more important when on a shared 
device, not on devices dedicated to the respondent alone. Over half of respondents selected 
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always (32.09%) or most of the time (19.86%), while a little under half selected about half of the 
time (10.82%), sometimes (28.19%), or never (9.04%).  
4.5 Security Intentions (Existing) 
 84.6% of survey respondents are responsible for maintaining the Internet in their home, 
while 16.4% are not. When asked what security software was being used, 9.14% of respondents 
were unsure and 5.45% reported using no security software. Of the remaining respondents who 
are using security software and know what security software they are using, antivirus (70.37%), 
malware protection (52.88%), and a personal firewall (47.12%) are the most common security 
software packages in use by respondents. Application whitelisting (9.05%), monitoring software 
(7.41%), other (6.58%) were selected at a much lower rate.  
 While thirty-one respondents selected none for security software used, an additional 
eighty-one respondents did not select any options for security software, including other, for a 
total of one hundred and twelve respondents (19.68%) that are not using security software. Two 
software types (22.67%) were most common, followed by three (21.44%), then one (18.98%). 
Those with four or more software types totaled 8.08%. Those who selected unsure were treated 
as having zero security software in the analysis. While each individual type of security software 
has a different level of efficacy, information security focuses on the concept of defense in depth, 
encouraging more layers that an attacker must traverse to get to their goal. Therefore, the number 
of types of each protective measure is a better indicator of each respondent’s level of security. 
 Of the 569 respondents to this question, twenty-four (4.22%) selected none of the above 
and seventy-two (12.65%) failed to provide an answer. Using encryption (72.94%), changing 
WiFi passwords (62.21%), and changing default passwords (52.22%) were the only three that 
more than half of the respondents used. The three least used are review router logs (17.34%), 
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limit connection by MAC address (14.16%), and change the IP address range (13.53%). No 
answer and none of the above were counted as having zero network protection measures. 
 Of the remaining 473 respondents, who selected at least one network protection measure, 
there were 1730 network protection measures in place, with an average of 3.66 network 
prevention measures per person. Two (19.33%) was the most common number of network 
protection measures, followed by zero (16.87%), then three (14.13%).  
 Update firmware when available (49.03%), use encryption (when available) (42.68%), 
and check for firmware updates (38.98%) are the most selected IoT device protection measures. 
However, one of the major weaknesses of IoT devices is that many of them do not have 
updateable firmware or use encryption. However, only 20.46% of respondents committed to 
buying only devices with upgradeable firmware and 8.99% are willing to replace insecure 
devices, so those intentions to perform the top three IoT device protective measures may not be 
executable with the respondents’ current hardware. 
 Of the 567 respondents to the question, 444 had at least one IoT device protection 
measure. With a total of 1082 reported protection measures, the 444 respondents average 2.44 




Figure 13 IoT Device Protection Measures Count 
 
 Respondents were concerned with self-protection on the Internet, with 444 respondents 
(78.45%) ranging from somewhat concerned to very concerned. Of the remaining respondents, 
22 (3.89%) were neutral, while 100 respondents (17.67%) ranged from somewhat unconcerned 
to very unconcerned. 
 When asked about bad experiences on the Internet, 141 respondents (24.78%) had no 
negative consequences, while the remaining 468 (75.22%) had at least one, for a combined total 
of 698 negative consequences. Malware infections (280) and hacked accounts (206) were the 
most common, followed by identity theft (113), having someone pose as them on social media 
(49), and any other negative consequence (50). 
4.6 Locus of Control 
 
 Locus of control answers are mostly positive, with 86.4% of respondents exhibiting an 
internal locus of control concerning their Internet safety, while only 10% demonstrated an 
external locus of control. The results for self-protection from information security violations at 
home were even stronger with  90.5% of respondents in agreement that it is within their control 
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they were primarily responsible for home network protection, with 84.2% believing they were 
primarily responsible. 89% believed that taking necessary security measures is within their 
control. The highest number of respondents selected “agree” followed by “somewhat agree”, 
with “strongly agree” having slightly fewer responses. 
 
4.7 Perceived Self-Efficacy 
 
 Perceived self-efficacy responses were not nearly as consistent, as those for locus of 
control. While respondents had positive responses to comfort taking measures to protect their 
home network (81.9% agree) and resources and knowledge to protect their home network 
(71.4%), responses varied markedly on the four subsequent questions. When asked if protecting 
their home network was hard or easy, 45.3% chose hard, while only 35.7% chose easy. 19% 
remained neutral. However, anxiety about online security issues was high among respondents 
with 52.8% agreeing that they feel nervous when thinking about online security issues, compared 
to 32.3% who disagreed. More respondents agreed that they had the skills to implement 
preventative measures (61.3%) than did not (28.6%). Additionally, more respondents also rated 
their skills to stop information security violations as adequate (58.4%) than did not (34.1%). 
4.8 Security Intentions (Future) 
 
 Security intentions (future) was measured by Likert items requesting respondents indicate 
the degree to which they agree with the statement given. Additionally, respondents were asked 
which IoT device protection measures they intended to use in the future. 
 Question 49 measured users’ likelihood to take action to either protect the Internet or 
protect themselves. While the answers are similar, there is a slightly different number of each 
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response. On the positive end of the spectrum, the number of people taking action for self-
protection were slightly lower than those protecting the Internet for agree and strongly agree.   
 Those who selected somewhat agree to strongly agree for changing passwords more often 
(70.61%) and using passwords that are harder to guess (77.19%) far exceeded those who chose 
neutral or negative behaviors. 
 Fewer respondents were committed to increasing their browser security settings at 
60.46%. However, respondents overwhelmingly committed to learning to be more secure online 
at 86.31%. 64.15% of respondents selected a form of agree to keeping guests and IoT devices on 
a guest network, while 92.75% agreed not to use default passwords. 
 Respondents have the intention to change their WiFi passwords to more secure passwords 
(75.19%), while fewer have the intent to change their IP address range and default gateway 
(50%).  
Two hundred ninety-seven respondents answered no to the question, “Will you make any 
changes to your home network or IoT devices after completing this survey?”, while another 
sixty-eight respondents skipped the question. Of those sixty-eight respondents who skipped the 
question, only two of them answered the question about what future IoT device changes they 
intended to make. However, all of them clicked through to the end of the survey. 
The reasons respondents selected for why they don’t intend to change their security are 
shown in Figure 32. 122 respondents felt their network was already secure enough, while 77 
believed their system works just fine as it is, 58 don’t know how to make changes, 46 selected 
Other, 43 believed selected nothing has happened to them yet, 31 selected that no one wants to 
get into their network, 23 have someone else manage their home network, while only 22 felt that 




Figure 14 Reasons for not making changes 
 Through a survey configuration error, those who said they had no intention to make 
changes in the future were still asked in the future what changes they planned to make to their 
IoT devices. Even after answering that they planned to make no changes, and providing reasons 
why, those respondents selected changes that they intend to make. Two hundred twenty-three 
respondents selected five hundred thirty changes they would make with a mean of 2.3767 
changes per person. This number is far below the Security Intentions (Future) average of those 
who intended to make changes to their network at 5.2303 per person, but well above the zero that 
would be expected after they expressed that they would not be making changes. 
Respondents were able to choose from a range of possible security measures, such as 
using encryption, purchasing only devices with upgradeable firmware, upgrading firmware, and 
replacing outdated insecure devices. Using encryption when available had the most responses 
with eighty-nine, followed by updating firmware when available with eighty-two, and checking 
for firmware updates regularly was third highest with seventy-five responses. Checking 
shodan.io was fourth with fifty-six users committing to doing so, followed by only buying 
devices with upgradeable firmware with fifty-one responses, and reviewing router logs with 
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Q50 Why aren't you going to make any changes?
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the Internet with forty-three responses, place IoT devices on a guest network with forty-two 
responses, followed by replacing insecure IoT devices even if they are still functional with 
twenty-four, and other was last with twenty-three responses. 
 

























































Q51 In the future, I plan to make the following IoT device 
changes:
All respondents Intent to Change No intent to change
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Chapter 5 Quantitative Analysis 
  
 In this data set, there are two latent dependent variables, security intentions (existing) and 
security intentions (future), and 3 independent variables, past performance, locus of control, and 
self-efficacy. Security intentions (existing) is further divided into security software, network 
protection measures, and IoT protection measures. Security intentions (future) is comprised of 
security changes and IoT changes. Past performance incorporates IT/CS related employment, 
formal education, informal education, internet and email security, and certifications. Self-
efficacy and locus of control are not divided into individual questions. 
Four of the five elements of security intentions are ratio variables, because there is an 
absolute zero, or absence of security intentions, and the intervals are equal. A person with two 
network protection measures has twice as many as a person with one (Warne, 2018). However, 
the security intentions (future) security changes variable is interval data, as respondents were 
asked to answer how likely they were to implement each measure, rather than just select those 
they plan to implement. 
IT/CS employment is interval data, assigning value to employment that requires working 
on a computer, ranging from not working on a computer to working on a computer more than 
half of the time. Formal education, informal education, and certification count are all ratio data. 
Internet and email security questions are interval data. 
With more than one independent variable and more than one dependent variable, there 
are two main options, analyzing dependent variables separately with univariate methods, or using 
a multivariate method, such as structural equation modeling (Warne, 2018). Another text 
recommended a Spearman rank-order correlation (Creswell, 2009), but that would not provide 
the same fidelity of information as multiple regression, path modeling or structural equation 
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modeling. However, Creswell (2009) did recommend multiple regression for two or more 
independent variables and a single dependent variable.  
Given this study’s exploratory nature, hierarchical linear regression provided the 
opportunity for an in-depth look into the relationships between each component of past 
performance with each component of security intentions, as well as the aggregate effect of past 
performance. The past performance variables were different types of measures, on different 
scales, so they could not be combined into a single measure. Hierarchical linear regression also 
allowed analysis of the overall effect of past performance without the measurements being on  
the same scale, as well as allowed for exploration of interactions between the independent 
variables and any indication of a Simpson’s paradox (Warne, 2018), where the direction of the 
effect changes depending upon the addition of other independent variables. 
Based on the studies analyzed in the literature review, ten used regression and eleven 
used partial least squares. The challenge with partial least squares methods is that variables that 
are on different scales are group together in latent variables, allowing insight only into the whole 
variable and not the individual components. 
However, after reviewing the results of the hierarchical linear regression, which did not 
show interaction amongst the elements of past performance, locus of control, and self-efficacy, it 
was important to explore the latent variable constructs of past performance, security intentions 
(existing) and security intentions (future) to determine the overall effect of the different 
variables. Partial least squares path modeling is typically used for exploratory studies, when 
attempting to assess relationships between latent variables.  
Structural equation modeling was one of the other options available for analyzing 
multiple independent variables and multiple dependent variables. While structural equation 
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modeling is typically used for confirming existing models, it was worth investigating whether the 
results would be similar to the hierarchical linear regressions and the path modeling analyses. 
5.1 Variable Composition 
 
 Initially, there were four variables to be measured: past performance, locus of control, 
perceived self-efficacy, and security intentions. However, only locus of control and perceived 
self-efficacy had established scales that required only minor alterations to be subject matter 
specific. Past performance and security intentions were newly developed with minimal items that 
have been used previously in survey instruments. The past performance variable measured 
technical education, informal education, and attitudes toward security in typical Internet usage.  
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Variable Acronym Group Variable Description 
PP Past Performance All elements of past performance 
PP_ITCSJob Past Performance 
Whether the respondent has a job that is related to 
information technology or computer science  
PP_FormalEd Past Performance Dummy count of types of formal education 
PP_InfEd Past Performance Dummy count of types of informal education 
PP_Likert Past Performance Internet and Email security questions 
PP_CertCount Past Performance Weighted Certificate Scores 
LofC Locus of Control 
Respondent belief concerning whether they 
control their environment or it is controlled 
externally 
SEFF Self-Efficacy 
Respondents' perception of their ability to perform 
security tasks 
SINTEX Security Intentions (Existing) 
Existing Security Intentions (Inclusive of 
SecSoftware, NetworkPro, and IoTPro) 
SINTEX SecSoftware Security Intentions (Existing) 
Security software that respondents self-report 
currently using 
SINTEX_NetworkPro Security Intentions (Existing) 
Network protection measures that respondents 
self-report currently using 
SINTEX_IoTPro Security Intentions (Existing) 
IoT protection measures that respondents self-
report currently using 
SINTFUT Security Intentions (Future) 
Security changes respondents self-reported they 
were going to make (inclusive of Changes and 
IoTChanges) 
SINTFUT_Changes Security Intentions (Future) 
(Optional) Changes to network and software 
respondents intended to make 
SINTFUT_IoTChanges Security Intentions (Future) 
Changes to IoT protections respondents intended 
to make 
Table 12 Variable Descriptions 
 Security intentions variables were the dependent variables, while past performance, locus 
of control, and self-efficacy were the independent variables. Self-efficacy was also tested as a 
moderating variable between past performance and security intentions. 
5.1.1 Validity 
Exploratory factor analysis (EFA) was conducted for past performance, self-efficacy, 
locus of control, security intention (existing), and security intentions (future). The assumption of 
multivariate normality was assessed using Mahalanobis distances, plotted against the quantiles of 
a Chi-Square distribution. All five latent variables met the multivariate normality assumption. 
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Pearson correlations were calculated to determine intercorrelations for the items 
comprising each latent variable, all of which exceeded 0.30, making them suitable for factor 
analysis. The determinant of the correlation table was then calculated to ensure that it exceeds 
.00001, indicating there is no multicollinearity. 
 Using the Kaiser Criterion, all factors with an Eigenvalue greater than one are retained.  
5.1.2 Reliability 
 
Cronbach’s alpha is used to determine the internal consistency of questions to ensure that 
variables are being accurately measured (Cortina, 1993). By comparing the questions in each 
block, the questions can be reduced to those that show the most internal consistency, reducing 
the time participants spend answering similar survey questions. By reducing the number of 
questions and time to complete the survey, more participants are likely to complete the entire 
survey. Typically, a Cronbach’s alpha above 0.7 is considered acceptable for reliability, in that 
the questions are measuring the variable they are intended to. 
Scale No. of Items α 
Past_Performance 5 0.72 
Locus_of_Control 4 0.79 
Self-Efficacy 6 0.87 
SINTEX 3 0.75 
SINTFUT 17 0.88 
Table 13 Cronbach's Alpha for variables 
5.1.3 Past Performance 
 The past performance scale was designed to measure pertinent IT/CS and security 
education. Formal and informal education were separated from the user’s current individual 
security practices. It is possible to have learned the best security practices, but to not put them in 
practice due to a myriad of reasons. Due to the changing nature of technology, security 
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knowledge is ephemeral and can quickly become stale if not used and refreshed on a regular 
basis, resulting in outdated security practices. 
While up to nine questions were asked quantifying education, including job-related 
education, six had the highest internal consistency, resulting in a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.72. Three 
of the six results counted the number of varying types of formal education, number of IT 
certifications, number of types of informal education, while the fourth measured whether they 
have a job that requires computer work. The question about IT/CS accounts for possible on the 
job training, including organizationally required mandatory computer security training. The fifth 
and sixth questions asked for the respondents’ internet and email security past performance.  
For Question 15, the certifications were weighted based on difficulty and subject 
specificity. A basic IT certification is worth one point, while a basic security certification is 
worth two, an intermediate IT certification worth three points, an intermediate security 
certification worth four points, an advanced IT certification worth 5 points and an advanced 
security certification worth 6 points. This question was focused more on the diversity of 
education than on the number of total certifications that had been earned. For example, there was 
no mechanism for a respondent to report multiple certifications at the same difficulty level in the 
same subject.  
Questions 30 and 31 were Likert scale items requesting participants self-report their 
internet and email security past performance. These were on a scale of 1-5 points, while the 
remainder of the survey was on a 1-7 scale of Likert items. Question 30 focused on secure 
Internet usage past performance and Question 31 focused on secure email past performance. 
Table 14 displays the summary statistics for the past performance variables. For 
PP_Cert_Count, skewness is greater than 2 in absolute value, therefore the variable is 
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asymmetrical about its mean. Due to the kurtosis being greater than or equal to 3, then the 
variable's distribution is markedly different than a normal distribution. 
Variable M SD n SEM Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
PP_Cert_Count 1.48 3.72 569 0.16 0.00 21.00 2.90 8.27 
PP_FormalEd 1.33 1.54 569 0.06 0.00 7.00 1.33 1.21 
PP_InfEd 2.41 1.83 569 0.08 0.00 6.00 0.03 -1.43 
PP_ITCSJob 2.25 1.71 569 0.07 1.00 5.00 0.79 -1.21 
PP_Likert 3.58 0.61 544 0.03 1.92 5.00 -0.12 -0.51 
Table 14 Summary Statistics for Past Performance 
 The χ2 goodness of fit being significant shows that this model may not be the strongest 
predictor and that other factors may need to be added to improve the model fit. 
Factor Eigenvalue % of variance Cumulative % 
1 2.33 46.63 46.63 
Note: χ2(5) = 48.13, p < .001 
Table 15 Past Performance Eigenvalue and Percentage of Variance 
 The loading for PP_Likert is poor, which would typically warrant removal from the scale. 
However, it was left in because removal reduced the predictive power of the model and further 
regression analysis revealed that PP_Likert was extremely important in modeling past 
performance’s relationship to security intentions.  
  Factor loading   
Variable 1 Communality 
PP_FormalEd 0.88 0.77 
PP_InfEd 0.60 0.36 
PP_Cert_Count 0.73 0.54 
PP_ITCSJob 0.71 0.50 
PP_Likert 0.40 0.16 
Table 16 Exploratory Factor Analysis Factor Loadings for Past Performance 
Due to the items being on different scales, it was imprudent to combine them into a single 
variable. Therefore, the two Likert items were combined into a single item, while the other four 
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were maintained separately. They were handled as five separate items in the hierarchical 
regression analysis.  
5.1.4 Locus of Control 
 
 The locus of control scale consists of four Likert scale questions designed to measure 
whether respondents have an internal locus of control, where they believe that they are in control 
of their own environment, or an external locus of control, where things happen to them. While 
the means are consistent among items on the scale, the kurtosis of Q39 is slightly above 3, 
indicating that question does not have a normal distribution. 
Variable M SD n SEM Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Q38 5.44 1.24 567 0.05 1.00 7.00 -1.12 1.21 
Q39 5.64 1.23 566 0.05 1.00 7.00 -1.56 3.27 
Q40 5.59 1.55 563 0.07 1.00 7.00 -1.45 1.26 
Q41 5.65 1.23 565 0.05 1.00 7.00 -1.45 2.53 
Table 17 Summary Statistics for Locus of Control 
The χ2 goodness of fit shows that this model is a good fit. 
Factor Eigenvalue % of variance Cumulative % 
1 2.02 50.50 50.50 
Note: χ2(2) = 2.42, p = .298. 
Table 18 Locus of Control Eigenvalue and Percentage of Variance 
 While all loadings are acceptable to good, communality is below the 0.40 threshold for 
Q40. However, Q40 remained in the model because when it was removed, the predictive power 






  Factor loading   
Variable 1 Communality 
Q38 0.73 0.54 
Q39 0.78 0.61 
Q40 0.58 0.34 
Q41 0.73 0.53 
Table 19 Exploratory Factor Analysis Factor Loadings for Locus of Control 
Because these items were all on the same 7 point Likert scale, they were combined into a 
single item by adding the values for each question and calculating the mean of all four values. 
5.1.5 Perceived Self-Efficacy 
 
 Self-Efficacy was measured through a series of questions to determine the respondents’ 
level of confidence in their ability to secure their home network and devices. The means for 
these questions vary much more widely than those of locus of control, with a range from 3.76 to 
5.40. All data is normally distributed. 
Variable M SD n SEM Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
Q42 5.40 1.44 564 0.06 1.00 7.00 -1.16 0.84 
Q43 4.89 1.64 567 0.07 1.00 7.00 -0.72 -0.31 
Q44 3.93 1.51 568 0.06 1.00 7.00 0.10 -0.67 
Q45_R 3.76 1.68 566 0.07 1.00 7.00 0.33 -0.91 
Q46 4.60 1.63 565 0.07 1.00 7.00 -0.46 -0.76 
Q47 4.42 1.79 566 0.08 1.00 7.00 -0.44 -1.04 
Table 20 Summary Statistics for Self-Efficacy 
 The model is not a good fit, based on χ2 being significant. 
Factor Eigenvalue % of variance Cumulative % 
1 3.55 59.14 59.14 
Note: χ2(9) = 81.57, p < .001. 
Table 21 Self-Efficacy Eigenvalue and Percentage of Variance 
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 Q45_R, which asked about respondent anxiety in securing their network and was reverse 
coded, had low factor loadings and low communality. Like other items, removing Q45_R 
reduced the predictive power of the model. Therefore, it was placed back in the model. 
 
  Factor loading   
Variable 1 Communality 
Q42 0.81 0.65 
Q43 0.90 0.82 
Q44 0.69 0.48 
Q45_R   0.08 
Q46 0.89 0.78 
Q47 0.86 0.74 
Note: Factor loadings < .32 are suppressed. 
Table 22 Exploratory Factor Analysis Factor Loadings for Locus of Control 
 These items were all on a 7 point Likert scale and were combined into a single mean, like 
the four items in locus of control. 
5.1.6 Security Intentions (Existing) 
 Due to the inability to evaluate users’ self-reported security measures, the term security 
intentions was used for self-reported current security configuration. This variable measured 
security software usage, network protection measures, and IoT device protection measures. The 
network protection mean was higher while the means for IoT protection and security software 
were closer in value. 
Variable M SD n SEM Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
SINTEX_IoTPro 1.93 1.69 569 0.07 0.00 8.00 0.90 0.35 
SINTEX_NetworkPro 3.04 2.55 569 0.11 0.00 11.00 0.84 0.11 
SINTEX_SecSoftware 1.65 1.41 569 0.06 0.00 6.00 0.51 -0.33 
Table 23 Summary Statistics for Security Intentions (Existing) 
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 A Chi-squared value could not be calculated to determine the goodness of fit. 
Factor Eigenvalue % of variance Cumulative % 
1 1.71 56.84 56.84 
Table 24 Eigenvalues and Variance for SINT_EX 
 All three measures had strong loadings, but IoT protection measures had a low 
communality. Usually that would result in removal, but exploratory factor analysis requires at 
least three measures with loadings above 0.32, thus requiring the measure to remain. 
  Factor loading   
Variable 1 Communality 
SINTEX_SecSoftware 0.75 0.56 
SINTEX_NetworkPro 0.91 0.83 
SINTEX_IoTPro 0.56 0.31 
Table 25 Exploratory Factor Analysis factor loading for SINT_EX 
 These items were not combined, in order to determine the relationship between the 
independent variables and each classification of security intention. Each variable is a count of the 
number of security measures by type. 
5.1.6 Security Intentions (Future) 
 
 The mean of the 16 item Likert scale was taken as a measure of SINTFUT_Changes. The 
number of respondents who committed to making changes (n=245) was far lower than the 
number of respondents for the other variables, due to the question being optional. Only 
respondents who answered yes to Q48, asking if they planned to make changes, were able to 
view Q49. 
Variable M SD n SEM Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
SINTFUT_Changes 5.24 0.88 245 0.06 1.73 7.00 -0.47 0.82 
SINTFUT_IoTChanges 2.59 2.44 569 0.10 0.00 9.00 0.91 -0.05 
Table 26 Summary Statistics for Security Intentions (Future) 
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  The model was not a good fit for the data, based on the χ2 being significant, as 
shown in Table 27. 
 
Factor Eigenvalue % of variance Cumulative % 
1 6.18 36.37 36.37 
2 1.20 7.08 43.46 
Note: χ2(103) = 150.65, p = .002. 
Table 27 Eigenvalues and Variance for SINT_FUT 
 The factor loadings were low on Q49_10 and SINTFUT_IoTChanges, while the 
communality was low for Q49_1, Q49_7, Q49_8, Q49_10, and Q49_11. Removing all six items 
would result in a sharp decrease in the ability to explain variance in security intentions (future). 
  Factor loading   
Variable 1 2 Communality 
Q49_1 0.46   0.24 
Q49_2 0.64   0.44 
Q49_3 0.75   0.67 
Q49_4 0.69 0.38 0.63 
Q49_5 0.69 0.41 0.65 
Q49_6 0.65   0.46 
Q49_7 0.60   0.36 
Q49_8 0.37   0.14 
Q49_9 0.59 0.33 0.45 
Q49_10   0.07 
Q49_11 0.51  0.33 
Q49_12 0.63 0.32 0.50 
Q49_15 0.67  0.49 
Q49_16 0.73  0.53 
Q49_17 0.70  0.49 
Q49_13 0.73 -0.59 0.88 
SINTFUT_IoTChanges   0.06 
Table 28 Exploratory Factor Analysis factor loadings for SINT_FUT 
 All 16 items in Q49 were combined into a single variable, SINTFUT_Changes, while 
SINTFUT_IoTChanges was kept as a separate variable. 
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5.2 Hierarchical Linear Regression 
 Performing a hierarchical linear regression allows the regression to be run by building 
upon each variable. Past performance cannot be simplified to a single variable, so the 
hierarchical linear regression allows the regression to be run with the five past performance items 
and determine the effect of past performance on each security intentions variable. 
 For the three security intentions (existing) items, a three-step hierarchical regression was 
performed. The first step measured the effect of the five past performance items, while the 
second step added perceived self-efficacy, and the third step measured the added effect of locus 
of control. Neither security intentions (future) item were tested against the security intentions 
(existing) items because future intentions cannot effect existing intentions. 
 For the two security intentions (future) items, a four-step hierarchical regression was 
performed. The first three steps were identical to those for the security intentions (existing) 
items, while the fourth step added the three security intentions (existing) items to determine the 
effect of current security intentions on future security intentions. 
 The statistically significant effects are shown in Figure 34. PP_ITCSJob was not 
statistically significant in any of the five hierarchical linear regressions. PP_CertCount was only 
significant for SINTEX_NetworkPro. PP_Likert had the greatest weight amongst independent 




Figure 16 Regression Coefficients 
 The assumptions for linear regression are that the data is normal, homoscedastic, not 
multicollinear, and have few or no outliers. For each model, normality was tested using a Q-Q 
scatter plot, which compares the distribution of the residuals with a normal distribution. The 
plotted points should follow a mostly straight line, which represents the theoretical quantiles of a 
normal distribution. 
 To evaluate homoscedasticity, model residuals were plotted against predicted model 
values (Osborne & Walters, 2002). To meet the assumption, the points should appear randomly 
distributed with a mean of zero and not resembling a curve. 
 Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) were used to detect the presence of multicollinearity 
between predictor variables in the model, which can occur when there is a high degree of 
correlation between predictors. High multicollinearity decreases the statistical power of the 
model (Yoo et al., 2014), and decreases the reliability of the regression coefficient for the 
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variable. Variance Inflation Factors greater than 10 indicate high multicollinearity, while VIFs 
greater than 5 are concerning. 
 To identify outliers, studentized residuals were calculated and plotted against the 
observation numbers. Each regression has those outliers identified and plotted.  
5.2.1 Security Intentions (Existing) Software Security Measures 
 
 Security Intentions (Existing) Software Security Measures, the dependent variable, is 
comprised of a count of the number of different security software packages that respondents are 
using and is labeled SINTEX_SecSoftware in the dataset. In Step 1 of the regression, 
PP_FormalEd, PPInfEd_Count, PP_ITCSJob, PP_Cert_Count, and PP_Likert were the predictor 
variables entered into the null model. In Step 2, Perceived_Self_Efficacy was added, while in 
Step 3, Locus_of_Control was added. 
 The Q-Q scatterplot in Figure 87 below shows a mostly straight line through all three 
steps of the regression, indicating normality. 
 
Figure 17 Q-Q Scatterplot for Security Intentions (Existing) Security Software Regressions 
 The residuals scatterplot in Figure 36 shows data with a mean of zero and no curvature, 




Figure 18 Residuals Scatterplot for Security Intentions (Existing) Security Software Regressions 
 The Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) in the chart below are all below 5 for Steps 1-3 of 
the regression. 
Variable VIF Variable VIF Variable VIF 
Step 1   Step 2   Step 3   
    PP_FormalEd 2.49     PP_FormalEd 2.49     PP_FormalEd 2.51 
    PP_InfEd 1.53     PP_InfEd 1.58     PP_InfEd 1.58 
    PP_ITCSJob 1.77     PP_ITCSJob 1.79     PP_ITCSJob 1.79 
    PP_Cert_Count 1.94     PP_Cert_Count 1.95     PP_Cert_Count 1.96 
    PP_Likert 1.2     PP_Likert 1.41     PP_Likert 1.42 
      Perceived_Self_Efficacy 1.49     Perceived_Self_Efficacy 2.09 
  
      Locus_of_Control 1.65 
Table 29 Variance Inflation Factors for SINT_EX Security Software Regressions 
One observation with a Studentized residual greater than 3.11 in absolute value, the 0.999 
quartile of a t distribution with 524 degrees of freedom, had significant influence on the results 
of the model. 
 




 The F-test for Step 1 was significant, F (5,519) = 32.27, p<.001, ΔR2 = 0.24, indicating 
the five measured items explained 23.72% of the variation in SINTEX_SecSoftware. The Step 2 
F-test was also significant, F(1,518)=10.12, p=.002, ΔR2 = 0.01, indicating that 
Perceived_Self_Efficacy accounted for 1.46% of the variation in SINTEX_SecSoftware. 
The F-test for Step 3 was not significant, F(1,157)=1.59, p=.207, ΔR2 = 0.00, demonstrating that 
Locus_of_Control did not account for any additional variation in the model. Together, past 
performance and perceived self-efficacy accounted for 25.18% of the variation in 
SINTEX_SecSoftware. 
Model R2 dfmod dfres F p ΔR2 
Step 1 0.24 5 519 32.27 < .001 0.24 
Step 2 0.25 1 518 10.12 0.002 0.01 
Step 3 0.25 1 517 1.59 0.207 0 
Table 30 SINT_EX Security Software Model Summary 
 Significant past performance predictors in the model were PP_FormalEd, B = 0.13, t(517) 
= 2.63, p = .009; PP_InfEd, B = 0.12, t(517) = 3.51, p < .001; and PP_Likert, B = 0.37, t(517) = 
3.85, p < .001. Perceived_Self_Efficacy, B = 0.11, t(517) = 2.01, p = .045, was also a significant 
predictor.  
The hypothesis for this regression was: 
H1: Locus of control, perceived self-efficacy, and past performance predict security intentions 
(existing) security software usage. 
H1 is partially supported. Three of five past performance variables (formal education, informal 
education, and internet and email security) and perceived self-efficacy were statistically 





Variable B SE CI β t p 
Step 1             
    (Intercept) -0.55 0.30 [-1.14, 0.04] 0.00 -1.82 .070 
    PP_FormalEd 0.13 0.05 [0.03, 0.23] 0.15 2.54 .011 
    PP_InfEd 0.13 0.03 [0.07, 0.20] 0.19 4.06 < .001 
    PP_ITCSJob 0.02 0.04 [-0.05, 0.10] 0.03 0.61 .543 
    PP_Cert_Count 0.01 0.02 [-0.02, 0.05] 0.04 0.72 .474 
    PP_Likert 0.49 0.09 [0.32, 0.66] 0.23 5.59 < .001 
Step 2             
    (Intercept) -0.73 0.30 [-1.33, -0.13] 0.00 -2.41 .016 
    PP_FormalEd 0.13 0.05 [0.03, 0.22] 0.15 2.53 .012 
    PP_InfEd 0.12 0.03 [0.05, 0.18] 0.17 3.48 < .001 
    PP_ITCSJob 0.01 0.04 [-0.06, 0.09] 0.02 0.31 .753 
    PP_Cert_Count 0.01 0.02 [-0.03, 0.04] 0.02 0.46 .646 
    PP_Likert 0.38 0.09 [0.19, 0.56] 0.18 3.99 < .001 
    Perceived_Self_Efficacy 0.15 0.05 [0.06, 0.24] 0.15 3.18 .002 
Step 3             
    (Intercept) -0.95 0.35 [-1.64, -0.26] 0.00 -2.72 .007 
    PP_FormalEd 0.13 0.05 [0.03, 0.23] 0.16 2.63 .009 
    PP_InfEd 0.12 0.03 [0.05, 0.18] 0.17 3.51 < .001 
    PP_ITCSJob 0.01 0.04 [-0.06, 0.09] 0.02 0.33 .739 
    PP_Cert_Count 0.01 0.02 [-0.03, 0.04] 0.02 0.39 .696 
    PP_Likert 0.37 0.09 [0.18, 0.55] 0.17 3.85 < .001 
    Perceived_Self_Efficacy 0.11 0.06 [0.00, 0.22] 0.11 2.01 .045 
    Locus_of_Control 0.08 0.06 [-0.04, 0.20] 0.06 1.26 .207 
Table 31 Regression Results for Security Software 
 The internet and email security Likert questions have the greatest influence with a B 
value of 0.37, followed by formal education with B value of 0.13, informal education with a B 
value of 0.12, and perceived self-efficacy with a B value of 0.11. The unstandardized regression 
equation to predict Security Intentions (Existing) Security Software is:  
SINTEX_SecSoftware = 0.13*PP_FormalEdCount + 0.12*PP_InfEd + 0.01*PP_ITCSJob + 
0.01*PP_Cert_Count + 037*PP_Likert + 0.11*Perceived_Self_Efficacy + 
0.08*Locus_of_Control - 0.95. 
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5.2.2 Security Intentions (Existing) Network Protection Measures 
 
Security Intentions (Existing) Network Protection Measures, the dependent variable, is 
comprised of a count of the number of different network security measures that respondents self-
reported and is labeled SINTEX_NetworkPro in the dataset. In Step 1 of the regression, 
PP_FormalEd, PPInfEd, PP_ITCSJob, PP_Cert_Count, and PP_Likert were the predictor 
variables entered into the null model. In Step 2, Perceived_Self_Efficacy was added, while in 
Step 3, Locus_of_Control was added. 
 The Q-Q scatterplot in Figure 20 below shows a mostly straight line through all three 
steps of the regression, indicating normality. 
 
Figure 20 Q-Q Scatterplot for Security Intentions (Existing) Network Protection Regressions 
The residuals scatterplot in Figure 21 shows data with a mean of zero and no curvature, 
thus indicating the data meets the homoscedasticity assumption. 
 
Figure 21 Residuals Scatterplot for Security Intentions (Existing) Network Protections Regressions 
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The Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) in the chart below are all below 5 for Steps 1-3 of 
the regression. 
Variable VIF Variable VIF Variable VIF 
Step 1   Step 2   Step 3   
    PP_FormalEd 2.49     PP_FormalEd 2.49     PP_FormalEd 2.51 
    PP_InfEd 1.53     PP_InfEd 1.58     PP_InfEd 1.58 
    PP_ITCSJob 1.77     PP_ITCSJob 1.79     PP_ITCSJob 1.79 
    PP_Cert_Count 1.94     PP_Cert_Count 1.95     PP_Cert_Count 1.96 
    PP_Likert 1.2     PP_Likert 1.41     PP_Likert 1.42 
      Perceived_Self_Efficacy 1.49     Perceived_Self_Efficacy 2.09 
  
      Locus_of_Control 1.65 
Table 32 Variance Inflation Factors in Security Intentions (Existing) Network Protections Regressions 
 Five observations were considered outliers with Studentized residuals greater than 3.11, 
the 0.999 quartile of a t distribution with 524 degrees of freedom. Figure 23 shows those 
observations. 
 
Figure 22 Outliers in Security Intentions (Existing) Network Protections Regressions 
 The F-test for past performance was significant, F(5,519)=70.42, p<.001, ΔR2 = 0.40, 
indicating that the past performance items account for 40.42% of the variation in 
SINTEX_NetworkPro. The F-test for Step 2 was also significant, F(1,518)=8.37, p=.004, ΔR2 = 
0.01, indicating that Perceived_Self_Efficacy explained 0.95% of the variation in 
SINTEX_NetworkPro. Again, the F-test for Step 3 was not significant, F(1,517)=0.61, p=.436, 
ΔR2 = 0.00, indicating that Locus_of_Control does not add to the predictive power of the model. 
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Past performance and perceived self-efficacy accounted for a total of 41.37% of the variation in 
SINTEX_NetworkPro. 
Model R2 dfmod dfres F p ΔR2 
Step 1 0.40 5 519 70.42 < .001 0.40 
Step 2 0.41 1 518 8.37 .004 0.01 
Step 3 0.41 1 517 0.61 .436 0.00 
Table 33 Network Protections Model Summary 
 PP_FormalEd, B = 0.28, t(517) = 3.20, p = .001, PP_InfEd, B = 0.24, t(517) = 4.06, p < 
.001, PP_Cert_Count, B = 0.10, t(517) = 3.02, p = .003, and PP_Likert, B = 0.90, t(517) = 5.35, p 
< .001, were the past performance significant predictors. Perceived_Self_Efficacy was a 
significant predictor, B = 0.20, t(517) = 2.02, p = .044. Locus_of_Control did not have a 
significant effect on SINTEX_NetworkPro. 
The hypothesis for this regression was: 
H2: Locus of control, perceived self-efficacy, and past performance predict security intentions 
(existing) network protection measures. 
H2 was partially supported. Past performance variables, excluding past performance (IT/CS job), 










Variable B SE CI β t p 
Step 1             
    (Intercept) -2.35 0.53 [-3.39, -1.31] 0.00 -4.44 < .001 
    PP_FormalEd 0.28 0.09 [0.10, 0.45] 0.17 3.15 .002 
    PP_InfEd 0.27 0.06 [0.15, 0.38] 0.19 4.58 < .001 
    PP_ITCSJob 0.13 0.07 [-0.00, 0.26] 0.09 1.96 .050 
    PP_Cert_Count 0.11 0.03 [0.04, 0.17] 0.16 3.29 .001 
    PP_Likert 1.09 0.16 [0.79, 1.40] 0.26 7.05 < .001 
Step 2             
    (Intercept) -2.65 0.54 [-3.70, -1.60] 0.00 -4.95 < .001 
    PP_FormalEd 0.28 0.09 [0.10, 0.45] 0.17 3.15 .002 
    PP_InfEd 0.24 0.06 [0.12, 0.35] 0.17 4.04 < .001 
    PP_ITCSJob 0.11 0.07 [-0.02, 0.24] 0.08 1.70 .090 
    PP_Cert_Count 0.10 0.03 [0.04, 0.16] 0.14 3.07 .002 
    PP_Likert 0.91 0.17 [0.58, 1.24] 0.22 5.45 < .001 
    Perceived_Self_Efficacy 0.24 0.08 [0.08, 0.41] 0.12 2.89 .004 
Step 3             
    (Intercept) -2.89 0.62 [-4.11, -1.67] 0.00 -4.67 < .001 
    PP_FormalEd 0.28 0.09 [0.11, 0.45] 0.17 3.20 .001 
    PP_InfEd 0.24 0.06 [0.12, 0.35] 0.17 4.06 < .001 
    PP_ITCSJob 0.11 0.07 [-0.02, 0.24] 0.08 1.71 .088 
    PP_Cert_Count 0.10 0.03 [0.03, 0.16] 0.14 3.02 .003 
    PP_Likert 0.90 0.17 [0.57, 1.23] 0.21 5.35 < .001 
    Perceived_Self_Efficacy 0.20 0.10 [0.01, 0.39] 0.10 2.02 .044 
    Locus_of_Control 0.08 0.11 [-0.13, 0.29] 0.03 0.78 .436 
Table 34 Regression Results for Network Protections 
 The internet and email security questions had the greatest influence on network security 
protections, with a B value of 0.90, followed by PP_FormalEd, with a B value of 0.28, PP_InfEd, 
with a B value of 0.24, and perceived self-efficacy with a B value of 0.20. The unstandardized 
regression equation is: 
PP_NetworkPro_Count = 0.28*PP_FormalEd + 0.24*PP_InfEd + 0.11*PP_ITCSJob + 
0.10*PP_Cert_Count + 0.90*PP_Likert + 0.20*Perceived_Self_Efficacy + 
0.08*Locus_of_Control – 2.89. 
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5.2.3 Security Intentions (Existing) IoT Device Protection Measures 
 
Security Intentions (Existing) IoT Device Protection Measures, the dependent variable, is 
comprised of a count of the number of different network security measures that respondents self-
reported and is labeled SINTEX_IoTPro in the dataset. In Step 1 of the regression, 
PP_FormalEd, PPInfEd, PP_ITCSJob, PP_Cert_Count, and PP_Likert were the predictor 
variables entered into the null model. In Step 2, Perceived_Self_Efficacy was added, while in 
Step 3, Locus_of_Control was added. 
The Q-Q scatterplot in Figure 24 shows a mostly straight line through all three steps of 
the regression, indicating normality. 
 
Figure 23 Q-Q Scatterplot for Security Intentions (Existing) IoT Protections 
The residuals scatterplot in Figure 25 shows data with a mean of zero and no curvature, 




Figure 24 Residuals Scatterplot for IoT Protections 
The Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) in the chart below are all below 5 for Steps 1-3 of 
the regression. 
Variable VIF Variable VIF Variable VIF 
Step 1   Step 2   Step 3   
    PP_FormalEd 2.49     PP_FormalEd 2.49     PP_FormalEd 2.51 
    PP_InfEd 1.53     PP_InfEd 1.58     PP_InfEd 1.58 
    PP_ITCSJob 1.77     PP_ITCSJob 1.79     PP_ITCSJob 1.79 
    PP_Cert_Count 1.94     PP_Cert_Count 1.95     PP_Cert_Count 1.96 
    PP_Likert 1.2     PP_Likert 1.41     PP_Likert 1.42 
      Perceived_Self_Efficacy 1.49     Perceived_Self_Efficacy 2.09 
  
      Locus_of_Control 1.65 
Table 35 Variance Inflation Factors for IoT Protections 
Two observations with a Studentized residual greater than 3.11 in absolute value, the 
0.999 quartile of a t distribution with 524 degrees of freedom, had significant influence on the 
results of the model. 
 
 
Figure 25 Outliers in IoT Protections 
The F-test for Step 1 was significant, F (5, 519) = 47.40, p < .001, ΔR2 = 0.31. This 
model indicates that adding PP_FormalEd, PP_InfEd, PP_ITCSJob, PP_Cert_Count, and 
PP_Likert explained an additional 31.35% of the variation in SINTEX_IoTPro. The F-test for 
Step 2 was significant, F (1, 518) = 7.86, p = .005, ΔR2 = 0.01. This model indicates that adding 
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Perceived_Self_Efficacy explained an additional 1.03% of the variation in SINTEX_IoTPro. The 
F-test for Step 3 was significant, F (1, 517) = 4.44, p = .036, ΔR2 = 0.01. This model indicates 
that adding Locus_of_Control explained an additional 0.58% of the variation in 
SINTEX_IoTPro. Past performance, perceived self-efficacy, and locus of control together 
account for 32.96% of the variation in SINTEX_IoTPro. 
Model R2 dfmod dfres F p ΔR2 
Step 1 0.31 5 519 47.40 < .001 0.31 
Step 2 0.32 1 518 7.86 .005 0.01 
Step 3 0.33 1 517 4.44 .036 0.01 
Table 36 IoT Protections Model Summary 
The two significant past performance predictors were PP_InfEd, B = 0.15, t(517) = 3.59, 
p < .001 and PP_Likert, B = 0.85, t(517) = 7.15, p < .001. A one unit increase in PP_InfEd will 
increase SINTEX_IoTPro by 0.15 units, while a one unit increase of PP_Likert will increase 
SINTEX_IoTPro by 0.85 units. Perceived_Self_Efficacy did not significantly predict 
SINTEX_IoTPro in the third step of the model, but did during the second step. 
Locus_of_Control significantly predicted SINTEX_IoTPro, B = 0.16, t(517) = 2.11, p = .036. A 
one unit increase in Locus of Control increases SINTEX_IoTPro by 0.16 units. 
The hypothesis for this regression was: 
H3: Locus of control, perceived self-efficacy, and past performance predict security intentions 
(existing) IoT protection measures. 
H3 was partially supported. Past performance (informal education), past performance (internet 
and email security), and locus of control were significant predictors, while perceived self-





Variable B SE CI β t p 
Step 1             
    (Intercept) -2.33 0.37 [-3.07, -1.60] 0.00 -6.23 < .001 
    PP_FormalEd 0.07 0.06 [-0.05, 0.19] 0.06 1.09 .277 
    PP_InfEd 0.17 0.04 [0.09, 0.25] 0.18 4.06 < .001 
    PP_ITCSJob 0.05 0.05 [-0.05, 0.14] 0.05 0.98 .325 
    PP_Cert_Count 0.04 0.02 [-0.00, 0.09] 0.09 1.79 .074 
    PP_Likert 1.00 0.11 [0.78, 1.21] 0.36 9.08 < .001 
Step 2             
    (Intercept) -2.54 0.38 [-3.28, -1.79] 0.00 -6.69 < .001 
    PP_FormalEd 0.07 0.06 [-0.06, 0.19] 0.06 1.07 .285 
    PP_InfEd 0.15 0.04 [0.07, 0.23] 0.16 3.53 < .001 
    PP_ITCSJob 0.03 0.05 [-0.06, 0.13] 0.04 0.73 .469 
    PP_Cert_Count 0.04 0.02 [-0.01, 0.08] 0.08 1.57 .118 
    PP_Likert 0.87 0.12 [0.64, 1.10] 0.32 7.37 < .001 
    Perceived_Self_Efficacy 0.17 0.06 [0.05, 0.28] 0.12 2.80 .005 
Step 3             
    (Intercept) -3.00 0.44 [-3.86, -2.14] 0.00 -6.86 < .001 
    PP_FormalEd 0.08 0.06 [-0.04, 0.20] 0.07 1.24 .215 
    PP_InfEd 0.15 0.04 [0.07, 0.23] 0.16 3.59 < .001 
    PP_ITCSJob 0.04 0.05 [-0.06, 0.13] 0.04 0.76 .448 
    PP_Cert_Count 0.03 0.02 [-0.01, 0.08] 0.07 1.45 .146 
    PP_Likert 0.85 0.12 [0.61, 1.08] 0.31 7.15 < .001 
    Perceived_Self_Efficacy 0.09 0.07 [-0.05, 0.22] 0.06 1.24 .214 
    Locus_of_Control 0.16 0.08 [0.01, 0.31] 0.10 2.11 .036 
Table 37 Regression Results for IoT Protections 
 
 The unstandardized regression equation for Security Intentions (Existing) IoT Protection 
Measures is: 
SINTEX_IoTPro = 0.08*PP_FormalEd + 0.15*PP_InfEd + 0.04*PP_ITCSJob + 
0.03*PP_Cert_Count + 0.85*PP_Likert + 0.09*Perceived_Self_Efficacy + 





5.2.4 Security Intentions (Future) Security Changes 
 
 Security Intentions (Future) Security Changes, the dependent variable, is comprised of a 
count of the number of changes the respondents plan to make to their existing security 
configuration, labeled SINTFUT_Changes in the dataset. In Step 1 of the regression, 
PP_FormalEd, PPInfEd_Count, PP_ITCSJob, PP_Cert_Count, and PP_Likert were the predictor 
variables entered into the null model. In Step 2, Perceived_Self_Efficacy was added, in Step 3, 
Locus_of_Control was added, while in Step 4, SINTEX_SecSoftware, SINTEX_NetworkPro, 
and SINTEX_IoTPro were added. 
 The Q-Q scatterplot in Figure 28 shows a mostly straight line through all four steps of the 
regression, indicating normality. 
 
Figure 26 Q-Q Scatterplot for Security Intentions (Future) Changes 
The residuals scatterplot in Figure 29 shows data with a mean of zero and no curvature, 




Figure 27 Residuals Scatterplot for Future Changes 
The Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs), shown in the chart below, are all below 5 for 
Steps 1-4 of the regression. 
Variable VIF Variable VIF Variable VIF 
Step 1   Step 3   Step 4   
    PP_FormalEd 2.21     PP_FormalEd 2.24     PP_FormalEd 2.29 
    PP_InfEd 1.47     PP_InfEd 1.52     PP_InfEd 1.66 
    PP_ITCSJob 1.72     PP_ITCSJob 1.72     PP_ITCSJob 1.73 
    PP_Cert_Count 1.75     PP_Cert_Count 1.78     PP_Cert_Count 1.83 
    PP_Likert 1.14     PP_Likert 1.24     PP_Likert 1.48 
Step 2       Perceived_Self_Efficacy 1.72     Perceived_Self_Efficacy 1.76 
    PP_FormalEd 2.22     Locus_of_Control 1.45     Locus_of_Control 1.46 
    PP_InfEd 1.51       SINTEX_SecSoftware 1.79 
    PP_ITCSJob 1.72       SINTEX_NetworkPro 2.5 
    PP_Cert_Count 1.78       SINTEX_IoTPro 1.45 
    PP_Likert 1.23     
    Perceived_Self_Efficacy 1.3     
Table 38 Variance Inflation Factors for Future Changes 
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Two observations with a Studentized residual greater than 3.13 in absolute value, the 
0.999 quartile of a t distribution with 227 degrees of freedom, had significant influence on the 
results of the model. 
 
Figure 28 Outliers in Future Changes 
The F-test for Step 1 was significant, F (5,222) = 6.08, p < .001, ΔR2 = 0.12. This model 
indicates PP_FormalEd, PP_InfEd, PP_ITCSJob, PP_Cert_Count, and PP_Likert explains 
12.05% of the variation in SINTFUT_Changes. The F-test for Step 2 was significant, F (1, 221) 
= 6.82, p = .010, ΔR2 = 0.03. This model indicates that adding Perceived_Self_Efficacy 
explained an additional 2.63% of the variation in SINTFUT_Changes. The F-test for Step 3 was 
significant, F (1, 220) = 8.84, p = .003, ΔR2 = 0.03. This model indicates that adding 
Locus_of_Control explained an additional 3.30% of the variation in SINTFUT_Changes. The F-
test for Step 4 was significant, F (3, 217) = 4.89, p = .003, ΔR2 = 0.05. This model indicates that 
adding SINTEX_SecSoftware, SINTEX_NetworkPro, and SINTEX_IoTPro explained an 
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additional 5.20% of the variation in SINTFUT_Changes. Past performance, perceived self-
efficacy, locus of control, and security intentions (existing) accounted for a total of 23.18% of 
the variance in SINTFUT_Changes. 
Model R2 dfmod dfres F p ΔR2 
Step 1 0.12 5 222 6.08 < .001 0.12 
Step 2 0.15 1 221 6.82 .010 0.03 
Step 3 0.18 1 220 8.84 .003 0.03 
Step 4 0.23 3 217 4.89 .003 0.05 
Table 39 Future Changes Model Summary 
PP_InfEd significantly predicted SINTFUT_Changes, B = -0.09, t(217) = -2.34, p = .020, 
indicating that a one-unit increase of PP_InfEd will decrease the value of SINTFUT_Changes by 
0.09 units. Locus_of_Control significantly predicted SINTFUT_Changes, B = 0.20, t(217) = 
2.79, p = .006. SINTEX_IoTPro significantly predicted SINTFUT_Changes, B = 0.12, t(217) = 
2.92, p = .004. 
The hypothesis for this regression was: 
H4: Locus of control, perceived self-efficacy, past performance, and security intentions (existing) 
predict security intentions (future) security changes. 
H4 was partially supported. Past performance (informal education), locus of control, and security 









Variable B SE CI β t p 
Step 1             
    (Intercept) 3.56 0.35 [2.86, 4.25] 0.00 10.02 < .001 
    PP_FormalEd -0.03 0.06 [-0.15, 0.08] -0.06 -0.59 .553 
    PP_InfEd -0.04 0.04 [-0.11, 0.04] -0.08 -1.01 .311 
    PP_ITCSJob -0.05 0.04 [-0.13, 0.04] -0.09 -1.06 .288 
    PP_Cert_Count 0.03 0.02 [-0.01, 0.08] 0.12 1.39 .166 
    PP_Likert 0.52 0.10 [0.32, 0.72] 0.35 5.13 < .001 
Step 2             
    (Intercept) 3.25 0.37 [2.52, 3.97] 0.00 8.78 < .001 
    PP_FormalEd -0.04 0.06 [-0.16, 0.07] -0.07 -0.74 .459 
    PP_InfEd -0.05 0.04 [-0.13, 0.02] -0.11 -1.44 .152 
    PP_ITCSJob -0.05 0.04 [-0.13, 0.04] -0.09 -1.13 .259 
    PP_Cert_Count 0.03 0.02 [-0.02, 0.07] 0.09 1.07 .286 
    PP_Likert 0.45 0.10 [0.25, 0.66] 0.30 4.33 < .001 
    Perceived_Self_Efficacy 0.14 0.05 [0.03, 0.25] 0.18 2.61 .010 
Step 3             
    (Intercept) 2.51 0.44 [1.65, 3.38] 0.00 5.72 < .001 
    PP_FormalEd -0.03 0.06 [-0.14, 0.08] -0.05 -0.51 .609 
    PP_InfEd -0.05 0.04 [-0.12, 0.02] -0.10 -1.36 .175 
    PP_ITCSJob -0.05 0.04 [-0.13, 0.03] -0.10 -1.19 .234 
    PP_Cert_Count 0.02 0.02 [-0.02, 0.07] 0.08 0.99 .325 
    PP_Likert 0.42 0.10 [0.22, 0.62] 0.28 4.10 < .001 
    Perceived_Self_Efficacy 0.05 0.06 [-0.07, 0.17] 0.07 0.83 .405 
    Locus_of_Control 0.22 0.07 [0.07, 0.36] 0.22 2.97 .003 
Step 4             
    (Intercept) 3.04 0.46 [2.14, 3.94] 0.00 6.66 < .001 
    PP_FormalEd -0.05 0.06 [-0.17, 0.06] -0.09 -0.97 .332 
    PP_InfEd -0.09 0.04 [-0.16, -0.01] -0.18 -2.34 .020 
    PP_ITCSJob -0.05 0.04 [-0.13, 0.03] -0.10 -1.30 .195 
    PP_Cert_Count 0.02 0.02 [-0.03, 0.07] 0.07 0.89 .374 
    PP_Likert 0.26 0.11 [0.05, 0.48] 0.17 2.40 .017 
    Perceived_Self_Efficacy 0.02 0.06 [-0.10, 0.14] 0.03 0.34 .736 
    Locus_of_Control 0.20 0.07 [0.06, 0.34] 0.20 2.79 .006 
    SINTEX_SecSoftware 0.02 0.06 [-0.09, 0.13] 0.03 0.34 .734 
    SINTEX_NetworkPro 0.05 0.04 [-0.02, 0.12] 0.13 1.35 .179 
    SINTEX_IoTPro 0.12 0.04 [0.04, 0.21] 0.21 2.92 .004 
Table 40 Regression Results for Future Changes 
5.2.5 Security Intentions (Future) IoT Device Protection Measures 
 
 Security Intentions (Future) IoT Device Protection Measures, the dependent variable, is 
comprised of a count of the number of changes the respondents plan to make to their IoT device 
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configurations, labeled SINTFUT_IoTChanges in the dataset. In Step 1 of the regression, 
PP_FormalEd, PPInfEd, PP_ITCSJob, PP_Cert_Count, and PP_Likert were the predictor 
variables entered into the null model. In Step 2, Perceived_Self_Efficacy was added, in Step 3, 
Locus_of_Control was added, while in Step 4, SINTEX_SecSoftware, SINTEX_NetworkPro, 
and SINTEX_IoTPro were added. 
 The Q-Q scatterplot shows a mostly straight line through all four steps of the regression, 
indicating normality. 
 
Figure 29 Q-Q Scatterplot for Security Intentions (Future) IoT Changes 
The residuals scatterplot in Figure 32 below shows data with a mean of zero and no 




Figure 30 Residuals Scatterplot for Future IoT Changes 
The Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs), shown in the chart below, are all below 5 for 
Steps 1-4 of the regression. 
Variable VIF Variable VIF Variable VIF 
Step 1   Step 3   Step 4   
    PP_FormalEd 2.49     PP_FormalEd 2.51     PP_FormalEd 2.57 
    PP_InfEd 1.53     PP_InfEd 1.58     PP_InfEd 1.66 
    PP_ITCSJob 1.77     PP_ITCSJob 1.79     PP_ITCSJob 1.8 
    PP_Cert_Count 1.94     PP_Cert_Count 1.96     PP_Cert_Count 2 
    PP_Likert 1.2     PP_Likert 1.42     PP_Likert 1.6 
Step 2       Perceived_Self_Efficacy 2.09     Perceived_Self_Efficacy 2.11 
    PP_FormalEd 2.49     Locus_of_Control 1.65     Locus_of_Control 1.67 
    PP_InfEd 1.58       SINTEX_SecSoftware 1.87 
    PP_ITCSJob 1.79       SINTEX_NetworkPro 2.49 
    PP_Cert_Count 1.95       SINTEX_IoTPro 1.61 
    PP_Likert 1.41     
    Perceived_Self_Efficacy 1.49     
Table 41 Variance Inflation Factors for Future IoT Changes 
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No observations with a Studentized residual greater than 3.11 in absolute value, the 0.999 
quartile of a t distribution with 524 degrees of freedom, had significant influence on the results 
of the model. 
 
Figure 31 Outliers in Future IoT Changes 
The F-test for Step 1 was significant, F (5, 519) = 9.30, p < .001, ΔR2 = 0.08. This model 
indicates that adding PP_FormalEd, PP_InfEd, PP_ITCSJob, PP_Cert_Count, and PP_Likert 
explained 8.22% of the variation in SINTFUT_IoTChanges. The F-test for Step 2 was not 
significant, F (1, 518) = 0.00, p = .953, ΔR2 = 0.00. This model indicates that adding 
Perceived_Self_Efficacy did not account for a significant amount of additional variation in 
SINTFUT_IoTChanges. The F-test for Step 3 was significant, F (1, 517) = 14.17, p < .001, ΔR2 
= 0.02. This model indicates that adding Locus_of_Control explained an additional 2.45% of the 
variation in SINTFUT_IoTChanges. The F-test for Step 4 was significant, F (3, 514) = 10.96, p 
< .001, ΔR2 = 0.05. This model indicates that adding SINTEX_SecSoftware, 
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SINTEX_NetworkPro, and SINTEX_IoTPro explained an additional 5.37% of the variation in 
SINTFUT_IoTChanges. Past performance, locus of control, and security intentions (existing) 
account for 16.04% of the variance in SINTFUT_IoTChanges. 
Model R2 dfmod dfres F p ΔR2 
Step 1 0.08 5 519 9.30 < .001 0.08 
Step 2 0.08 1 518 0.00 .953 0.00 
Step 3 0.11 1 517 14.17 < .001 0.02 
Step 4 0.16 3 514 10.96 < .001 0.05 
Table 42 Security Intentions (Future) IoT Changes Model Summary 
PP_InfEd significantly predicted SINTFUT_IoTChanges, B = 0.22, t(514) = 3.15, p = 
.002. Perceived_Self_Efficacy significantly predicted SINTFUT_IoTChanges, B = -0.28, t(514) 
= -2.45, p = .014. This indicates that on average, a one-unit increase of Perceived_Self_Efficacy 
will decrease the value of SINTFUT_IoTChanges by 0.28 units. Locus_of_Control significantly 
predicted SINTFUT_IoTChanges, B = 0.41, t(514) = 3.28, p = .001. This indicates that on 
average, a one-unit increase of Locus_of_Control will increase the value of 
SINTFUT_IoTChanges by 0.41 units. SINTEX_IoTPro significantly predicted 
SINTFUT_IoTChanges, B = 0.37, t(514) = 4.91, p < .001.  
The hypothesis for this regression was: 
H5: Locus of control, perceived self-efficacy, past performance, and security intentions (existing) 
predict security intentions (future) IoT changes. 
H5 was partially supported. Past performance (informal education), perceived self-efficacy, locus 






Variable B SE CI β t p 
Step 1             
    (Intercept) -0.03 0.63 [-1.27, 1.21] 0.00 -0.05 .963 
    PP_FormalEd -0.02 0.11 [-0.22, 0.19] -0.01 -0.17 .868 
    PP_InfEd 0.29 0.07 [0.15, 0.43] 0.22 4.15 < .001 
    PP_ITCSJob 0.09 0.08 [-0.07, 0.25] 0.06 1.11 .266 
    PP_Cert_Count -0.05 0.04 [-0.12, 0.03] -0.07 -1.24 .214 
    PP_Likert 0.51 0.19 [0.15, 0.87] 0.13 2.75 .006 
Step 2             
    (Intercept) -0.04 0.65 [-1.31, 1.23] 0.00 -0.06 .955 
    PP_FormalEd -0.02 0.11 [-0.23, 0.19] -0.01 -0.17 .868 
    PP_InfEd 0.29 0.07 [0.15, 0.43] 0.22 4.08 < .001 
    PP_ITCSJob 0.09 0.08 [-0.07, 0.25] 0.06 1.10 .271 
    PP_Cert_Count -0.05 0.04 [-0.12, 0.03] -0.07 -1.24 .214 
    PP_Likert 0.51 0.20 [0.11, 0.90] 0.13 2.51 .012 
    Perceived_Self_Efficacy 0.01 0.10 [-0.19, 0.20] 0.00 0.06 .953 
Step 3             
    (Intercept) -1.44 0.74 [-2.89, 0.01] 0.00 -1.94 .052 
    PP_FormalEd 0.01 0.10 [-0.19, 0.22] 0.01 0.14 .889 
    PP_InfEd 0.29 0.07 [0.16, 0.43] 0.22 4.20 < .001 
    PP_ITCSJob 0.09 0.08 [-0.06, 0.25] 0.07 1.17 .241 
    PP_Cert_Count -0.06 0.04 [-0.13, 0.02] -0.08 -1.46 .145 
    PP_Likert 0.43 0.20 [0.04, 0.82] 0.11 2.17 .031 
    Perceived_Self_Efficacy -0.23 0.12 [-0.46, -0.00] -0.12 -1.97 .050 
    Locus_of_Control 0.48 0.13 [0.23, 0.73] 0.20 3.76 < .001 
Step 4             
    (Intercept) -0.16 0.76 [-1.64, 1.33] 0.00 -0.21 .834 
    PP_FormalEd -0.04 0.10 [-0.24, 0.17] -0.02 -0.35 .726 
    PP_InfEd 0.22 0.07 [0.08, 0.36] 0.16 3.15 .002 
    PP_ITCSJob 0.08 0.08 [-0.08, 0.23] 0.05 0.99 .321 
    PP_Cert_Count -0.07 0.04 [-0.14, 0.00] -0.11 -1.86 .063 
    PP_Likert 0.06 0.21 [-0.35, 0.46] 0.01 0.28 .781 
    Perceived_Self_Efficacy -0.28 0.12 [-0.51, -0.06] -0.14 -2.45 .014 
    Locus_of_Control 0.41 0.12 [0.16, 0.65] 0.17 3.28 .001 
    SINTEX_SecSoftware 0.15 0.11 [-0.06, 0.36] 0.08 1.39 .165 
    SINTEX_NetworkPro 0.01 0.06 [-0.11, 0.13] 0.01 0.17 .865 
    SINTEX_IoTPro 0.37 0.08 [0.22, 0.52] 0.25 4.91 < .001 
Table 43 Regression Results for Future IoT Changes 
The unstandardized regression equation for SINTFUT_IoTChanges is: 
SINTFUT_IoTChanges = -0.04*PP_FormalEd + 0.22*PP_InfEd + 0.08*PP_ITCSJob – 
0.07*PP_Cert_Count + 0.06*PP_Likert – 0.28*Perceived_Self_Efficacy + 




5.3 Demographic Mean Comparison 
 Several publications have indicated that there are differences in information security 
behavior based on demographic variables, as discussed in the Literature Review. I collected the 
respondents’ demographic characteristics to determine whether there are differences based on 
gender, race, age, education level, and/or household income. I also included IoT ownership to 
determine if there are significant differences between respondents, based on IoT ownership. 
General education level had no statistically significant effect on any of the measured variables. 
 In this section, only those variables with statistically significant differences (p < .05) will 
be discussed further. Unfortunately, due to the small size of some groups within the 
demographics variables, there was not a large enough sample size for each group to perform a 
regression analysis of the effect on each variable. For example, there were too few respondents 
over the age of 75 to have sufficient cases for a regression. 
5.3.1 Age  
 Respondent age had a statistically significant effect on Locus of Control, Security 
Intentions (Existing) Security Software, and Security Intentions (Existing) Network Protection 



















Between Groups 13.538 6 2.256 2.173 0.044 
Within Groups 568.897 548 1.038     
Total 582.435 554       
SINTEX_SecSoftware 
Between Groups 32.487 6 5.414 3.238 0.004 
Within Groups 936.442 560 1.672     
Total 968.929 566       
SINTEX_NetworkPro 
Between Groups 119.444 6 19.907 3.142 0.005 
Within Groups 3547.7 560 6.335     
Total 3667.15 566       
Table 44 ANOVA comparing variables by age 
The youngest respondents, 18-24 year olds, had the lowest locus of control scores, 
indicating greater external locus of control, while 25-34 year olds had a 13.50% increase in locus 
of control. 45-54 year old respondents had the highest locus of control scores, 15.29% higher 
than 18-24 year olds. As seen in Figure 92, 45-54 year olds have the highest mean in all 
categories, while 18-24 year olds and 75-84 year olds have the lowest in all categories. The prior 
cyber hygiene study that collected data on similar variables treated everyone over 55 as a 
monolith (Cain, Edwards, & Still, 2018), but the data collected in this study showed sizeable 
differences between 55-64 year olds, 65-74 year olds, and 75-84 year olds. While there were 
only two respondents in the 75-84 year old category, this study provides insight into the age 







Variable   18-24 25-34 35-44 45-54 55-64 65-74 75-84 Total 





Mean 4.9773 5.6490 5.5974 5.7382 5.5076 5.2206 5.2500 5.5856 
Std. Error 
of Mean 
0.26569 0.08445 0.06699 0.10966 0.12613 0.25714   0.04352 
N 22 151 213 85 66 17 1 555 
Std. 
Deviation 
1.24621 1.03770 0.97774 1.01103 1.02467 1.06023   1.02534 






Mean 0.9545 1.8693 1.6843 2.1163 1.9275 1.8333 0.5000 1.8016 
Std. Error 
of Mean 
0.20255 0.10272 0.09552 0.13172 0.14790 0.21768 0.50000 0.05495 
N 22 153 217 86 69 18 2 567 
Std. 
Deviation 
0.95005 1.27058 1.40704 1.22156 1.22857 0.92355 0.70711 1.30839 






Mean 1.8636 3.4052 2.7097 3.5930 3.2029 2.2222 1.5000 3.0388 
Std. Error 
of Mean 
0.43790 0.20621 0.17508 0.28235 0.29313 0.37535 1.50000 0.10690 
N 22 153 217 86 69 18 2 567 
Std. 
Deviation 
2.05393 2.55064 2.57904 2.61839 2.43492 1.59247 2.12132 2.54540 
Variance 4.219 6.506 6.651 6.856 5.929 2.536 4.500 6.479 
Table 45 Comparison of Means by Age 
5.3.4 Ethnicity 
 
 Ethnicity had a statistically significant effect on every variable, excluding Past 












 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
PP_FormalEd Between Groups 59.580 5 11.916 5.181 .000 
Within Groups 1287.975 560 2.300   
Total 1347.555 565    
PP_InfEd Between Groups 50.065 5 10.013 3.051 .010 
Within Groups 1838.090 560 3.282   
Total 1888.155 565    
PP_Cert_Count Between Groups 402.594 5 80.519 6.053 .000 
Within Groups 7448.763 560 13.301   
Total 7851.357 565    
PP_ITCSJob Between Groups 64.986 5 12.997 4.556 .000 
Within Groups 1597.388 560 2.852   
Total 1662.375 565    
Perceived_Self_Efficacy Between Groups 18.445 5 3.689 2.339 .041 
Within Groups 866.021 549 1.577   
Total 884.466 554    
SINTEX_SecSoftware Between Groups 22.938 5 4.588 2.720 .019 
Within Groups 944.552 560 1.687   
Total 967.490 565    
SINTEX_NetworkPro Between Groups 165.158 5 33.032 5.306 .000 
Within Groups 3486.270 560 6.225   
Total 3651.428 565    
SINTEX_IoTPro Between Groups 36.610 5 7.322 2.614 .024 
Within Groups 1568.563 560 2.801   
Total 1605.173 565    
SINTFUT_Changes Between Groups 10.382 5 2.076 2.435 .036 
Within Groups 202.988 238 .853   
Total 213.371 243    
Table 46 Analysis of Variance by Ethnicity 
 While they had smaller sample sizes, respondents in the American Indian/Alaska Native, 
Asian, Other, and Multi-racial categories had higher means than white respondents or African-
Americans in all categories, except perceived self-efficacy, where African-Americans had a 



















Mean 1.3160 0.9717 3.0000 1.6500 2.2500 2.6429 1.3322 
Std. Error 
of Mean 
0.07472 0.12173   0.44883 0.49137 0.47587 0.06491 
N 405 106 1 20 20 14 566 
Std. 
Deviation 
1.50375 1.25324   2.00722 2.19749 1.78054 1.54436 






Mean 2.4938 1.8774 3.0000 2.4500 2.5000 3.5000 2.4028 
Std. Error 
of Mean 
0.09201 0.17204   0.39387 0.32847 0.35933 0.07684 
N 405 106 1 20 20 14 566 
Std. 
Deviation 
1.85170 1.77121   1.76143 1.46898 1.34450 1.82808 






Mean 1.4247 0.7830 16.0000 2.6000 3.5000 3.0000 1.4841 
Std. Error 
of Mean 
0.17798 0.26028   0.98782 1.34849 1.57243 0.15669 
N 405 106 1 20 20 14 566 
Std. 
Deviation 
3.58177 2.67975   4.41767 6.03062 5.88348 3.72776 






Mean 2.2025 1.9811 5.0000 2.6500 3.6500 2.9286 2.2509 
Std. Error 
of Mean 
0.08432 0.15516   0.39918 0.39918 0.49685 0.07210 
N 405 106 1 20 20 14 566 
Std. 
Deviation 
1.69697 1.59750   1.78517 1.78517 1.85904 1.71530 






Mean 4.4184 4.5175 6.5000 4.4833 4.9167 5.3077 4.4820 
Std. Error 
of Mean 
0.06417 0.12426   0.20974 0.24348 0.30067 0.05363 
N 396 105 1 20 20 13 555 
Std. 
Deviation 
1.27693 1.27327   0.93799 1.08889 1.08407 1.26353 
Variance 1.631 1.621   0.880 1.186 1.175 1.597 
Table 47 Past Performance and Perceived Self-Efficacy by Race 
5.3.5 Annual Household Income 
 











Square F Sig. 
Locus_of_Control Between 
Groups 
23.700 11 2.155 2.082 .020 
Within 
Groups 
556.703 538 1.035 
  
Total 580.403 549    
Table 48 Analysis of Variance by Household Income 
Participants with a household income of $10,000-19,999 have the highest locus of control 
mean, while those with a household income below $10,000 have the lowest. Those with a 
household income of $100-149.999K have the second highest locus of control mean, 1.95% 
below those with a household income of $10,000-19,999. There are no obvious linear trends with 
the means for locus of control. However, there is a significantly lower mean among those with a 
household income from $50-59.999K, 12.35% lower than those in $40-49.999K income bracket 
and 8.77% below those in the $60-69.999K income bracket. 
Locus of Control by HHI 
HHI Mean N Std Dev Median Variance 
<$10K 4.388888888888890 3 0.673575314054564 4.500000000000000 0.454 
$10-19.999K 5.833333333333330 3 0.381881307912987 5.750000000000000 0.146 
$20-29.999K 5.597222222222220 6 1.479880500681150 6.250000000000000 2.190 
$30-$39.999K 5.232142857142860 14 1.186722562168780 5.250000000000000 1.408 
$40-49.999K 5.677083333333330 16 0.989703940018877 5.875000000000000 0.980 
$50-59.999K 4.970000000000000 25 1.229667976867470 5.000000000000000 1.512 
$60-69.999K 5.447916666666670 32 1.162001039487750 5.500000000000000 1.350 
$70-79.999K 5.437500000000000 36 0.928468400877796 5.500000000000000 0.862 
$80-89.999K 5.651315789473690 38 0.910782767147657 5.750000000000000 0.830 
$90-99.999K 5.695652173913040 46 1.017776775731000 6.000000000000000 1.036 
$100-149.999K 5.718632958801500 178 0.943927400126974 6.000000000000000 0.891 
>$150K 5.560240963855420 166 1.090115773437380 5.750000000000000 1.188 
Total 5.577856719952640 563 1.038185573531390 5.750000000000000 1.078 





 Gender had a statistically significant effect on all variables, excluding Security Intentions 
(Future) Changes and Security Intentions (Future) IoT Changes. 
ANOVA 
 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
PP_FormalEd Between Groups 84.103 2 42.051 18.852 .000 
Within Groups 1249.119 560 2.231   
Total 1333.222 562    
PP_InfEd Between Groups 129.679 2 64.839 20.764 .000 
Within Groups 1748.719 560 3.123   
Total 1878.398 562    
PP_Cert_Count Between Groups 424.748 2 212.374 16.024 .000 
Within Groups 7421.990 560 13.254   
Total 7846.739 562    
PP_ITCSJob Between Groups 93.023 2 46.511 16.573 .000 
Within Groups 1571.595 560 2.806   
Total 1664.618 562    
PP_Likert Between Groups 4.375 2 2.187 5.728 .003 
Within Groups 204.693 536 .382   
Total 209.068 538    
Perceived_Self_Efficacy Between Groups 59.924 2 29.962 20.043 .000 
Within Groups 820.697 549 1.495   
Total 880.621 551    
Locus_of_Control Between Groups 8.335 2 4.168 3.996 .019 
Within Groups 571.511 548 1.043   
Total 579.846 550    
SINTEX_SecSoftware Between Groups 83.592 2 41.796 26.696 .000 
Within Groups 876.748 560 1.566   
Total 960.340 562    
SINTEX_NetworkPro Between Groups 237.550 2 118.775 19.528 .000 
Within Groups 3406.155 560 6.082   
Total 3643.705 562    
SINTEX_IoTPro Between Groups 44.933 2 22.466 8.093 .000 
Within Groups 1554.502 560 2.776   
Total 1599.435 562    




Men had a 17.2% higher perception of self-efficacy than women, while nonbinary 
respondents had the highest perceived self-efficacy, with a score .3% higher than men. When 
comparing median scores, men were 20% higher than women and equal to nonbinary 
respondents.  
Self-Efficacy by Gender  
Gender  Mean  N  Std Dev  Median  Variance 
Male  4.861283643892340 322 1.178918904593700 5.000000000000000 1.390  
Female  4.022175732217580 239 1.236692415863140 4.000000000000000 1.529  
Nonbinary 4.875000000000000 4  0.936650850004853 5.000000000000000 0.877  
Total  4.506430678466070 565 1.270162815151090 4.666666666666670 1.613  
Table 51 Perceived Self-Efficacy by Gender 
Nonbinary respondents had the highest locus of control means at 5.75 and second highest 
locus of control medians at 5.875, with men second in locus of control means at 5.69, 1% behind 
nonbinary respondents and highest in locus of control medians at 6. Women were lower with a 
mean of 5.42, 5.7% lower than nonbinary respondents, and a median of 5.5. 
Locus of Control by Gender  
Gender  Mean  N  Std Dev  Median  Variance 
Male  5.689771547248180 321 1.019560473320420 6.000000000000000 1.040 
Female  5.422245467224550 239 1.042946396956710 5.500000000000000 1.088 
Nonbinary 5.750000000000000 4 1.136515141415490 5.875000000000000 1.292 
Total  5.576832151300240 564 1.036906336436100 5.750000000000000 1.075 
Table 52 Locus of Control by Gender 
5.3.7 IoT Ownership 
 
 IoT Ownership had a statistically significant effect on all measured variables, excluding 







 Sum of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
PP_FormalEd Between Groups 12.877 1 12.877 5.440 .020 
Within Groups 1337.455 565 2.367   
Total 1350.332 566    
PP_InfEd Between Groups 68.306 1 68.306 21.128 .000 
Within Groups 1826.583 565 3.233   
Total 1894.889 566    
PP_ITCSJob Between Groups 13.798 1 13.798 4.707 .030 
Within Groups 1656.121 565 2.931   
Total 1669.919 566    
PP_Likert Between Groups 3.062 1 3.062 8.005 .005 
Within Groups 206.555 540 .383   
Total 209.617 541    
Perceived_Self_Efficacy Between Groups 20.855 1 20.855 13.305 .000 
Within Groups 868.375 554 1.567   
Total 889.230 555    
Locus_of_Control Between Groups 17.029 1 17.029 16.655 .000 
Within Groups 565.406 553 1.022   
Total 582.435 554    
SINTEX_SecSoftware Between Groups 9.094 1 9.094 5.353 .021 
Within Groups 959.835 565 1.699   
Total 968.929 566    
SINTEX_NetworkPro Between Groups 105.434 1 105.434 16.725 .000 
Within Groups 3561.713 565 6.304   
Total 3667.146 566    
SINTEX_IoTPro Between Groups 125.071 1 125.071 47.606 .000 
Within Groups 1484.382 565 2.627   
Total 1609.453 566    
SINTFUT_IoTChanges Between Groups 81.910 1 81.910 14.013 .000 
Within Groups 3296.813 564 5.845   
Total 3378.723 565    






5.4 Survey Effects 
 
 Security Intentions (Existing) IoT Protection Measures were assessed early in the survey, 
while the assessment of Security Intentions (Future) IoT Changes was penultimate. Both 
questions had almost identical responses, with IoT Changes having an additional option to select 
“Find other alternatives for devices that don’t need to connect to the Internet”. 
 
Figure 32 Difference in IoT Protection Measures 
 
As seen in Figure 34, there is a decrease in the number of respondents with 4 or fewer 
IoT device protection measures compared to their answers to question 35, while the number of 













Figure 33 Comparison of the Number of IoT Protective Measures 
 
 To correctly compare the means of SINTEX_IoTPro and SINTFUT_IoTChanges, the 
count of using non-connected devices was removed to ensure that the available responses were 
the same. Then, a paired samples t-test was run to determine if the difference in means was 
statistically significant. 
Paired Samples Statistics 
 Mean N Std. Deviation Std. Error Mean 
Pair 1 SINTEX_IoTPro 1.9330 567 1.68628 .07082 
Q51_PostHoc 2.6226 567 2.40407 .10096 
 
Paired Samples Test 
 
Paired Differences 







Interval of the 
Difference 
Lower Upper 
Pair 1 SINTEX_IoTPro 
- Q51_PostHoc 
-.68959 2.67542 .11236 -.91028 -.46891 -6.138 566 .000 
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 The means of the same IoT protection measures increased by 35.68% over the course of 
the survey. However, because the question was focused on changes that the respondent intended 
to make, there is a chance that some users included all security measures they intend to use in the 
future, while other respondents only checked the boxes for additional security measures beyond 
what they reported using in Question 35. 
5.5 Self-Reported Secure User Analysis 
Question 50 asked why users were not going to make any changes to their network, to 
which 122 respondents answered that their network was already secure enough. To determine the 
accuracy of that statement, I compared means for all variables, excluding SINTFUT_Changes, 
based on whether the respondent selected that checkbox. SINTFUT_Changes was excluded 
because users who answered no to making changes in question 48 did not receive question 49, on 
which SINTFUT_Changes was based. PP_Likert was the smallest mean difference at 0.31, while 
SINTEX_NetworkPro was highest at 1.68. SINTFUT_IoTChanges was lower for the secure 




Figure 35 Comparison of Means of Self-Reported Secure Users and All Others 
 The results showed that the respondents who felt their network was secure enough 
(Q50_1 = 1) had statistically significant, far higher means in each of the independent variable 
categories, except for SINTFUT_IoTChanges, where the group who felt their network was 
secure enough had a lower mean. However, the question requested changes only, so those who 
don’t feel a need to make changes due to their existing security configuration should have a 
lower mean. 
 Performing linear regressions for the post hoc more secure group, compared to the less 
secure group, resulted in an increased predictive power for the secure group for 
SINTEX_SecSoftware, SINTEX_NetworkPro, and SINTEX_IoTPro, but a lower predictive 
power for SINTFUT_IoTChanges. SINTFUT_Changes cannot be compared because those who 
























Mean 1.1345 2.2511 1.0022 2.0336 3.5109 4.2856 5.5229 1.6738 2.6794 1.7713 2.7011
Std. Error 
of Mean
0.0655 0.0852 0.1438 0.0768 0.0303 0.0594 0.0484 0.0597 0.1099 0.0744 0.1162
Std. 
Deviation
1.3836 1.7988 3.0357 1.6218 0.6237 1.2394 1.0117 1.2603 2.3210 1.5713 2.4510
N 446 446 446 446 424 436 437 446 446 446 445
Variance 1.914 3.236 9.216 2.63 0.389 1.536 1.024 1.588 5.387 2.469 6.007
Mean 2.0744 2.9835 3.2727 3.0744 3.8168 5.2139 5.8178 2.2727 4.3636 2.5289 2.1901
Std. Error 
of Mean
0.1689 0.1668 0.4740 0.1652 0.0514 0.0990 0.0963 0.1253 0.2624 0.1772 0.2175
Std. 
Deviation
1.8582 1.8348 5.2138 1.8174 0.5580 1.0843 1.0463 1.3784 2.8868 1.9497 2.3921
N 121 121 121 121 118 120 118 121 121 121 121
Variance 3.453 3.366 27.183 3.303 0.311 1.176 1.095 1.9 8.333 3.801 5.722
Mean 1.3351 2.4074 1.4868 2.2557 3.5775 4.486 5.5856 1.8016 3.0388 1.933 2.5919
Std. Error 
of Mean
0.0649 0.0768 0.1564 0.0721 0.0267 0.0537 0.0435 0.0550 0.1069 0.0708 0.1028
Std. 
Deviation
1.5446 1.8297 3.7250 1.7177 0.6225 1.2658 1.0253 1.3084 2.5454 1.6863 2.4454
N 567 567 567 567 542 556 555 567 567 567 566







 The adjusted R2 for SINTEX_SecSoftware for the insecure group was 0.198, while it was 
0.222 for the secure group. For SINTEX_SecSoftware, the secure group equation was:  
SINTEX_SecSoftware = 0.047*PP_FormalEd + 0.167*PP_InfEd - 0.25*PP_Cert_Count + 
0.157*PP_ITCSJob + 0.416*PP_Likert + 0.006*Perceived_Self_Efficacy + 
0.145*Locus_of_Control – 1.227. 
 
Only PP_InfEd was statistically significant (p=.023). The insecure group equation was: 
 
 SINTEX_SecSoftware = 0.186*PP_FormalEd + 0.098*PP_InfEd + 0.032*PP_Cert_Count – 
0.055*PP_ITCSJob + 0.238*PP_Likert + 0.121*Perceived_Self_Efficacy + 
0.067*Locus_of_Control – 0.412. 
 
PP_FormalEd (p=.002), PP_InfEd (p=.012), and PP_Likert (p=.022) were statistically 
significant. 
 The adjusted R2 for SINTEX_NetworkPro for the insecure group was 0.332, but it was 
0.452 for the secure group. The equations for the two groups were as follows: 
SINTEX_NetworkPro (insecure) = 0.288*PP_FormalEd + 0.21*PP_InfEd + 
0.059*PP_Cert_Count + 0.067*PP_ITCSJob + 0.884*PP_Likert + 
0.272*Perceived_Self_Efficacy -0.004*Locus_of_Control – 2.582. 
 
PP_FormalEd (p=.005), PP_InfEd (p=.002), PP_Likert (p=.000), and Perceived_Self_Efficacy 
(p=.014) were all statistically significant. 
SINTEX_NetworkPro (secure) = 0.177*PP_FormalEd + 0.336*PP_InfEd + 
0.149*PP_Cert_Count + 0.266*PP_ITCSJob + 0.684*PP_Likert – 
0.278*Perceived_Self_Efficacy + 0.412*Locus_of_Control – 1.826. 
 
PP_InfEd (p=.01) and PP_Cert_Count (p=.013) were statistically significant. 
 The adjusted R2 for SINTEX_IoTPro for the insecure group was 0.268, while it was 
0.345 for the secure group. The equations are as follows: 
SINTEX_IoTPro (insecure) = 0.60*PP_FormalEd + 0.132*PP_InfEd + 0.021*PP_Cert_Count + 
0.014*PP_ITCSJob + 0.813*PP_Likert + 0.104*Perceived_Self_Efficacy + 
0.110*Locus_of_Control – 2.587. 
 
PP_InfEd (p=.004), and PP_Likert (p=.000) were statistically significant. 
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SINTEX_IoTPro (secure) = 0.123*PP_FormalEd + 0.205*PP_InfEd + 0.029*PP_Cert_Count + 
0.087*PP_ITCSJob + 0.725*PP_Likert + 0.123*Perceived_Self_Efficacy + 
0.299*Locus_of_Control – 3.9. 
 
PP_InfEd (p=.037) and PP_Likert (p=.031) were statistically significant. 
 The adjusted R2 for SINTFUT_IoTChanges for the insecure group is 0.192 and the secure 
group is 0.047. An ANOVA determined the secure group regression was not statistically 
significant, nor were any of the independent variables for the secure equation statistically 
significant. The equations are as follows: 
SINTFUT_IoTChanges (insecure) = -0.013*PP_FormalEd + 0.221*PP_InfEd – 
0.075*PP_Cert_Count + 0.056*PP_ITCSJob + 0.112*PP_Likert – 
0.159*Perceived_Self_Efficacy + 0.452*Locus_of_Control + 0.189*SINTEX_SecSoftware + 
0.018*SINTEX_NetworkPro + 0.418*SINTEX_IoTPro– 1.091. 
 
PP_InfEd (p=.005), Locus_of_Control (p=.001) and SINTEX_IoTPro (p=.000) are statistically 
significant. 
SINTFUT_IoTChanges (secure) = -0.004*PP_FormalEd + 0.150*PP_InfEd – 
0.046*PP_Cert_Count + 0.237*PP_ITCSJob – 0.311*PP_Likert – 
0.459*Perceived_Self_Efficacy + 0.176*Locus_of_Control + 0.097*SINTEX_SecSoftware + 
0.013*SINTEX_NetworkPro + 0.288*SINTEX_IoTPro + 2.78. 
 
Neither the regression nor any of the variables were statistically significant. 
 This result was consistent with Torten, Raiche, and Boyle’s (2018) extension of Hanus 
and Wu (2016), which found that information security professionals had a higher percentage of 
variance explained on the same questions.  
5.6 Partial Least Squares – Path Modeling 
 
 Two PLS-PM analyses were conducted on the data, one to examine the relationship 




The measurement or outer model was assessed by examining multicollinearity in the 
model and checking the weights of each indicator via bootstrapping. Multicollinearity was also 
examined with variance inflation factors (VIF) to assess the validity of the formative indicators. 
A VIF with a value greater than 10 indicates that there is extreme multicollinearity among the 
predictors (Henseler et al., 2009; Cenfetelli & Bassellier, 2009; Menard, 2009). No formative 
indicators exhibited multicollinearity, which suggests that the formative indicators are 




















PP   
    Q38 1.74 
    Q39 1.39 
    Q40 1.27 
    Q41 1.59 
SEFF   
    PP_FormalEd 2.15 
    PP_InfEd 1.79 
    PP_Cert_Count 1.39 
    PP_ITCSJob 1.79 
    PP_Likert 1.27 
LofC   
    Q42 3.08 
    Q43 2.43 
    Q44 1.70 
    Q45_R 1.20 
    Q46 2.89 
    Q47 2.61 
SINT_EX   
    SINTEX_SecSoftware 2.58 
    SINTEX_NetworkPro 2.64 
    SINTEX_IoTPro 1.34 
SINT_FUT   
    Q49_1 1.79 
    Q49_2 3.06 
    Q49_3 3.44 
    Q49_4 3.45 
    Q49_5 4.87 
    Q49_6 3.28 
    Q49_7 1.91 
    Q49_8 1.70 
    Q49_9 2.43 
    Q49_10 1.86 
    Q49_11 2.22 
    Q49_12 2.92 
    Q49_15 2.66 
    Q49_16 4.49 
    Q49_17 3.57 
    Q49_13 2.94 
    SINTFUT_IoTChanges 1.25 
Table 54 Variance Inflation Factors 
Bootstrapping was performed with 500 resamples. The loadings were assessed for the 
reflective indicators, and the weights were examined for the formative indicators. Significance 
was determined using confidence intervals for the given parameter estimates, which were 
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calculated based on an alpha value of 0.05 (Henseler et al., 2009; Sanchez, 2013; Chinn, 2010). 
Since there were no reflective indicators, the bootstrapped loadings were not examined. The 
following formative indicators did not have a significant weight for its latent variable: 
PP_FormalEd, PP_InfEd, PP_Cert_Count, PP_ITCSJob, SEFF, SINTEX_SecSoftware, 
SINTEX_NetworkPro, SINTFUT, and SINTFUT_IoTChanges. Any indicator that does not have 
a significant loading or weight should be examined whether it belongs to the specified latent 

















Construct-Indicator M SE CI 
PP-PP_FormalEd 0.11 0.24 [-0.37, 0.59] 
PP-PP_InfEd 0.22 0.25 [-0.28, 0.71] 
PP-PP_Cert_Count 0.17 0.23 [-0.29, 0.63] 
PP-PP_ITCSJob 0.16 0.17 [-0.19, 0.51] 
PP-PP_Likert 0.60 0.19 [0.22, 0.98] 
SEFF-Q42 -0.14 0.36 [-0.87, 0.59] 
SEFF-Q43 0.35 0.28 [-0.21, 0.92] 
SEFF-Q44 0.17 0.29 [-0.40, 0.74] 
SEFF-Q45_R -0.21 0.23 [-0.68, 0.26] 
SEFF-Q46 0.17 0.37 [-0.56, 0.91] 
SEFF-Q47 0.51 0.33 [-0.14, 1.17] 
LofC-Q38 0.74 0.42 [-0.11, 1.59] 
LofC-Q39 0.15 0.57 [-0.98, 1.29] 
LofC-Q40 -0.14 0.35 [-0.85, 0.56] 
LofC-Q41 -0.06 0.53 [-1.12, 1.00] 
SINT_EX-SINTEX_SecSoftware 0.33 0.38 [-0.42, 1.09] 
SINT_EX-SINTEX_NetworkPro 0.33 0.35 [-0.38, 1.04] 
SINT_EX-SINTEX_IoTPro 0.47 0.21 [0.06, 0.88] 
SINT_FUT-Q49_1 0.03 0.18 [-0.34, 0.39] 
SINT_FUT-Q49_2 0.16 0.33 [-0.51, 0.83] 
SINT_FUT-Q49_3 -0.11 0.32 [-0.76, 0.54] 
SINT_FUT-Q49_4 -0.19 0.30 [-0.79, 0.40] 
SINT_FUT-Q49_5 0.60 0.38 [-0.17, 1.37] 
SINT_FUT-Q49_6 -0.10 0.35 [-0.80, 0.61] 
SINT_FUT-Q49_7 -0.04 0.26 [-0.56, 0.47] 
SINT_FUT-Q49_8 -0.07 0.25 [-0.57, 0.43] 
SINT_FUT-Q49_9 0.11 0.26 [-0.41, 0.63] 
SINT_FUT-Q49_10 -0.28 0.24 [-0.77, 0.21] 
SINT_FUT-Q49_11 0.59 0.22 [0.16, 1.03] 
SINT_FUT-Q49_12 -0.14 0.29 [-0.72, 0.44] 
SINT_FUT-Q49_15 -0.05 0.29 [-0.62, 0.53] 
SINT_FUT-Q49_16 -0.16 0.34 [-0.84, 0.52] 
SINT_FUT-Q49_17 0.08 0.27 [-0.46, 0.63] 
SINT_FUT-Q49_13 0.21 0.27 [-0.32, 0.74] 
SINT_FUT-SINTFUT_IoTChanges 0.24 0.19 [-0.15, 0.63] 
Table 55 Bootstrap Results 
The structural or inner model was assessed by examining the R2-values for each 
endogenous variable and the goodness of fit (GoF) index for the model. Bootstrapping was also 







PP Exogenous -- -- 
SEFF Exogenous -- -- 
LofC Exogenous -- -- 
SINT_EX Endogenous 0.61 -- 
SINT_FUT Endogenous 0.68 -- 
Table 56 Structural Model Summary 
 A visual summary of the structural model with weights is below in Figure 38. 
 
Figure 36 Structural Model 
The hypotheses for this model were: 
H6: Locus of control, perceived self-efficacy, and past performance effect security intentions 
(existing). 
H7: Locus of control, perceived self-efficacy, and past performance effect security intentions 
(future). 




H7 was partially supported and partially rejected. Self-efficacy effected security intentions 
(future). 
To determine if the relationships among the latent variables are appropriate, R2-values 
were calculated for each endogenous variable. Each endogonous variable should have an R2-
value ≥ .20 (Sanchez, 2013). There were no low R2-values, indicating that each relationship is 
appropriate for the model.  
The predictive power of the PLS-PM can be determined by the GoF index. The GoF 
index is calculated by computing the geometric mean of the average R2-values and average 
communality for each latent variable. Values greater than .90 are considered a good model fit, 
while a GoF index less than .90 and greater than .70 is an acceptable model fit (Sanchez, 2013; 
Chinn, 2010). A model with poor predictive power is indicated by a GoF index less than or equal 
to .70. The GoF index, GoF = 0.47, indicates that the model had a poor model fit and poor ability 
to predict. 
Bootstrapping was performed with 500 resamples. The regression coefficients were 
evaluated using confidence intervals to determine the significance of the regression paths using 
an alpha value of 0.05 (Henseler et al., 2009; Sanchez, 2013; Chinn, 2010). The following 
regression paths did not have a significant relationship: SEFF and LofC → SINT_EX, PP and 
LofC→ SINT_FUT. This suggests that the regression might not belong in the model, since the 
independent latent variable did not explain a significant portion of the variance in the dependent 







Path Original B M SE CI 
PP → SINT_EX 0.62 0.60 0.12 [0.36, 0.85] 
SEFF → SINT_EX 0.23 0.24 0.12 [-0.00, 0.48] 
LofC → SINT_EX 0.06 0.07 0.13 [-0.20, 0.33] 
PP → SINT_FUT 0.08 0.16 0.15 [-0.13, 0.46] 
SEFF → SINT_FUT 0.15 0.27 0.13 [0.00, 0.53] 
LofC → SINT_FUT 0.24 0.18 0.21 [-0.25, 0.60] 
SINT_EX → SINT_FUT 0.56 0.38 0.15 [0.09, 0.68] 
Table 57 Bootstrap Results for Inner Model 
A partial least squares path modeling (PLS-PM) analysis was conducted to determine 
whether the latent variables, PP, SEFF, LocusofControl, SINT_EX, SINT_FUT, Gender, 
Ethnicity, and IoT_Ownership, adequately describe the data. The goal of PLS-PM is to 
accurately describe the network of variables and their relationships. 
The PLS-PM model was assessed by evaluating the validity of the measurement model 
and the structural model. After model validation, the regressions of the PLS-PM were analyzed. 
The measurement or outer model was assessed by examining the unidimensionality of indicators, 
the loadings and communalities for each indicator, and the crossloadings. Bootstrapping was also 
implemented to check the significance of each loading in the model.  
For reflective indicators, the latent construct must be positively correlated with one 
another, which is defined as the unidimensionality of indicators. To evaluate the 
unidimensionality of indicators, Cronbach's alpha (α) and Dillon-Goldstein's rho (ρ) were 
calculated. Unidimensionality of indicators can be assumed if the values of each Cronbach's 
alpha and Dillon-Goldstein's rho is high (α ≥ .7 and ρ ≥ .7). All latent variables exhibited 
unidimensionality with its reflective indicators, suggesting the relationships between each latent 






Construct Indicator Type Number of items α ρ 
PP reflective 5 0.77 0.85 
SEFF reflective 6 0.86 0.90 
LocusofControl reflective 4 0.77 0.85 
SINT_EX reflective 3 0.75 0.86 
SINT_FUT reflective 16 0.87 0.89 
Gender reflective 1 1 1 
Ethnicity reflective 1 1 1 
IoT_Ownership reflective 1 1 1 
Table 58 Unidimensionality of Indicators 
The factor loadings and communality were examined for the reflective indicators to 
identify any indicators with weak loadings for the latent variables. The variability in each 
indicator should explain at least 50% of its latent variable construct (|loading| ≥ .707; 
communality ≥ .50) (Henseler et al., 2009; Sanchez, 2013; Chinn, 2010). Otherwise, it is 
identified as a weak loading. The following reflective indicators did not explain a significant 
portion of its latent construct and was a weak loading: PP_InfEd, PP_Likert, Q44, Q45_R, Q40, 
Q41, Q49_1, Q49_2, Q49_3, Q49_4, Q49_5, Q49_6, Q49_7, Q49_8, Q49_9, Q49_10, Q49_11, 
Q49_12, Q49_15, Q49_17, and SINTFUT_IoTChanges. Typically, indicators with weak 
loadings would be removed, but in this case, all were retained due to reduced predictive power 
during analysis with them removed. The weak loadings of Q49 are particularly concerning, as 








Indicator Construct Weight Loading Communality Redundancy 
PP_FormalEd PP 0.28 0.82 0.67 0.00 
PP_InfEd PP 0.28 0.69 0.47 0.00 
PP_Cert_Count PP 0.26 0.73 0.53 0.00 
PP_ITCSJob PP 0.24 0.76 0.57 0.00 
PP_Likert PP 0.34 0.62 0.39 0.00 
Q42 SEFF 0.23 0.84 0.71 0.17 
Q43 SEFF 0.26 0.89 0.79 0.19 
Q44 SEFF 0.16 0.67 0.45 0.11 
Q45_R SEFF 0.08 0.42 0.18 0.04 
Q46 SEFF 0.23 0.88 0.77 0.18 
Q47 SEFF 0.27 0.88 0.77 0.18 
Q38 LocusofControl 0.36 0.84 0.70 0.00 
Q39 LocusofControl 0.38 0.83 0.68 0.00 
Q40 LocusofControl 0.29 0.71 0.50 0.00 
Q41 LocusofControl 0.25 0.70 0.49 0.00 
SINTEX_SecSoftware SINT_EX 0.37 0.82 0.67 0.32 
SINTEX_NetworkPro SINT_EX 0.46 0.88 0.78 0.37 
SINTEX_IoTPro SINT_EX 0.39 0.74 0.55 0.27 
Q49_1 SINT_FUT 0.14 0.48 0.23 0.07 
Q49_2 SINT_FUT 0.10 0.61 0.37 0.12 
Q49_3 SINT_FUT 0.01 0.49 0.24 0.07 
Q49_4 SINT_FUT 0.04 0.50 0.25 0.08 
Q49_5 SINT_FUT 0.06 0.54 0.29 0.09 
Q49_6 SINT_FUT 0.06 0.52 0.27 0.09 
Q49_7 SINT_FUT 0.14 0.58 0.33 0.11 
Q49_8 SINT_FUT 0.10 0.51 0.26 0.08 
Q49_9 SINT_FUT 0.06 0.53 0.28 0.09 
Q49_10 SINT_FUT -0.05 0.15 0.02 0.01 
Q49_11 SINT_FUT 0.28 0.66 0.44 0.14 
Q49_12 SINT_FUT 0.07 0.64 0.41 0.13 
Q49_15 SINT_FUT 0.08 0.56 0.31 0.10 
Q49_16 SINT_FUT 0.18 0.71 0.50 0.16 
Q49_17 SINT_FUT 0.17 0.70 0.50 0.16 
SINTFUT_IoTChanges SINT_FUT 0.19 0.54 0.29 0.09 
Q6 Gender 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Q4_PostHoc Ethnicity 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Q7 IoT_Ownership 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 
Table 59 Outer Model Summary Table 
Reflective indicator crossloadings were tested to assess the validity of the model. A 
crossloading occurs, when an indicator has a higher absolute loading on a different latent 
variable compared to the specified latent variable for that indicator (Henseler et al., 2015; 
Henseler et al., 2009; Sanchez, 2013). Q49_10 exhibited crossloadings and should be taken into 
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consideration for removal from the model, because it is not evident which factors or factor the 
variable is affecting. However, removal of Q49_10 decreased the predictive power of the model. 
Indicator PP SEFF LocusofControl SINT_EX SINT_FUT Gender Ethnicity IoT_Ownership 
PP_FormalEd 0.82 0.35 0.13 0.48 0.24 -0.26 0.12 -0.07 
PP_InfEd 0.69 0.35 0.15 0.51 0.19 -0.26 0.05 -0.13 
PP_Cert_Count 0.73 0.33 0.18 0.39 0.26 -0.21 0.12 0.00 
PP_ITCSJob 0.76 0.31 0.16 0.39 0.21 -0.15 0.12 -0.07 
PP_Likert 0.62 0.38 0.28 0.51 0.39 -0.16 0.11 -0.06 
Q42 0.36 0.84 0.50 0.39 0.36 -0.26 0.26 -0.10 
Q43 0.46 0.89 0.47 0.42 0.38 -0.32 0.22 -0.10 
Q44 0.25 0.67 0.39 0.28 0.26 -0.07 0.19 -0.10 
Q45_R 0.15 0.42 0.24 0.15 0.08 -0.25 0.17 -0.16 
Q46 0.44 0.88 0.44 0.40 0.30 -0.28 0.21 -0.16 
Q47 0.50 0.88 0.47 0.50 0.33 -0.29 0.15 -0.06 
Q38 0.30 0.53 0.84 0.29 0.32 -0.06 0.08 -0.22 
Q39 0.19 0.38 0.83 0.26 0.38 -0.02 0.15 -0.08 
Q40 0.14 0.34 0.71 0.24 0.26 -0.08 0.12 -0.09 
Q41 0.13 0.43 0.70 0.13 0.29 0.00 0.12 -0.06 
SINTEX_SecSoftware 0.47 0.38 0.24 0.82 0.32 -0.30 0.11 -0.07 
SINTEX_NetworkPro 0.63 0.46 0.29 0.88 0.42 -0.30 0.10 -0.13 
SINTEX_IoTPro 0.45 0.34 0.22 0.74 0.41 -0.21 0.05 -0.26 
Q49_1 0.21 0.26 0.27 0.18 0.48 -0.01 0.12 -0.05 
Q49_2 0.14 0.15 0.22 0.15 0.61 0.06 0.16 -0.00 
Q49_3 0.00 -0.05 0.12 0.07 0.49 0.14 0.02 -0.07 
Q49_4 0.03 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.50 0.06 0.08 -0.05 
Q49_5 0.07 0.09 0.14 0.13 0.54 0.08 0.02 -0.09 
Q49_6 0.00 0.04 0.19 0.09 0.52 0.03 0.11 -0.00 
Q49_7 0.16 0.20 0.18 0.29 0.58 -0.12 -0.03 -0.12 
Q49_8 0.14 0.15 0.27 0.19 0.51 0.00 0.05 0.04 
Q49_9 -0.10 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.53 -0.06 0.14 -0.01 
Q49_10 -0.35 -0.02 0.05 -0.05 0.15 0.01 -0.04 -0.02 
Q49_11 0.40 0.45 0.31 0.48 0.66 -0.25 0.19 -0.06 
Q49_12 0.04 0.16 0.20 0.14 0.64 -0.03 0.05 0.07 
Q49_15 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.17 0.56 0.03 0.17 0.02 
Q49_16 0.24 0.27 0.34 0.30 0.71 -0.13 0.09 0.03 
Q49_17 0.29 0.24 0.27 0.34 0.70 -0.05 0.06 -0.06 
SINTFUT_IoTChanges 0.30 0.18 0.26 0.41 0.54 -0.14 0.06 -0.08 
Q6 -0.29 -0.32 -0.05 -0.33 -0.13 1.00 -0.08 -0.08 
Q4_PostHoc 0.14 0.25 0.15 0.11 0.16 -0.08 1.00 -0.05 
Q7 -0.10 -0.13 -0.16 -0.19 -0.06 -0.08 -0.05 1.00 
Table 60 Loadings and Crossloadings of the Outer Model 
Bootstrapping was performed with 1000 resamples. The loadings were assessed for the 
reflective indicators, and the weights were examined for the formative indicators. Significance 
was determined using confidence intervals for the given parameter estimates, which were 
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calculated based on an alpha value of 0.05 (Henseler et al., 2009; Sanchez, 2013; Chinn, 2010). 
Q49_10 did not have a significant loading for its latent variable. Since there were no formative 
indicators, the bootstrapped weights were not examined. Any indicator that does not have a 
significant loading or weight should be examined whether it belongs to the specified latent 




Construct-Indicator M SE CI 
PP-PP_FormalEd 0.82 0.03 [0.77, 0.87] 
PP-PP_InfEd 0.68 0.04 [0.60, 0.77] 
PP-PP_Cert_Count 0.73 0.04 [0.66, 0.81] 
PP-PP_ITCSJob 0.76 0.04 [0.68, 0.83] 
PP-PP_Likert 0.63 0.04 [0.54, 0.71] 
SEFF-Q42 0.84 0.03 [0.79, 0.90] 
SEFF-Q43 0.89 0.02 [0.86, 0.92] 
SEFF-Q44 0.67 0.05 [0.58, 0.76] 
SEFF-Q45_R 0.42 0.08 [0.27, 0.58] 
SEFF-Q46 0.88 0.02 [0.84, 0.91] 
SEFF-Q47 0.88 0.02 [0.85, 0.91] 
LocusofControl-Q38 0.83 0.03 [0.78, 0.89] 
LocusofControl-Q39 0.83 0.04 [0.75, 0.90] 
LocusofControl-Q40 0.70 0.05 [0.60, 0.80] 
LocusofControl-Q41 0.70 0.06 [0.59, 0.81] 
SINT_EX-SINTEX_SecSoftware 0.81 0.03 [0.75, 0.88] 
SINT_EX-SINTEX_NetworkPro 0.88 0.02 [0.84, 0.92] 
SINT_EX-SINTEX_IoTPro 0.75 0.04 [0.68, 0.82] 
SINT_FUT-Q49_1 0.48 0.08 [0.31, 0.64] 
SINT_FUT-Q49_2 0.61 0.07 [0.47, 0.74] 
SINT_FUT-Q49_3 0.48 0.10 [0.27, 0.68] 
SINT_FUT-Q49_4 0.50 0.09 [0.31, 0.68] 
SINT_FUT-Q49_5 0.53 0.09 [0.35, 0.71] 
SINT_FUT-Q49_6 0.51 0.09 [0.34, 0.69] 
SINT_FUT-Q49_7 0.56 0.06 [0.44, 0.69] 
SINT_FUT-Q49_8 0.50 0.08 [0.34, 0.67] 
SINT_FUT-Q49_9 0.52 0.09 [0.34, 0.70] 
SINT_FUT-Q49_10 0.15 0.11 [-0.07, 0.36] 
SINT_FUT-Q49_11 0.65 0.05 [0.55, 0.76] 
SINT_FUT-Q49_12 0.63 0.07 [0.49, 0.77] 
SINT_FUT-Q49_15 0.55 0.07 [0.42, 0.69] 
SINT_FUT-Q49_16 0.70 0.06 [0.59, 0.81] 
SINT_FUT-Q49_17 0.70 0.05 [0.60, 0.80] 
SINT_FUT-SINTFUT_IoTChanges 0.53 0.06 [0.41, 0.66] 
Gender-Q6 1.00 0.00 [1.00, 1.00] 
Ethnicity-Q4_PostHoc 1.00 0.00 [1.00, 1.00] 
IoT_Ownership-Q7 1.00 0.00 [1.00, 1.00] 
Table 61 Bootstrap Results for the Weights for Each Indicator 
The structural or inner model was assessed by examining the R2-values for each 
endogenous variable, the average variance extracted (AVE) for each latent variable with 
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reflective indicators, and the goodness of fit (GoF) index for the model. Bootstrapping was also 
used to determine the reliability of the inner model.  
To determine if the relationships among the latent variables are appropriate, R2-values 
were calculated for each endogenous variable. Each endogonous variable should have an R2-
value ≥ .20 (Sanchez, 2013). There were no low R2-values, indicating that each relationship is 
appropriate for the model.  
To verify that each latent variable has a strong relationship with its reflective indicators, 
the average variance extracted for each construct was calculated. Each latent variable should 
have an AVE ≥ .50, which suggests that 50% or more of the variance for the indicators is 
explained by its latent variable (Henseler et al., 2009; Sanchez, 2013; Chinn, 2010). AVE is only 
assessed for reflective variables. The following latent variables had an AVE < .50: SINT_FUT. 
However, it is one of two dependent variables and was retained.  
Construct Type R
2 AVE 
PP Exogenous -- 0.53 
SEFF Endogenous 0.24 0.61 
LocusofControl Exogenous -- 0.59 
SINT_EX Endogenous 0.48 0.67 
SINT_FUT Endogenous 0.32 0.31 
Gender Exogenous -- 1.00 
Ethnicity Exogenous -- 1.00 
IoT_Ownership Exogenous -- 1.00 
Table 62 Variance of Latent Variables 
The predictive power of the PLS-PM can be determined by the GoF index. The GoF 
index is calculated by computing the geometric mean of the average R2-values and average 
communality for each latent variable. Values greater than .90 are considered a good model fit, 
while a GoF index less than .90 and greater than .70 is an acceptable model fit (Sanchez, 2013; 
Chinn, 2010). The GoF index, GoF = 0.40, indicates that the model had a poor model fit and 
poor ability to predict. 
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Bootstrapping was performed with 1000 resamples. The following regression paths did 
not have a significant relationship: LocusofControl and Ethnicity → SINT_EX, PP, SEFF, 
Gender, Ethnicity, and IoT Ownership → SINT_FUT.  
 
Path Original B M SE CI 
PP → SEFF 0.49 0.49 0.05 [0.40, 0.58] 
PP → SINT_EX 0.50 0.50 0.05 [0.40, 0.61] 
SEFF → SINT_EX 0.14 0.14 0.07 [0.00, 0.28] 
LocusofControl → SINT_EX 0.08 0.08 0.06 [-0.03, 0.19] 
Gender → SINT_EX -0.15 -0.15 0.05 [-0.25, -0.05] 
Ethnicity → SINT_EX -0.03 -0.03 0.05 [-0.13, 0.08] 
IoT_Ownership → SINT_EX -0.12 -0.12 0.04 [-0.21, -0.03] 
PP → SINT_FUT 0.06 0.06 0.09 [-0.11, 0.23] 
SEFF → SINT_FUT 0.04 0.05 0.09 [-0.13, 0.22] 
LocusofControl → SINT_FUT 0.27 0.27 0.07 [0.14, 0.41] 
SINT_EX → SINT_FUT 0.35 0.35 0.07 [0.21, 0.49] 
Gender → SINT_FUT 0.04 0.04 0.06 [-0.08, 0.15] 
Ethnicity → SINT_FUT 0.07 0.08 0.06 [-0.03, 0.19] 
IoT_Ownership → SINT_FUT 0.07 0.07 0.06 [-0.06, 0.19] 















 Figure 39 below shows the significant relationships between variables in this model. 
With the demographic variables included, self-efficacy has a statistically significant relationship 




Figure 37 PLS-PM With Demographic Variables 
 The negative relationship between gender and security intentions (existing) demonstrates 
that female and transgender respondents have lower security intentions than males, as a group. 
IoT owners have higher security intentions. The percentage of variance explained by the model 
decreased for both existing and future security intentions. With the addition of demographics, 
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perceived self-efficacy effect security intentions (existing) and locus of control effects security 
intentions (future). 
5.7 Structural Equation Modeling 
 
 The data was analyzed through structural equation modeling to determine the 
relationships between the latent variables. The squared Mahalanobis distances were calculated 
for the data and plotted against the quantiles of a Chi-square distribution (DeCarlo, 1997; Field, 
2013). In the scatterplot, the solid line represents the theoretical quantiles of a normal 
distribution. Normality can be assumed if the points form a relatively straight line. The 
scatterplot for normality is presented in Figure 105. 
 
Figure 38 Mahalanobis Distance 
Mahalanobis distances were calculated and compared to a χ2 distribution (Newton & 
Rudestam, 2012). An outlier was defined as any Mahalanobis distance that exceeds 45.31, the 
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.999 quantile of a χ2 distribution with 20 degrees of freedom (Kline, 2015). There were 5 
observations detected as outliers. 
Although variables should be correlated with one another to be considered suitable for 
factorization, variables that are too highly correlated can cause problems in SEM. To assess 
multicollinearity, the squared multiple correlations were inspected and the determinant of the 
correlation matrix was calculated. There were no variables that had an R2 > .90. The value of the 
determinant for the correlation matrix was 0.00011, indicating that there was no multicollinearity 
in the data. 
Reliability was tested based on the sample size used to construct the model and evaluated 




Parameter Estimate Unstandardized Standardized p 
SINT_EX ← PP 0.49(0.08) 0.60 < .001 
SINT_EX ← SEFF 0.17(0.09) 0.19 .065 
SEFF ← PP 0.48(0.07) 0.51 < .001 
SINT_EX ← LofC 0.10(0.10) 0.10 .298 
SINTFUT ← PP -0.11(0.07) -0.27 .122 
SINTFUT ← SEFF -0.09(0.07) -0.20 .197 
SINTFUT ← LofC 0.27(0.08) 0.48 .002 
SINTFUT ← SINT_EX 0.39(0.10) 0.77 < .001 
Indirect Effect of PP on SINT_EX by SEFF 0.08(0.04) 0.10 .065 
Total Effect of PP on SINT_EX 0.57(0.07) 0.70 < .001 
Indirect Effect of PP on SINTFUT by SEFF -0.04(0.03) -0.10 .201 
Total Effect of PP on SINTFUT -0.16(0.07) -0.37 .036 
Covariance for PP and LofC 0.26(0.08) 0.26 .002 
Covariance for SEFF and LofC 0.47(0.08) 0.60 < .001 
Error in PP 1.30(0.19) 1.00 < .001 
Error in PP_FormalEd 0.63(0.09) 0.33 < .001 
Error in PP_InfEd 1.95(0.21) 0.62 < .001 
Error in PP_Cert_Count 4.60(0.51) 0.53 < .001 
Error in PP_ITCSJob 1.41(0.16) 0.51 < .001 
Error in PP_Likert 0.27(0.03) 0.81 < .001 
Error in SEFF 0.83(0.12) 0.74 < .001 
Error in Q42 0.65(0.07) 0.36 < .001 
Error in Q43 0.59(0.07) 0.26 < .001 
Error in Q44 1.11(0.11) 0.64 < .001 
Error in Q45_R 2.01(0.19) 0.86 < .001 
Error in Q46 0.58(0.07) 0.28 < .001 
Error in Q47 0.71(0.09) 0.26 < .001 
Error in LofC 0.75(0.11) 1.00 < .001 
Error in Q38 0.42(0.06) 0.36 < .001 
Error in Q39 0.48(0.06) 0.47 < .001 
Error in Q40 1.33(0.14) 0.68 < .001 
Error in Q41 0.72(0.08) 0.61 < .001 
Error in SINT_EX 0.37(0.08) 0.43 < .001 
Error in SINTEX_SecSoftware 0.84(0.10) 0.49 < .001 
Error in SINTEX_NetworkPro 1.20(0.24) 0.25 < .001 
Error in SINTEX_IoTPro 1.47(0.15) 0.67 < .001 
Error in SINTFUT 0.09(0.05) 0.39 .051 
Error in SINTFUT_Changes 0.53(0.07) 0.70 < .001 
Error in SINTFUT_IoTChanges 4.29(0.59) 0.66 < .001 
Table 64 Loadings and Significance for SEM 
 The correlation between locus of control and past performance is the lowest of all 
variable correlations, followed by the correlation between past performance and security 
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intentions (future). The correlation between past performance and security intentions (existing) is 
the highest. 
Variable PP SEFF LofC SINT_EX SINTFUT 
PP 1.00 -- -- -- -- 
SEFF 0.51 1.00 -- -- -- 
LofC 0.26 0.65 1.00 -- -- 
SINT_EX 0.72 0.56 0.37 1.00 -- 
SINTFUT 0.31 0.40 0.57 0.64 1.00 
Table 65 Latent Variable Correlations 
While these analyses have included the Chi-square goodness of fit test, it is sensitive to 
sample size, causing the test to almost always reject the null hypothesis and indicate a poor 
model fit when the sample size is large (Hooper et al., 2008). The results of the Chi-square 
goodness of fit test were significant, χ2(160) = 303.24, p < .001, suggesting that the model did 
not adequately fit the data. 
Conversely, the RMSEA index was less than .08, RMSEA = 0.06, 90% CI = [0.05, 0.07], 
which is indicative of a good model fit (Hooper et al., 2008). The CFI was between .90 and .95, 
CFI = 0.92, suggesting an acceptable fit. The TLI was less than .95, TLI = 0.91, which is 
indicative of a poor model fit. The SRMR was between .05 and .08, SRMR = 0.07, which 
implies that the model fits the data adequately (Hooper et al., 2008).  
 
TLI CFI RMSEA SRMR 
0.91 0.92 0.06 0.07 
Table 66 SEM Model Fit Indices 
The regressions in the model can be assessed by examining the R2 value of each 
endogenous variable. The R2 value identifies how much the endogenous variable is explained by 
the regressions in the model. An R2 value ≤ .20 suggests the endogenous variable is not 
adequately explained by the regression(s) in the model and all regressions for that endogenous 
variable should be considered for removal from the model (Hooper et al., 2008). The following 
endogenous variables had R2 values ≤ .20: PP_Likert and Q45_R. However, removal of the items 
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reduced the predictive power of the model. Additionally, the importance of PP_Likert as a 
predictor was highlighted in hierarchical linear regression. 
 
Endogenous Variable Standard Error R
2 
PP_FormalEd 0.63 0.67 
PP_InfEd 1.95 0.38 
PP_Cert_Count 4.60 0.47 
PP_ITCSJob 1.41 0.49 
PP_Likert 0.27 0.19 
SEFF 0.83 0.26 
Q42 0.65 0.64 
Q43 0.59 0.74 
Q44 1.11 0.36 
Q45_R 2.01 0.14 
Q46 0.58 0.72 
Q47 0.71 0.74 
Q38 0.42 0.64 
Q39 0.48 0.53 
Q40 1.33 0.32 
Q41 0.72 0.39 
SINT_EX 0.37 0.57 
SINTEX_SecSoftware 0.84 0.51 
SINTEX_NetworkPro 1.20 0.75 
SINTEX_IoTPro 1.47 0.33 
SINTFUT 0.09 0.61 
SINTFUT_Changes 0.53 0.30 
SINTFUT_IoTChanges 4.29 0.34 
Table 67 SEM Error and Variance Values 
The regressions were examined based on an alpha value of 0.05, with PP significantly 
predicting SINT_EX and SEFF, LofC significantly predicting SINTFUT, and SINTEX 





Figure 39 Structural Equation Model 
The regressions were examined based on an alpha value of 0.05, with PP significantly 
predicting SINT_EX, LofC significantly predicting SINTFUT, and SINTEX significantly 
predicting SINTFUT. These results are consistent with the partial least squares path model that 
included gender and IoT ownership. 
 The hypotheses for this model were: 
H6: Locus of control, perceived self-efficacy, and past performance effect security intentions 
(existing). 
H7: Locus of control, perceived self-efficacy, and past performance effect security intentions 
(future). 
H6 was partially supported and partially rejected. Like PLS_PM, past performance had an effect 
on security intentions (existing). 
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H7 was partially supported and partially rejected. Locus of control had an effect on security 
intentions (future). 
5.8 Explanation of Findings 
 
 The null hypothesis that past performance, perceived self-efficacy, and locus of control 
had no effect on security intentions was partially supported. Therefore, the alternate hypothesis 
that locus of control, self-efficacy, and past performance have a statistically significant effect on 
existing and future security intentions was partially rejected. Across all of the models, different 
combinations of the variables and/or latent variables had different effects. The only variable 
completely excluded was past performance (IT/CS job), which had not statistically significant 
effect on any other variable. Locus of control only effected security intentions (future), while 
self-efficacy effected security intentions (existing) in some models and security intentions 
(future) in others. 
One of the strengths of hierarchical linear regression is the ability to explore relationships 
amongst the variables directly and in-depth. Whereas in path modeling and structural equation 
modeling, the latent variable constructs are measured against the other latent variable constructs, 
in hierarchical linear regression, the effect of components of the construct are compared with 
components of other constructs. One example of this is the effect of PP_Likert, which has its 
strongest relationships with network protection measures and IoT protection measures at 0.90 
and 0.85, respectively. However, in path modeling analysis, it had a weight of 0.34, which was 
only slightly higher than PP_CertCount at 0.24. PP_CertCount has a slight effect only on 
SINTEX_NetworkPro, but looking solely at the path modeling analysis would not provide that 
information. Additionally, the regression analysis determined there was a negative relationship 
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between self-efficacy and SINTFUT_IoTChanges and no relationship between self-efficacy and 
SINFUT_Changes.  
However, one of the weaknesses of hierarchical linear regression is the complexity of the 
model and that it may be finding relationships that are not strong enough to be included in a 
parsimonious model. While HLR was able to exclude ITCS_Job as an influence, all other 
variables had at least one statistically significant relationship, even if it may have only had a 
small effect. For exploratory studies, this may not be a true weakness, in that it allows 
researchers to take the more detailed information and refine the survey instrument for continued 
research. Another weakness was the inability to analyze demographic variables to due to not 
having sufficient representation in the number of cases for each demographic. There were low-
density categories within the respondents that would have been excluded from analysis in order 
to perform a regression exploring their effects on the main variables. 
While the path modeling and structural equation modeling analyses are more 
parsimonious, due to analyzing the latent variable constructs, they contradict some of the 
findings from the linear regression. For example, in the path modeling analysis, when the five 
latent variables were explored, self-efficacy only effected SINTFUT and past performance only 
effected SINTEX, with locus of control not having a relationship with either variables. However, 
when demographics were added, self-efficacy had a statistically significant effect on SINTEX, 
past performance had a large effect on self-efficacy, and locus of control had a moderate effect 
on SINTFUT. The second model, including demographics, appears to be closer to the 
hierarchical linear regression model. 
Structural equation modeling reported higher R2 values for SINTEX, SINTFUT, and self-
efficacy, as well as similar path coefficients to path modeling, but without including the 
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demographics in the analysis. One difference is that self-efficacy does not load on either of the 
dependent variables and is effected by past performance. While the relationship with past 
performance is not unexpected, it is unexpected that self-efficacy did not influence either 
SINTEX or SINTFUT. 
The R2 values for the dependent variables show promise in the amount of variance 
explained with a small number of variables. However, the inconsistency between the four 
different models, hierarchical linear regression, two partial least squares path modeling models, 
and structural equation model, deserves further investigation. While this study was based on  
three independent variables that are common in most information security theories, they usually 
do not appear together. In this case, it appears that adding additional variables may provide 
greater explanatory power, as opposed to removing variables. Each time, a question or variable 
was removed, the predictive power of the overall model decreased. 
Additionally, standardizing the instrument would be beneficial in improving the 
consistency between the methods of analysis. One cannot directly compare the results of the 
hierarchical linear regression with those of the two partial least squares methods, which had 







Chapter 6 Summary and Conclusion 
 
 Studies of IoT tend to fall into the following groups: technology adoption and usability, 
IoT as an enabler, securing IoT around the user, human-computer interaction, privacy, and 
technical papers concerning specific technologies and protocols.  
 Studies of human factors in cybersecurity focus on users in an organizational context, 
cybersecurity professionals, and home PC users. One exception is Egelman and Peer’s work, 
which is environment neutral and just focuses on users, even acknowledging that there is high 
variance in security-related behaviors based on the environmental context (“e.g. at home vs. at 
the workplace”) (Egelman & Peer, 2015). 
 This study explored a research gap by focusing on home IoT users and cybersecurity in 
the context of the entire home interconnected ecosystem, including security software on a 
computer, network protection measures, and IoT device specific security measures. The study 
also offered a way to quantify cyber security knowledge without requiring skills tests or relying 
on self-reported comfort or time spent with technology. 
6.1 Analysis of Survey Results 
 Previous studies have included past performance as a category of perceived self-efficacy 
or labeled it as knowledge. This study expanded past performance and explored the role of 
formal and informal education, as well as certifications, a job requiring IT/CS, and self-reported 
internet and email security questions. When separated from perceived self-efficacy, past 
performance accounted for 8-40% of the variance in the dependent variables. In the models 




The survey results offered greater insight into home users, updating the information 
collected in a previous study (Cain, Edwards, & Still, 2018). While this study used a theoretical 
background and also evaluated and measured variables and constructs, the Cain, Edwards, and 
Still (2018) study was exploratory. Their focus was on home computing, social media, past cyber 
attacks, expertise and training, and demographic comparisons.  
Unfortunately, their methodology may have degraded the quality of the information that 
they were attempting to analyze. During their three knowledge segments (concepts, threats, and 
behaviors), answers were collected on a Likert scale ranging from disagree to agree, which were 
then converted to binary scores of correct or incorrect. Neutral and disagree were converted to 
either correct or incorrect depending on the answer and agree answers were converted to correct 
or incorrect (Cain, Edwards, & Still, 2018).  
The survey also differed from other studies in that it explored IoT security intentions 
along with traditional computing security intentions. Other studies have focused on IoT adoption, 
home user security behaviors or intentions, and organizational user information security 
compliance or security behaviors. In this study, the goal was to evaluate past performance, locus 
of control, perceived self-efficacy, and security intentions, but also to explore home IoT users, 
their devices, and their security posture. There are twenty-four (4.23%) respondents with no 
reported security software, network protection measures, or IoT device protections. 
Some respondents who do not own IoT devices, but even among those who considered 
them and did not install them (17.71%) and those who did not consider them (25.64%), security 
was not a heavily selected reason for not installing IoT devices. Based on this survey, it is not 
clear how well home users understand the threat posed by IoT devices. The study was not 
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designed to measure the threat appraisal or coping appraisal, but should be incorporated into 
future studies of home IoT users. 
 Analysis of demographics on the survey determined that there are some significant 
differences in the means of some dependent and independent variables, based on age, gender, 
race, and household income. General education level had no significant effect on any of the 
dependent or independent variables, thus lending credence to Bandura’s assertion that perceived 
self-efficacy is domain-specific (Bandura, Guide for Constructing Self-Efficacy Scales, 2006).  
 Differing variable scales made it difficult to create a parsimonious model. The advantage 
to keeping the elements of each latent variable separate is discerning the effects of each 
component of past performance on each component of security intentions, rather than treating 
them like monoliths. Adding all existing security intention scores together into a single variable 
would have obfuscated the effect of perceived self-efficacy on security intentions. Due to the 
security intentions (future) changes question only being presented to those who answered yes to 
making changes in the future, combining the future security intentions into a single variable 
would reduce the number of cases to 267, eliminating over half of the respondents. 
 Internet and email security questions (PP_Likert) was the strongest predictor of four of 
the five dependent variables, despite its low communality. Security Intentions (Future) IoT 
Device Protection Changes was the only variable where there were stronger predictors in some 
iterations of the model. Locus of Control and Security Intentions (Existing) IoT Protection 
Measures were both higher than Internet and Email Security, with the addition of existing 
security intentions in the fourth model not only reducing the strength of the variable, but also 
rendering it statistically insignificant. 
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 Based on communality, PP_Likert should have been removed from the scale. However, 
that issue likely stems from the different scales that the counts of past performance items are on 
compared to the Likert scale that the internet and email security items are on. When PP_Likert 
was removed, the predictive power of the model was reduced. 
 Both security intentions (future) variables had mixed directional effects. Perceived self-
efficacy had a significant negative effect on security intentions (future) IoT changes and past 
performance formal education had an insignificant negative effect. However, this may be due to 
the already strong respondents not feeling the need to make any changes to their network to 
improve security. A previous analysis of the 122 people who answered that they felt their system 
was already secure enough, showed that they did have higher means in the positive security 
categories and lower means the security intentions (future) responses. Past performance formal 
education, informal education, and having an IT/CS job had small negative effects on security 
intentions (future) IoT device protection measures. The security intentions (future) questions 
were framed as changes to their existing configurations, so for those who had a strong 
configuration, they were less likely to make changes, while those who had few, if any, security 
measures in place were likely to self-report an intention to add security measures. 
 An IT/CS related job had no statistically significant effect on the models for any of the 
five dependent variables. This deserves further exploration to determine whether the respondents 
are working in places that do not require cyber security awareness training, whether that training 
is effective, and whether the respondents perceive that some organizational cybersecurity 
measures can be used on home networks and devices. This study did not ask any follow-up 
questions regarding on the job training for those who work in IT/CS related jobs, so it is 
impossible to draw conclusions from the data available. However, there are a lot of studies 
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concerning user security in an organizational environment and results from those may not have a 
correlation to security in the home environment, as briefly mentioned in the literature review. 
 Formal education had a statistically significant effect on security software and network 
protection measures, but not on IoT protection measures. IT and CS programs teach computers 
and networking, but not IoT security configurations. It is possible that without learning the 
specific task of securing IoT, even those with an IT/CS background, are not comfortable with 
securing it.  
Informal education scores had a statistically significant score on IoT protection measures. 
Perhaps those who are more comfortable seeking their own answers through the Internet or 
friends are more likely to pursue the information needed to secure their IoT devices. There is 
little formal training available in IoT security to home users, thus requiring them to seek their 
own answers through informal means. Seeking answers through informal means shows that the 
user is proactive, which, if measured as a variable, may provide further insight in future studies. 
Certifications only had a statistically significant effect on network protection measures. 
Certifications tend to focus on organizational IT and security, which may not directly correlate to 
home security measures, and especially not to IoT security. While there are certifications in IoT, 
they are new, not focused on security, and designed for professionals, not home users (Wouk, 
2020). Based on certifications and IT/CS jobs having little to no effect on home user security 
intentions, studying how respondents perceive the link between the two environments may 
provide insight into why those relationships are insignificant. 
 “Trying to change unsafe behaviors is difficult because there are no immediate obvious 
negative consequences (Pelgrin, 2014).” For IoT, this statement is even more prescient in that 
189 
 
there is no security feedback mechanism for the user unless an attacker chooses to make their 
presence known.  
 The difference in IoT protection measures between question 35 and question 51 highlight 
a missed opportunity to directly incorporate the fear appeals model into the survey instrument. It 
appears that there was a strong effect just from the questions asked in the survey, causing those 
who were less secure to want to improve their security posture. However, no questions were 
asked to measure the survey effect, such as a Likert item re-measuring anxiety (Q45). In post hoc 
analysis, I removed the additional answer that was available on question 51 to directly compare 
answers to question 35. Additionally, the question could be reworded asking users to include 
their existing IoT protection measures and check any additional protection measures they intend 
to implement as a result of the survey.  
6.2 Implications 
 Based on the models, past performance, perceived self-efficacy, and locus of control 
explain between 16 to 41% of individual variables’ variance amongst the security intentions 
variables. When grouped into latent constructs, the two security intentions constructs saw 32 to 
68% of their variance explained by the models. Due to the  
 This study also highlights the interaction effect of more complex models. While there are 
some that explain 60% or more of variance in security intentions, there are many that explain 
closer to 25-46%, with far more than three latent variables. For example, Herath and Rao (2009) 
studied intention to comply with security policy with an R2 value of 0.47, which had ten latent 
variables, comprised of an undetermined number of items, supporting four constructs. 
From an academic perspective, insight into users’ IoT security intentions as compared to 
their computer and network security intentions allows for future experimentation into 
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manipulating independent variables to determine the effect on the dependent variable. For 
example, determining how to approximate the confidence of past performance in an experiment 
could greatly improve home user security. From a practitioner perspective, the results of those 
experiments can help determine hardware, software, subscription services, and/or configurations 
users would feel comfortable configuring securely. Prior to an initial experimental run, a focus 
group to determine users’ perspectives on security in IoT and what they need would make it 
easier to determine which independent variables to focus on first and how best to manipulate 
them. 
Another actionable insight is the value in adding IoT specific curriculum to existing 
programs, such as K-12 education, college courses, and existing security certifications. Given the 
high loadings, weight, correlations, and path coefficients of past performance, it is a great place 
to start to improve security. However, in recent research, a study examined student interest and 
self-efficacy in secure design for IoT, where taking the course increased student interest in four 
of seven categories, while decreasing student confidence in all categories (Sharevski, Treebridge, 
& Westbrook, 2019). While one usually does not want to reduce confidence, the interest in 
continuing increased. Additionally, in the HLR model, a decrease in self-efficacy corresponded 
to an increase in future IoT changes. Paradoxically, lower confidence in IoT abilities may lead to 
better security. 
In the instrument itself, adding a fear appeals measurement would likely greatly increase 
the percentage of variance explained. There was a noticeable difference between IoT security 
measurements approximately halfway through the survey and a similar question at the end. 
Thinking about security had a noticeable effect, but the phrasing of the question made it difficult 




 The following limitations shape the research, participants must have: opted-in, been over 
18, sighted and hearing, had Internet access, and the initial sampling frame consists primarily of 
individuals with college degrees. This is likely due to the snowball sampling method, where the 
initial population is encouraged to share the information with their social networks. The overall 
participant population may have been more demographically balanced for a random sampling, 
particularly in educational background. 
For the survey results to be generalizable independent of the experiment required 384 
participants to achieve 95% confidence +/- 5% (Custom Insight, 2017), based on an estimated 
total population of 201,726,417 IoT device owners. That number is based on the United States 
population of 325,365,189 on July 4, 2017 (United States Census Bureau, 2017) and the estimate 
that 62% of Americans have at least one IoT device (Interactive Advertising Bureau; Maru 
Matchbox, 2016). For past performance, self-efficacy, locus of control, and security intentions 
(existing), there were 569 respondents. However, security intentions (future) was an optional 
question, which only 227 respondents answered. 
 The survey used an unweighted convenience sample, rather than a weighted population 
sample. While this is not as generalizable as a population sample, it can be completed more 
quickly and at no additional cost. Convenience samples cannot fully replace population samples, 
but exhibit the same trends and statistical significance as population samples at a lower cost 
(Mullinix, Leeper, Druckman, & Freese, 2015). The results of this research are generalizable to a 
higher income and more educated segment of the population, who have more technical education 
than the average American. 
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The study did not test a full theory, such as theory of reasoned action, theory of planned 
behavior, protection motivation theory, or health belief model. By focusing solely on past 
performance, locus of control, and self-efficacy, some of the explanatory power that comes with 
threat and coping variables, fear appeals, and response efficacy were lost. 
6.4 Contributions 
This study explored the relationships between locus of control, self-efficacy, past 
performance and user security intentions in depth.  While various studies have explored these 
factors, they were either in the context of several other variables or excluded one or more of the 
variables. This was intended as a preliminary exploration to determine the interrelationships of 
these variables, what aspects of past performance have the most influence on security intentions, 
and how locus of control, self-efficacy, and past performance may contribute to the confidence 
construct. The main contribution of this study will be the role of past performance in security 
intentions, as well as the past performance factors that most influence user security behaviors. 
Past performance has a single question derived from a prior study, where it was included 
as an aspect of perceived self-efficacy. The remaining questions are expansions upon various 
elements of past performance, such as informal education, formal education, and Internet 
security habits.  
This study provided an initial set of measurements for past performance and security 
intentions, verification of the locus of control instrument, and verification of the perceived self-
efficacy questions. While there is room for improvement, the instrument is adequately reliable 
and valid.  
This instrument divides security intentions into security software, network protection, and 
IoT device protection, providing a modular instrument for testing various aspects of home users’ 
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computing environment. Past performance also diversifies the information collected from the 
user, requesting information concerning certifications, classes taken in high school and college, 
working in IT/CS-related employment, and internet and email security questions. By collecting 
more detailed data from the user concerning their level of experience, the model can account for 
a solid portion of the variance in security behaviors with minimal variables. 
There were significant race and gender discrepancies in the measured variables, which 
deserve further attention to determine the cause.  
6.5 Future Work 
 
The survey questions concerning locus of control and self-efficacy are derived from 
existing literature, modified for the IoT home user audience, but the other items were developed 
for this research. While they were sufficiently valid and reliable, there is room for improvement. 
Standardizing questions and scales will vastly improve the statistical analysis of the data. 
Attempting to eliminate elements with low loadings or communality reduced the predictive 
power of the model. This indicates that additional elements need to be added, rather than 
removed. Testing additional survey questions and variables could improve the predictive power 
of the models, especially those that account for barriers to adopting security measures such as 
response cost. 
Testing user interfaces to improve security feasibility could improve security by having 
IoT devices boot directly into a secure setup menu. In an experiment, a control group would get a 
regular device without the secure menu, while the experimental group would get the special 
menu. A pre-survey would measure the human factors variables, while a post-test survey would 
determine whether the user was more confident in their ability to secure their device. 
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Experiments operationalizing the elements of behavior to determine their effects on 
security intentions could provide greater insight into improving the home security without 
waiting for manufacturers to incorporate security features and interfaces for users into their 
applications. One example would be an experiment where users are divided into two groups, a 
control group who receives an unopened IoT device and a group that receives the IoT device, 
along with complete step by step instructions to install it securely. Neither group would receive a 
prompt directing a secure installation, but would receive a prompt to install it as they would in 
their own home.  Another experiment could measure the effects of being told to install an IoT 
device, one group with directions and one without. 
Additionally, future work could explore the relationship between security intentions and 
security behaviors. A future study could obtain the participant’s home security configuration, 
administer the survey, then check their security configuration 30 days later to determine if the 
participants made the changes to their security configurations after their experience. User’s self-
reported security intentions can be misconfigured, resulting in their reported configuration not 
matching their actual configuration. While a user may have the intention to secure their network, 
it may not happen in practice and future research should determine how intentions and behavior 
interrelate.  
Future work will focus on continuing to evaluate and refine the full NOAH for IoT 
framework, as well as evaluating the role of each component of the framework to develop a 
predictive model to improve home network security for individuals. Having quantitative data 
regarding the effect of confidence may improve the focus placed on the role of the home user in 
securing their devices, as the goal is to improve home user security.   
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Experimentally validating the NOAH for IoT framework will allow for a predictive 
model that can be used by a home user to determine their current security posture, as well as to 
provide recommendations for how to improve it. Participants could complete the questions from 
the survey instruments concerning their home network and then receive an estimated security 
posture and recommendations for improving it. The survey, coupled with network scanning 
tools, could provide home users with actionable information similar to that organizations receive 
from their IT security personnel.  
 Additionally, after validating the NOAH for IoT framework, future work will focus on 
validating the larger, organizationally focused NOAH framework. A similar system would be 
created, allowing employees to complete surveys that would then be aggregated to determine the 
organization’s security posture. While organizations have various tools to test the technical 
configuration of the network, they do not have complete oversight into the behavior of users on 
the network. Incorporating anonymous feedback concerning user behavior will allow an 
organization to determine when more education or enforcement may be needed. 
6.6 Conclusion 
 According to the survey, 15.11% of respondents had no obvious security training, such as 
formal or informal education, certifications, or on the job training. That is a sizeable portion of 
the population with no obvious method to defend themselves, which puts them, and the rest of us 
at risk. By virtue of being connected, we are invested in each other’s success with security.   
 Despite research into human factors of security compliance dating back to 1995 
(Compeau & Higgins, 1995), there is still a sizeable percentage of user behavior that cannot be 
explained by predictive models. As IoT devices continue to be installed, the cyber attack surface 
is growing and vulnerability is increasing. While this survey provided information regarding IoT 
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home users, it has highlighted the need for more in-depth study into how to educate and motivate 
users to protect their devices and network from malicious actors. 
 The technical IoT research that is being conducted will move home users forward once it 
is commercially available, but in the interim, focusing on educating and empowering the user can 





Appendix A – Survey Instrument 
Dissertation Survey  
 
 
Start of Block: Introduction 
 
Q1  
 Syracuse University School of Information Studies 
 Hinds Hall, 315-443-6887 
 
 Home User Internet of Things (IoT) Security 
 
My name is Erica Mitchell and I am a PhD Candidate at Syracuse University. Dr. Joon Park of the Syracuse 
University School of Information Studies is the principal investigator for this study and my faculty advisor. We are 
inviting you to participate in a research study. Involvement in the study is voluntary, so you may choose to 
participate or not. This sheet will explain the study to you and please feel free to ask questions about the research if 
you have any. I will be happy to explain anything in detail if you wish. 
 
We are interested in learning more about home user Internet of Things (IoT) security. You will be asked to answer 
survey questions. This will take approximately 15-30 minutes of your time. All information will be kept anonymous. 
This means that your name will not appear anywhere and your specific answers will not be linked to your name in 
any way. 
 
The benefit of this research is that you will be helping us to understand home user IoT security. This information 
should help us to better understand how home users make IoT security decisions and evaluate security measures. By 
taking part in the research you may experience the following benefits: increased security awareness and methods for 
improving security. 
 
The risks to you of participating in this study are an increased awareness of personal digital security concerns. These 
risks will be minimized by providing information that you can use to reduce your vulnerability to Internet attacks. 
 
If you do not want to take part, you have the right to refuse to take part, without penalty. If you decide to take part 
and later no longer wish to continue, you have the right to withdraw from the study at any time, without penalty. 
 
Whenever one works with e-mail or the internet there is always the risk of compromising privacy, confidentiality 
and/or anonymity. Your confidentiality will be maintained to the degree permitted by the technology being used. It 
is important for you to understand that no guarantees can be made regarding the interception of data sent via the 
internet by third parties.  
 
 
 Contact Information: 
If you have any questions, concerns, complaints about the research, contact Dr. Joon S. Park or Erica Mitchell at 
315-443-6887, jspark@syr.edu, or emmitc01@syr.edu. If you have any questions about your rights as a research 
participant, you have questions, concerns, or complaints that you wish to address to someone other than the 
investigator, if you cannot reach the investigator, contact the Syracuse University Institutional Review Board at 315-
443-3013. 
 





 By selecting yes and clicking next I agree to participate in this research study. Please print a copy of this consent 
form for your records. 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
Skip To: End of Survey If Syracuse University School of Information Studies Hinds Hall, 315-443-6887 Home User 
Internet of T... = No 
End of Block: Introduction 
 
Start of Block: Demographics questions 
 
Q2 What is your age range? 
o Under 18  (1)  
o 18 - 24  (2)  
o 25 - 34  (3)  
o 35 - 44  (4)  
o 45 - 54  (5)  
o 55 - 64  (6)  
o 65 - 74  (7)  
o 75 - 84  (8)  
o 85 or older  (9)  
 





Q3 What is your education level? 
o Less than high school  (1)  
o High school graduate  (2)  
o Some college  (3)  
o 2 year degree (Associate's or equivalent)  (4)  
o 4 year degree (Bachelor's or equivalent)  (5)  
o Professional degree (Juris Doctor/Master's/Graduate Certificate or equivalent)  (6)  
o Doctorate  (7)  
 
Q4 What is your ethnicity? 
 White  (1)  
 Black or African American  (2)  
 American Indian or Alaska Native  (3)  
 Asian  (4)  
 Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander  (5)  






Q5 What is your annual household income? 
o Less than $10,000  (1)  
o $10,000 - $19,999  (2)  
o $20,000 - $29,999  (3)  
o $30,000 - $39,999  (4)  
o $40,000 - $49,999  (5)  
o $50,000 - $59,999  (6)  
o $60,000 - $69,999  (7)  
o $70,000 - $79,999  (8)  
o $80,000 - $89,999  (9)  
o $90,000 - $99,999  (10)  
o $100,000 - $149,999  (11)  




Q6 What is your gender? 
o Male  (1)  
o Female  (2)  







Q7 Do you currently have any internet of things (IoT) devices (i.e. Internet-connected DVD/Blu-ray players, 
cameras, security systems, thermostats, outlets, light bulbs, etc.) installed in your home? For the purposes of this 
survey, IoT devices do not include laptops or smartphones. 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
End of Block: Demographics questions 
 
Start of Block: No devices questions 
Display This Question: 
If Do you currently have any internet of things (IoT) devices (i.e. Internet-connected DVD/Blu-ray p... = No 
 
Q8 Have you considered installing IoT devices (ie. thermostats, lightbulbs, outlets, etc.)? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
 
Display This Question: 
If Have you considered installing IoT devices (ie. thermostats, lightbulbs, outlets, etc.)? = No 
 
Q9 Why have you not considered them? 
 Don't know enough about them  (1)  
 Too costly  (2)  
 Too much effort  (3)  
 Too new  (4)  
 Security risk  (5)  
 My current setup works fine  (6)  





Display This Question: 
If Have you considered installing IoT devices (ie. thermostats, lightbulbs, outlets, etc.)? = Yes 
 
Q10 After considering them, why have you not installed them? 
 Haven't had the time  (1)  
 Still deciding  (2)  
 Too costly  (3)  
 Too much effort  (4)  
 Too new  (5)  
 Security risk  (6)  
 My current setup works fine  (7)  
 I found other workarounds  (8)  
 Other  (9) ________________________________________________ 
 
End of Block: No devices questions 
 
Start of Block: Education 
 
Q11 Do you have any formal information technology or computer science (IT/CS) education (technology classes in 
secondary school, certification courses, online classes, college courses, etc.)? 
o Yes  (1)  






Q12 Do you have any informal technology or computer science (IT/CS) education? (hands-on playing with 
technology, Googling how to configure something, programming, being taught in an informal environment, etc.) 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
 
Display This Question: 
If Do you have any formal information technology or computer science (IT/CS) education (technology c... = 
Yes 
 
Q13 What formal education in IT/CS have you completed? 
 Classes (high school and below)  (1)  
 Certification courses (A+, Security+, Network+, Cisco Certified Network Associate, Certified Ethical 
Hacker, etc.)  (2)  
 College courses  (3)  
 Minor in an IT/CS field  (4)  
 Bachelor's degree in an IT/CS field  (5)  
 Master's degree in an IT/CS field  (6)  
 Graduate certificate in an IT/CS field  (7)  
 PhD in an IT/CS field  (8)  
 Other  (9) ________________________________________________ 
 
 
Display This Question: 
If What formal education in IT/CS have you completed? = Classes (high school and below) 
 
 






Display This Question: 
If What formal education in IT/CS have you completed? = Certification courses (A+, Security+, Network+, 
Cisco Certified Network Associate, Certified Ethical Hacker, etc.) 
 
Q15 What certification courses have you completed? 
 Entry-level IT certification (s) (CompTIA A+, Network+, Microsoft Technology Associate, ITIL 
Foundation and Practitioner Level, etc.)  (1)  
 Entry-level security certification (s) (CompTIA Security+, Systems Security Certified Practitioner, etc.)  (2)  
 Intermediate IT certification(s) (Cisco Certified Network Associate, ITIL Intermediate Level, Microsoft 
Certified Solutions Associate, etc.)  (3)  
 Intermediate security certification(s) (Global Information Assurance Certification Security Essentials 
(GSEC), Cisco Certified Network Associate Security, Certified Ethical Hacker, etc.)  (4)  
 Advanced IT certification(s) (Cisco Certified Internetwork Expert, ITIL Expert and Master Levels, 
Microsoft Certified Solutions Expert, etc.)  (5)  
 Advanced security certification(s) (Certified Information Systems Security Professional, CompTIA 
Advanced Security Practitioner, Offensive Security Certified Professional, etc.)  (6)  
 
 
Display This Question: 
If What formal education in IT/CS have you completed? = College courses 
 
 







Q17 Do you currently work in an IT/CS-related field? 
o Yes, IT/CS is the majority (51%+) of my job  (1)  
o Yes, IT/CS is 30-50% of my job  (2)  
o Yes, IT/CS is less than 30% of my job  (3)  
o No, but I have in the last 3 years  (4)  
o No  (5)  
 
 
Display This Question: 
If Do you have any informal technology or computer science (IT/CS) education? (hands-on playing with... = 
Yes 
 
Q18 What informal IT/CS education have you had? 
 Learning from friends/relatives  (1)  
 Looking up solutions to IT/CS problems on the Internet  (2)  
 Reading books on IT/CS-related topics  (3)  
 Hands-on tinkering with computers or other devices  (4)  
 Self-taught/Internet-learned programming  (5)  
 Other  (6) ________________________________________________ 
 
 
Display This Question: 
If What formal education in IT/CS have you completed? = Minor in an IT/CS field 
Or What formal education in IT/CS have you completed? = Bachelor's degree in an IT/CS field 
Or What formal education in IT/CS have you completed? = Master's degree in an IT/CS field 
Or What formal education in IT/CS have you completed? = Graduate certificate in an IT/CS field 
Or What formal education in IT/CS have you completed? = PhD in an IT/CS field 
 
Q19 What year did you earn with your most recent IT/CS-related degree or certificate? 
________________________________________________________________ 
 




Start of Block: Technological Past Performance 
 
Q20 What kinds of devices are connected to the Internet in your home? 
 Computer (laptop, desktop, etc.)  (1)  
 Smartphone  (2)  
 Tablet (ie. iPad, Kindle Fire, etc.)  (3)  
 E-reader (ie. Kindle (not Fire), Nook, etc.)  (4)  
 Smartwatch (ie. Apple Watch, Galaxy Gear)  (5)  
 Fitness tracker (ie. Fitbit, Vivofit)  (6)  
 Video game system (ie. Playstation, X Box, Wii, etc.)  (7)  
 Home automation devices (ie. outlets, thermostats, lightbulbs, etc.)  (8)  
 Smart Appliances (refrigerator, CrockPot, coffeemaker, etc.)  (9)  
 Media device (Smart TV, Chromecast, Fire Stick, Roku player, DVD/Blu-Ray player, etc.)  (10)  
 Security system devices (cameras, sensors, etc.)  (11)  
 Monitoring devices (ie. baby monitors, nanny cameras)  (12)  
 Medical devices (ie. pacemaker, glucose monitor, etc.)  (13)  
 Do-it-yourself (DIY) lightweight computing (ie. Raspberry Pi, Arduino, etc.)  (14)  







Q21 Approximately how many IoT devices do you have connected to your home network total? (Do not include 





Q22 Do you own your router or is it provided by your Internet provider? (A router is the black box that supplies the 
wireless Internet to your house. Personally-owned routers normally have external antennae on them, while those 
supplied by your Internet provider (Verizon, Spectrum, etc.) are usually all-in-one devices that resemble a rectangle 
with no external antennae.) 
 Personally owned  (1)  
 Internet provider-owned  (2)  




Q23 Did you set up your router yourself? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
 
Display This Question: 
If Do you own your router or is it provided by your Internet provider? (A router is the black box th... = Internet 
provider-owned 
 
Q24 Have you logged in to the router provided by your Internet provider? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
 
Display This Question: 




Q25 Who set up your router? 
o Someone else who resides in the home  (1)  
o Commercial third party (ie. Geek Squad)  (2)  
o No one, it worked out of the box  (3)  
o Other  (4) ________________________________________________ 
 
 
Display This Question: 
If Have you logged in to the router provided by your Internet provider? = No 
 
Q26 Do you know how to log in to the Internet provider-owned router? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
End of Block: Technological Past Performance 
 




Q27 What do you do on the Internet? 
 Check email  (1)  
 Online shopping  (2)  
 Play games  (3)  
 Social media (ie. Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Snapchat, etc.)  (4)  
 Chat  (5)  
 Research  (6)  
 Read news  (7)  
 Search (ie. Google, Bing, Yahoo!, etc.)  (8)  
 Comment on news, blog posts, etc.  (9)  
 Online banking  (10)  
 Watch videos (ie. YouTube, Vevo, Netflix, etc.)  (11)  
 Communicate anonymously (ie. Whisper, Jodel, YikYak, etc.)  (12)  
 Communicate secretly (ie. Whisper, Signal, WhatsApp, etc.)  (13)  




Q28 Approximately how many online accounts do you have?  
An online account is any site or service for which you need a validation method.  The validation method could be a 
username and password, a one time password texted to your phone, or a PIN number.  Anything where you identify 
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who you are and prove that you are you to use it (Facebook, banking, apps on your phone, etc) would count as an 
online account. 
o 1-5  (1)  
o 6-10  (2)  
o 11-20  (3)  
o 21-30  (4)  







Approximately how many unique passwords do you have? 
A password can describe a combination of letters and numbers, as well as just numbers, such as a PIN. 
o 1-5  (1)  
o 6-10  (2)  
o 11-15  (3)  
o 16-20  (4)  
o More than 20  (5)  
 
Q30 When using the Internet, do you: 
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 Always (1) 
Most of the 
time (2) 
About half the 
time (3) 









checking to see 
if the website 
begins with 
https instead of 
http or looking 
for a lock icon 
or looking for 




websites) (1)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Use strong 
passwords? (At 
least 2 upper 
case, 2 lower 
case, 2 numbers, 
2 special 
characters, total 
of at least 14 
characters) (2)  
o  o  o  o  o  




o  o  o  o  o  
Use a password 
vault? 
(software/app 
that stores all of 
your passwords 
with one master 
password for 
you to access it) 
(4)  




(Check to see if 
they have been 
compromised) 
(5)  
o  o  o  o  o  
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Log out of 
secure sites 
when finished? 
(A secure site is 
any site that 
requires you to 
log-in) (6)  
o  o  o  o  o  
Close the 
browser when 
finished with a 
secure site. (7)  




Display This Question: 
If What do you do on the Internet? = Check email 
 
Q31 When checking email, do you: 
 Always (1) 
Most of the 
time (2) 
About half the 
time (3) 
Sometimes (4) Never (5) 
Open emails from 
people you don't 
know? (1)  o  o  o  o  o  
Open attachments 
from people you don't 
know? (2)  o  o  o  o  o  
Click on links in 
emails? (3)  o  o  o  o  o  
Use digital 
signatures/encryption? 
(4)  o  o  o  o  o  
Log out when 
finished? (5)  o  o  o  o  o  
Close the browser 







Q32 Are you responsible for securing and maintaining the Internet in your home? (Do you interact with the Internet 
provider and/or fix your Internet when it isn't working properly?) 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
 
Display This Question: 
If Are you responsible for securing and maintaining the Internet in your home? (Do you interact with... = Yes 
 
Q33 Which of the following security software do you use? 
 Antivirus (Example: Bitdefender, Kaspersky, etc)  (1)  
 Malware Protection (Example: Malwarebytes Anti-Malware, AVG, etc.)  (2)  
 Application Whitelisting (Example: Microsoft AppLocker)  (3)  
 Personal Firewall (Example: Comodo Internet Security, Microsoft Windows Defender)  (4)  
 Monitoring Software (Example: GFI LanGuard, Nagios)  (5)  
 Other  (6) ________________________________________________ 
 ⊗None  (7)  
 ⊗I am unsure  (8)  
 
 
Display This Question: 




Q34 Which of the following network protection measures do you use? 
 Connect with Ethernet cable (instead of using wireless)  (1)  
 Don't broadcast SSID (network name on your wireless router)  (2)  
 Limit number of connections (only allow the number of devices that you have on the network at the same 
time)  (3)  
 Limit connections by MAC address (input the hardware address of your devices in the router and only 
allow those devices on your network)  (4)  
 Use  encryption (WEP/WPA/PSK) (must have a code to log into the wireless network from your device)  
(5)  
 Change default administrator username and password on router (personally owned routers come configured 
with the same administrator username and password)  (6)  
 Operate a guest network for visitors to the home and/or lower security devices  (7)  
 Change the WiFi password to a mix of letters, numbers, and characters (the WiFi password is what is used 
to connect wireless devices to the router)  (8)  
 Review router logs for unusual traffic  (9)  
 Change the IP addresses from the default ranges to random numbers (usually routers are configured to use 
192.168.1.1 as the default gateway and assign IP address to devices starting with 192.168.1.100)  (10)  
 Turn off remote router management  (11)  
 Other  (12) ________________________________________________ 






Q35 Which of the following IoT device protection measures do you use? 
 Buy only devices with upgradeable firmware  (1)  
 Place IoT devices on a separate guest network  (2)  
 Replace IoT devices if they are insecure, even if they still work  (3)  
 Check for firmware updates regularly  (4)  
 Update firmware when available  (5)  
 Review router logs  (6)  
 Use encryption (when available)  (7)  
 Check shodan.io to see if any of your devices are vulnerable  (8)  




Q36 How concerned are you with protecting your information on the Internet? 
o Very unconcerned  (8)  
o Unconcerned  (9)  
o Somewhat unconcerned  (10)  
o Neither unconcerned nor concerned  (11)  
o Somewhat concerned  (12)  
o Concerned  (13)  






Q37 Have you ever: 
 been infected with malware?  (1)  
 had your identity stolen?  (2)  
 had one or more of your accounts hacked?  (3)  
 had someone pose as you on social media?  (4)  
 had any other negative consequence of Internet surfing? (Please list below)  (5) 
________________________________________________ 
 
End of Block: Security Past Performance 
 
Start of Block: Locus of Control 
 
Q38 Keeping my home network and devices safe is: 
o Beyond my control  (8)  
o Mostly beyond my control  (9)  
o Somewhat beyond my control  (10)  
o Neither beyond my control nor within in control  (11)  
o Somewhat within in my control  (12)  
o Mostly within my control  (13)  






Q39 I believe that it is within my control to protect myself from information security violations at home: 
o Strongly disagree  (15)  
o Disagree  (16)  
o Somewhat disagree  (17)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (18)  
o Somewhat agree  (19)  
o Agree  (20)  




Q40 The primary responsibility for protecting my home network belongs to: 
o My Internet Service Provider  (1)  
o Mostly my Internet Service Provider  (2)  
o Somewhat my Internet Service Provider  (3)  
o Neither my Internet Service Provider or myself  (4)  
o Somewhat myself  (5)  
o Mostly myself  (6)  






Q41 Taking necessary security measures is entirely under my control: 
o Strongly disagree  (15)  
o Disagree  (16)  
o Somewhat disagree  (17)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (18)  
o Somewhat agree  (19)  
o Agree  (20)  
o Strongly agree  (21)  
 
End of Block: Locus of Control 
 
Start of Block: Self-efficacy 
 
Q42 I feel comfortable taking measures to protect my home network: 
o Strongly disagree  (20)  
o Disagree  (21)  
o Somewhat disagree  (22)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (23)  
o Somewhat agree  (24)  
o Agree  (25)  






Q43 I have the resources and the knowledge to protect my home network: 
o Strongly disagree  (18)  
o Disagree  (19)  
o Somewhat disagree  (20)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (21)  
o Somewhat agree  (22)  
o Agree  (23)  




Q44 Protecting my home network is:  
o Hard  (1)  
o Mostly hard  (2)  
o Somewhat hard  (3)  
o Neither hard nor easy  (4)  
o Somewhat easy  (5)  
o Mostly easy  (11)  






Q45 I feel nervous when I think about online security issues: 
o Strongly disagree  (15)  
o Disagree  (16)  
o Somewhat disagree  (17)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (18)  
o Somewhat agree  (19)  
o Agree  (20)  




Q46 I have the skills to implement preventative measures to stop people from damaging my home network: 
o Strongly disagree  (18)  
o Disagree  (19)  
o Somewhat disagree  (20)  
o Neither agree nor disagree  (21)  
o Somewhat agree  (22)  
o Agree  (23)  






Q47 My skills to stop information security violations on my home network are: 
o Extremely inadequate  (22)  
o Moderately inadequate  (23)  
o Slightly inadequate  (24)  
o Neither adequate nor inadequate  (25)  
o Slightly adequate  (26)  
o Moderately adequate  (27)  
o Extremely adequate  (28)  
 
End of Block: Self-efficacy 
 
Start of Block: Security Intentions 
 
Q48 Will you make any changes to your home network or IoT devices after completing this survey? 
o Yes  (1)  
o No  (2)  
 
 
Display This Question: 




Q49 Thinking of your future actions, indicate the degree to which you agree or disagree with the following 






















I am likely to take 
security measures 
to protect the 
Internet. (1)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
I will upgrade my 
security measures 
to protect myself 
better online. (2)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
I will change my 
passwords more 
often. (3)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
I will use 
passwords that 
are harder to 
guess. (4)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
I will change my 
browser security 
settings to a 
higher level. (5)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
I will learn how 
to be more secure 
online. (6)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
I will keep guests 
and IoT devices 
on a guest 
network. (7)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
I will not use 
default 
passwords. (8)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
I will limit 
connections to my 
router by MAC 
address. (9)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
I will use WEP 
encryption. (10)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
I will use WPA2 
encryption. (11)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
I will limit the 
number of 
connections to my 
router. (12)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
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I will change the 
WiFi password to 




o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
I will change the 




(avoiding .1, .100, 
and .254) (16)  
o  o  o  o  o  o  o  
I will turn off 
remote router 
management. (17)  o  o  o  o  o  o  o  




Display This Question: 
If Will you make any changes to your home network or IoT devices after completing this survey? = No 
 
Q50 Why are you not making any changes? 
 My network is already secure enough.  (1)  
 No one wants to get into my network.  (2)  
 I don't know how.  (3)  
 It's too hard.  (4)  
 It works just fine as it is.  (5)  
 Nothing has happened to me yet.  (6)  
 Someone else manages my home network.  (7)  






Q51 In the future, I plan to make the following IoT device changes: 
 Buy only devices with upgradeable firmware  (1)  
 Place IoT devices on a separate guest network  (2)  
 Replace insecure IoT devices, even if they are still functional  (3)  
 Check for firmware updates regularly  (4)  
 Update firmware when available  (5)  
 Review router logs  (6)  
 Use encryption (when available)  (7)  
 Check shodan.io to see if any of my devices are vulnerable  (8)  
 Find other alternatives for devices that don't need to connect to the Internet  (9)  
 Other  (10) ________________________________________________ 
 
End of Block: Security Intentions 
 
Start of Block: Additional Information 
 







End of Block: Additional Information 
 
End of Survey message: Thank you for completing this survey! Your responses will be recorded and used to study 
home user security. Please visit https://www.us-cert.gov/Home-Network-Security to learn more about how you can 




Appendix B – Research Appeals 
 
B.1 – Facebook Friends Appeal 
 
Hi everyone, as you all know, I am a PhD student at the iSchool in Syracuse University working on my 
PhD. My dissertation research is focused on the Internet of Things (IoT) and I would be forever indebted 
to you if you would click this link and complete a survey for me.  
I am looking for people over the age of 18. Even if you do not own any IoT devices, I would appreciate 
your answers to a few short questions about them. For those that do own IoT devices, I would appreciate 
more information about your use of them. 
The entire survey can be completed online in 15-30 minutes, depending on your answers to questions. I 
would also appreciate if you would share this with your friends list, in order to increase the number of 
participants. I would like as many participants as possible from all backgrounds. 
The survey can be accessed here: (survey link) 
If you have any questions about the research, please feel free to contact me on Facebook or at 
emmitc01@syr.edu. 
B.2 – Facebook Military-Affiliated Groups Appeal 
 
Hi everyone, my name is MAJ (P) Erica Mitchell and I am a fully-funded doctoral student at the iSchool 
in Syracuse University working on my PhD. My dissertation research is focused on the Internet of Things 
(IoT) and I would greatly appreciate it if you would click this link and complete a survey for me.  
I am looking for people over the age of 18. Even if you do not own any IoT devices, I would appreciate 
your answers to a few short questions about them. For those that do own IoT devices, I would appreciate 
more information about your use of them. 
The entire survey can be completed online in 15-30 minutes, depending on your answers to questions. I 
would also appreciate if you would share this with your friends list, in order to increase the number of 
participants. I would like as many participants as possible from all backgrounds. 
The survey can be accessed here: (survey link) 
If you have any questions about the research, please feel free to contact me on Facebook or at 
emmitc01@syr.edu. 
B.3 – LinkedIn Appeal 
 
Hi everyone, my name is Erica Mitchell and I am a doctoral student at the iSchool in Syracuse University 
working on my PhD. My dissertation research is focused on the Internet of Things (IoT) and I would 
greatly appreciate it if you would click this link and complete a survey for me.  
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I am looking for people over the age of 18. Even if you do not own any IoT devices, I would appreciate 
your answers to a few short questions about them. For those that do own IoT devices, I would appreciate 
more information about your use of them. 
The entire survey can be completed online in 15-30 minutes, depending on your answers to questions. I 
would also appreciate if you would share this with your networks, in order to increase the number of 
participants. I would like as many participants as possible from all backgrounds. 
The survey can be accessed here: (survey link) 
If you have any questions about the research, please feel free to contact me on LinkedIn or at 
emmitc01@syr.edu. 
B.4 – 53listserv Appeal 
 
Hi everyone, my name is MAJ (P) Erica Mitchell and I am a fully-funded doctoral student at the iSchool 
in Syracuse University working on my PhD. My dissertation research is focused on the Internet of Things 
(IoT) and I would greatly appreciate it if you would click this link and complete a survey for me.  
I am looking for people over the age of 18. Even if you do not own any IoT devices, I would appreciate 
your answers to a few short questions about them. For those that do own IoT devices, I would appreciate 
more information about your use of them. 
The entire survey can be completed online in 15-30 minutes, depending on your answers to questions. I 
would also appreciate if you would share this with your friends list, in order to increase the number of 
participants. I would like as many participants as possible from all backgrounds. 
The survey can be accessed here: (survey link) 
If you have any questions about the research, please feel free to reply to this email, 
Erica.m.mitchell3.mil@mail.mil, or at emmitc01@syr.edu. 
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